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This document is  one of the results of research work presented to the European Commission 
(Unit  Vlll/8/2)  by  COTA  and  which  was  funded  via  the  budget  line  for the  promotion  of 
decentralized cooperation (BL 7/6430). 
The object of the research was the creation of tools of awareness-enhancing and training  in 
decentralized cooperation for potential agents in the perspective of cooperation programming 
with ACP, ALA and MED countries. Amongst other activities considered were, in chronological 
order: 
1.  A series of fact-finding missions to study cooperation agencies (Europe, Canada, World 
Bank, UNDP, UNFE) along with their and EU projects (individual reports were produced by 
these missions, which are reproduced as annexes to this work in abridged form); 
2.  Analysis  of  existing  decentralized  cooperation  efforts  and  of  the  EU  instruments  for 
decentralized cooperation; 
3.  Drafting a document of methodological guidelines for decentralized cooperation; 
4.  Organisation  of  a  round-table  for  the  validation  of  this  document  by  experts  and 
practitioners  of  decentralized  cooperation  from  inside  and  outside  the  European 
Commission; 
5.  The production of a teaching kit on decentralized cooperation for training in the field; 
6.  The creation of an experimental training programme. 
This document brings together the methodological  reflections and  results of our research  in 
their latest state. The input of the relevant Unit of the European Commission took the form of 
critical  readings  and  constructive dialogues;  this  was  followed  by  in-depth  discussion  at  a 
round-table organised in June 1995 with many potential and expert decentralized agents from 
both North and South and  meetings with officials of the European Commission•s DG  VIII. We 
nevertheless feel that the reader should note the following points before reading further. 
First and  foremost,  this was  a fascinating  theme to  research,  but a much  larger and  more 
complex one than  it at first appeared, as  it comprised a whole series of basic methodological 
principles  (secondary  themes)  such  as  the  participation  of  society  in  the  process  of 
development,  the  relations  between  the  State  and  the  organisations  of the  society that  it 
governs, the identification of key institutions, the enhancement of the capacities of agents in 
development, the structuring and  coordination  of these agents,  the  role  of the  State  in  this 
process, etc. These secondary themes themselves comprised a multitude of other questions. 
The deadline for the production of this document then turned out to be too close for the result to 
meet  our  own  professional  standards.  Given  the  extraordinary  wealth  of  documentation 
collected and the experiences analysed, the document should therefore be considered a sort of 
synthesis, necessarily incomplete and by its very nature reductive. From our own perspective, 
the task that we were set has been only partially fulfilled. 
For the fact is  that this area is  still  relatively unexplored territory in  the context of  European 
cooperation, and it is therefore essential that reflection on decentralized development continues 
to benefit from the experience of the projects of today and the future. In the field, and in the light of  practical  considerations,  the  rema1n1ng  uncertainties  should  be  possible  to  clear  up, 
operational methodologies should be refined, and the pedagogic and training dimension for the 
various agents be developed. This document should not therefore be considered as a guide or 
as a step-by-step instruction book; we have basically sought to provide an avenue of approach 
towards  answers  to  the  questions  that  the  various  agents  are  asking  themselves.  Other 
answers could of course have been provided on the basis of different experiences in the field. 
Moreover, it seems to us essential that this theme should be debated within the Commission. 
'  Implementation of decentralized cooperation implies major changes in  management practice 
and therefore requires a consensual and favourable institutional attitude. We therefore believe 
that if the Commission genuinely wishes to develop its own concept and an innovative way of 
practising cooperation with development, it is important that it makes reflection on this topic its 
own1. 
Finally, since the basis of this study is strategic choices in favour of support for local initiatives, 
for the  participation  of  the  population  in  the  process  of  development,  for agent capacity 
reinforcement and for State consultation with civil society, two further remarks should be made 
concerning the basis of our study.  In  the first place,  it is  not our intention here to  reinvent 
development cooperation. Our study confines itself to exploring avenues that are already well-
known, but which have perhaps not been fully appreciated and whose value has not been fully 
acknowledged. The new developments that it records are those which individuals, organisations 
and institutions in the field have originated and will originate. On the other hand, we are neither 
naive nor blind. We are aware of the fact that strategic choices are no guarantee of success, 
but rather a difficult 'third way', a path full of surprises and perils: the resulting failures are all the 
more disappointing and painful. 
For example, we note that the concept of participatory development was initiated as a subject for 
reflection within the World Bank several years ago as a result of the initiative of a certain number of 
competent and well-motiyated officials. It was then studied in depth in specific working groups. The many 
intermediate versions of the conceptual documents produced were then regularly submitted to the various 
discussion fora within the Bank, up to the Board of Directors, before the ·world Bank Practical Guide to 
Participation' was published. CONTENT OF THE DOCUMENT 
In  Chapter  1  of  this  document,  we  have  attempted  to  define  a  certain  number of  basic 
principles of decentralized cooperation  in  terms both  of the instruments used and  the goals 
envisaged. 
We have then sought to show throughout the document that, ambitious though the principles of 
decentralized cooperation may seem at first sight, they are within the reach  of the  European 
Union's instruments for supporting development. We have  not,  however,  sought to  hide the 
obstacles that may arise. 
It  was  clearly  necessary  to  present  in  synthetic  form  the  basic  EU  texts  concerning 
decentralized cooperation and to review the efforts made in this field in the context of the EU's 
development policy. The constraints on EU performance which would need to be lifted are also 
specified (Chapter 2). 
Through its basic principles,  decentralized cooperation conceals a considerable potential  in 
terms  of  more  effective and  sustainable  development action.  It  could  determine the  EU's 
essential "development policy (Chapter 3). But in  order to  do this,  it would  have to rely on  a 
carefully thought through development strategy, whose mainstays would be as follows: 
•  a central role attributed to the development of capacities (individual and institutional); · 
•  social participation in each stage of the development action, but also,  at differen.t levels of 
consultation and decision-making, in more general political processes; 
•  support for the process of democratisation and administrative decentralization in  Southern 
countries. 
These three strategic principles have recently been specifically recommended ·to  the  EC  by 
OECD  Development Aid.  They should  be  considered  not  only as  a methodology for more 
effective cooperation but as ends in themselves. 
To ensure that the approach to and collaboration with the partners is both more effective and 
more  respectful  of  the  interests  and  prerogatives  of  all  involved,  there  are  two  basic 
prerequisites in the preparation of DC (Chapter 4): 
•  the identification of the institutions on which to rely in various respects during operations; 
•  the structuring of consultations between decentralized agents and the State. 
Specific methodologies and guidelines are proposed for the realisation of these goals. Particular 
attention  is  paid  to  the  potential  roles  of  the  main  types  of  decentralized  agents.  The 
implications for Indicative programming at country level are also described. 
In ACP countries, the individual characteristics of a DC operation will influence the choice of a 
simplified  or normal  decision-making  mechanism  (Chapter  5).  There  are  two  forms  of 
programmes to match these two mechanisms: 
•  support programmes for small, local initiatives (which can thus be compared to micro-project 
programmes); 
•  more  conventional  programmes,  which  may  consist  in  more  ambitious  and  coherent 
operations related for example to a theme, a sector or a geographical zone. In this Chapter we also stress the very general need for an interface capable of supporting the 
downstream operators (by its proximity) and  reassuring the responsible officials upstream (by 
applying the rules of the system). This structure should,  ideally,  be  a permanent one whose 
function would be the support of local initiatives via decentralized antennae/operators. It should 
gain the gratitude and trust of the operators by its  neutrality and  professional qualities.  It  is, 
moreover,  in  our  view  advisable  to  take  significant  support/follow  up  measures  at  both 
beneficiary and  operator levels;  this  should  consist in  the enhancement of their capacities. 
These measures would take different forms according to the level and context in question. 
In terms of internal procedures (Chapter 6), the interface will assume- among other roles- that 
of the management/coordination of one or more programmes. The operators would suggest the 
action to be undertaken. The funding of operations should be performed under the responsibility 
of the interface,  on  the  basis  of an  impressed  account system whose advances would  be 
divided among the contracted operators. The interface would be  responsible to the National 
Authorizing  Officer (or to the  Commission  in  Developing/ALA countries),  consolidating the 
reports and accounts of the operators. The rigorous control required will have to be combined 
with flexibility in the application of procedures. SUMMARY 
I.  DECENTRALIZED COOPERATION: DEFINITION 
AND PRINCIPLES 
•  As  conceived by the  European Commission, the objective of decentralized cooperation  is 
above all that of ensuring 'better' development by taking greater account of the needs and 
priorities expressed by the population; it thus aims to enhance the role and the place of civil 
society in the development process. 
•  It  will  consist,  on  the  one  hand,  of bringing together and  ensuring the collaboration at 
different intervention levels of potential economic and social agents  North and South; on 
the other, of eliciting the active and decisive participation of direct beneficiaries in decision-
making and in the different stages of the actions which concern them. 
•  Decentralized  cooperation  is  not  therefore  a  new  instrument  or  theme  of  action  in 
development cooperation,  but a different and  innovative way of  desiging  and  practising 
cooperation. Insofar as it claims to diverge from the beaten track of international aid and offer 
responses  to  the  evolution  and  initiatives  of  the  societies  of  Southern  countries,  it  will 
inevitably take various forms, adapted to the contexts and requirements of partners; in  other 
words, it will mostly involve 'made to measure' work. It must also be flexible and transparent. 
It implies a structural and  gradual process of change away from the conventional ways of 
implementing development cooperation. 
•  It can thus be said that,  by its participatory approach, decentralized cooperation requires a 
particular attitude and state of mind on the part of the various participants and in particular on 
the  part  of  aid  managers:  a  favourable  and  propitious  environment  in  the  head  of  the 
government  of the  country  concerned  and  in  the  donors  is  required.  Within  the  donor 
organisation, this attitude and state of mind can only be generalised if they are supported by 
an ad hoc institutional culture. 
•  Finally,  DC will rely  less on  regulations,  instructions, or specific procedures and  more on 
basic  principles  favouring  openness,  dialogue,  consultation,  demQcratic  modes  of 
expression and  operation, the participation of the agents,  and,  in  the  long term,  the more 
equitable and sustainable development which constitutes its purpose. 
•  These principles refer to the objectives of DC and its instruments: 
1.  Objectives 
o  Mobilise populations and take greater account of their needs and priorities. 
0  Enhance the role and place of civil society in development processes. 
0  Foster equitable  and  sustainable social  and  economic development  through 
participation. 
2.  Instruments 
0  Decentralized cooperation relies on: 
- a varied and  pluralistic range  of  competent agents  and/or representatives in 
order to promote joint efforts by different sectors of society, in particular by fostering 
exchanges of experiences and  expertise between agents,  and the valorisation of 
local and traditional knowledge. - who  consult  among  themselves  in  order  to  reach  a  consensus  as  to 
national/regional/local development priorities; 
- while  remaining  autonomous  (e.g.  as  regards  initiating  and  performing  tasks): 
subject to rigorous control but free from interference in their management. 
0  Decentralized cooperation fosters coherent intervention by planning priorities through 
consultation and  by the coordination of  means.  To  this  end  it  must find  a balance 
between the need for flexibility/speed (which implies autonomy relative to the State) 
and the need for a coherent overall vision  and for sectoral strategies (which implies 
coordination with the State). 
0  Actions rely on  the experience of the agents (whose right to learn  and to  error is 
acknowledged), and seek sustainability  (a  necessary condition of participation and 
capacity reinforcement) through self-multiplying effects  which will,  in  time,  lead to 
increased impact (gradual diffusion of efforts through space and consolidation in time). 
0  To this  end,  the aid  mechanism should  seek to  enhance  the  capacities  of  the 
organised agents (this is a necessary condition of sustainable participation by these 
agents and of their long-term autonomy), be receptive to initiatives arising from civil 
society and propose a form of administrative and financial management flexible in its 
different dimensions,  so  that  it  can  be  adapted  to  the  level  of  qualification  of  the 
agents involved and their financial limits (e.g. cash flow). 
•  By introducing the concept of decentralized cooperation, the donors (and more especially the 
European Commission) seek to renew the operating modes of development cooperation and 
make cooperation  more effective, coherent,  appropriate,  participatory, and closer to  local 
societies, to the field and to the agents in civil society. 
II.  DECENTRALIZED COOPERATION IN THE 
DEVELOPMENT POLICY OF THE EUROPEAN 
UNION 
•  The various regulations governing European cooperation with Southern countries make the 
application of the concept of decentralized cooperation possible. 
- For the  ACP  countries, decentralized cooperation forms  one of the  provisions of the 
Lome Convention,  which  emphasises the  instrumental  (Articles 290 and  251 a-e)  and 
political (ACP-EC common declaration) aspects of DC. 
- As regards  non-associated countries (Asia, Latin-America), the 1992 regulation regarding 
Financial and Technical Assistance opens the field of aid-beneficiaries and cooperation 
partners to all decentralized agents (Article 3). 
- For the  Mediterranean  countries,  various transversal  programmes  (Med-Urbs,  Med-
Campus, Med-lnvest, Med-Media, Med-Techno) are also accessible to the different kinds 
of decentralized agent both North and South of the Ocean, with a view to the creation of 
partnerships and networks. •  The current record of implementation in decentralized cooperation is limited but promising. 
- In ACP countries, attempts to decentralize cooperation (of varying intensity) can be found 
in the conventional EDF (rural and urban) development programmes, in the Micro-project 
programmes and  in  certain more specific DC  programmes (Benin, Ghana, Madagascar, 
Niger, Senegal). 
- As  regards  non-associated countries  (Asia,  Latin  America),  Financial  and  Technical 
Assistance (FTA)  has generally taken very conventional forms.  Celebrated advances in 
decentralized  cooperation  have  been  observed  in  certain  countries  or  regions 
(Bangladesh, India, Central America, etc.) as a consequence of the creativeness, open-
mindedness and innovative spirit of the Commission's representatives. 
- In the Mediterranean  countries,  the  Med  programmes  have  caused  the  creation  of 
partnerships  and  networks  aiming  to  encourage  collaborations  and  transfers  of 
competence between decentralized partners from both  regions.  These programmes do 
not,  however,  consider the funding  of development actions vis-a-vis particular target-
groups. 
•  The main constraints on  attempted decentralized cooperation perceived during this 
study would seem to be: 
- the bilateral nature of the Lome Convention; 
- lack of information about the Convention; 
- divergent interpretations of the concept of DC; 
- insufficient knowledge of the associative fabric of communities; 
- insufficient response capacity on the part of the EU  Delegations; 
- the lack of political will and outright commitment within the Commission; 
- the lack of specific operational instruments; 
- existing mechanisms ill-suited to DC; 
- the resistance of Southern administrations and States; 
- the low capacity of potential operators. 
Ill.  STRATEGIC ELEMENTS OF A POLICY OF 
DECENTRALIZED COOPERATION 
•  If the implementation of decentralized cooperation is not to have effects directly contrary (aid-
'sprinkling', lack of coherence and sustainability, decentralization without democracy, etc.) to 
those intended, it must be based on three key strategic principles: 
0  the  development of institutional and human capacities as a central element in all actions 
envisaged; 
' 
0  the  participation of the population in the development processes that concern them; 
0  support  for  political,  administrative  and  financial  decentralization processes  in 
Southern States. 
•  These three principles are the basic elements on  which the European  Union development 
policy should be built.  Decentralized cooperation would be one of t"he  essential components 
of this policy. •  There is a perceptible risk of DC remaining simply one development tool among others: more 
flexible and more participatory, but just one tool  of EU  cooperation policy. This risk makes 
clear the  importance of  an  approach to  DC  that  is  coherent with  the  National  Indicative 
Programme as a whole (or its ALA/MED equivalent) and with other cooperation instruments, 
in particular the Structural Adjustment Facility. It remains to be seen whether a political will to 
perform  these  tasks  exists  within  the  EU  and  whether the  internal  organisation  of the 
Commission allows of such an approach. 
Capacity Development 
•  Capacity development (CD) is more than a simple means of attaining greater effectiveness in 
development action.  It  covers both technical  realisation  and  management capacities and 
analytical, conceptual and organisational capacities. Behind CD lies the notion of learning to 
conceptualise problems, be flexible, negotiate, resolve conflicts and make compromises. To 
this extent, it contributes to the strengthening and structuring of civil society. 
•  It  concerns  not only individuals and  the forms  of  representation  with  which  they endow 
themselves  but  also  'external'  private  and  public  institutions.  It  relates  to  all  agents: 
beneficiaries, intermediate support structures, and decision-makers. 
•  Results at beneficiary level can be envisaged only for the  long term. Support structures wi.ll 
be necessary, as will their articulation by interconnection into networks allowing maximum 
use to be made of competences. 
•  One of the objectives of decentralized cooperation should be the enhancement of human 
resources and of the institutions of change, and it should therefore include as a significant 
component the strengthening of the capacities of agents, which would take the form of 
suitable follow-up measures (see 5.4). 
•  Moreover, this points highlights the fact that decentralized cooperation as designed in  the 
Lome  Convention  be  integrated  into  the  framework  of  a  broad,  overall  strategy  of 
participatory capacity development. Decentralized cooperation could become an instrument, 
a method which (amongst other things) plays a part in the CD of civil society. 
Participatory development 
•  Participation  must  be  considered  an  end  in  itself  (implementing  the  democratisation  of 
society) and not merely a means (of increasing the efficiency and viability of aid). 
•  The  decentralization  of  cooperation  and  administration  are  necessary but not sufficient 
conditions for the sustainability of development action. The result of these processes can 
simply be the recentralisation of power at a local level, or again a reinforcing of the power of 
local elites at the expense of marginalized sectors of the population.  Popular participation 
and joint efforts are equally indispensable in the attainment of concerted and sustainable 
development. And there can be no real participation without the simultaneous establishment 
of processes and mechanisms intended to restore a balance of power, at the different levels, 
that favours to civil society. •  Neither the  involvement of private associations (NGOs,  grassroots organisations,  etc.)  in 
processes and  programmes  of  development nor popular participation  in  development in 
themselves constitute  participatory development. The  Commission  should  therefore  pay 
particular  attention  to  the  basic  questions  of  the  democratic  functioning,  legitimacy, 
representativeness and motivation of these institutions, the participatory or non-participatory 
methodologies that they use and the real content of their work (see Chapter 4). 
•  In many cases, decentralized partners will not individually be of pluralistic character; they will 
represent groups, tendencies, regions, parties, religions, etc.  Decentralized cooperation can, 
however, attain pluralism by establishing relations with a plurality of partners, for example 
in  the context of overall programmes which permit a balanced sharing out of support (see 
4.2). 
•  In  comparison  with  rigid  procedures  and  patterns  such  as  can  be  implied  by  the 
Commission's Project Management Cycle or financial control, the use of a truly participatory 
approach  will  require  great flexibility  and  a 'receptive  attitude'  on  the  part  of  those 
managing the aid (see the box at point 6.1.2). 
•  Local  dynamics will  have to  be  the  main  point of  reference  and  the  powerhouse of  the 
interventions envisaged (see 4.1 ). As in all kinds of operations, a detailed knowledge of the 
frameworks and societies in question is indispensable, both at identification and execution 
stages. The adage 'to teach Peter French, you need to know French and you need to know 
Peter' is equally applicable here. 
Decentralization and popular participation 
•  Economic globalisation and  growing aspirations to  democracy imply new forms  of State 
intervention suited to the evolution of the context and  requiring a redefinition of the role of 
the State.  The ongoing reforms can  only be  (fully)  effective in  a more decentralized State 
that is in touch with the population. 
•  The State can play various roles in the context of a process of popular participation: it can be 
the powerhouse, the  catalyst or the brake.  Decentralization of  the  State is  obviously an 
important factor in the participation of the citizens in decision-making and the management of 
public affairs. 
•  Decentralization can be considered both a means (of enrooting democracy at local level) and 
an end (the restructuring of the state and relegitimization of public institutions). 
•  Decentralization is not only a de-concentration of public services; it must be accompanied by 
a real transfer of powers techno-administrative, political and financial. In the long term this 
can lead to a fundamental transformation of the face of a society. 
•  For  donors,  there  can  be  no  question  of  imposing  decentralization;  it  is  a  matter  of 
supporting the ongoing processes in different countries with the appropriate measures, 
paying the most stringent attention to the specificity of the local context. A gradual case-by-
case approach must be adopted. 
•  In  the  approaches favoured  by  DC,  it  is  the  local  officials who  become the  developers, 
inspirers and  facilitators  of  local  development;  they  also  take  on  a function  of  town  and 
'  r  '  ' 
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level; complementarities naturally function at this level. 
•  A process of grassroots organisation and management bringing together the local politico-
administrative structures can be the first stage, the underpinning of a bottom-up movement of 
dialogue and of the construction of a more democratic society, a society closer in its structure 
and modes of functioning to its citizens. 
•  Differing  in  different regions  of the world,  strategies will  for example focus  on  support for 
States in  the implementation of decentralization processes  (via programmes of institutional 
strengthening  and  municipal  development projects) or on  support for the  States'  reforms 
(focusing  efforts  on  governmental  management,  civil  society,  legislation  and  the judicial 
system). 
•  A close correlation might be expected between the level of civic participation, the impact of 
decentralized  cooperation  and  the  progress  of  local  decentralization  processes.  DC 
intervention is  nevertheless possible (and necessary) even where there is  no clearly defined 
decentralization policy. 
IV.  PREPARING A DECENTRALIZED COOPERATION 
OPERATION 
•  This  involves the definition of certain  preconditions with  a view to attaining a partnership 
approach and  an  efficient collaboration while at the same time respecting the interests and 
prerogatives of each agent.  In this perspective, the constraints linked to the programming of 
Community aid are also tackled. 
Identification of key institutions 
•  Identification of key institutions and the structuring of the agents in  order to ensure dialogue 
between  these  and  the  State  are  two  basic  prerequisites  in  the  implementation  of 
decentralized cooperation programmes. 
•  The  identification  of  institutions  (institution  mapping)  is  complex  and  requires  specific 
methodologies.  An  example  of  a  method  of  investigation  of  what  constitutes  'local 
government' is offered. It takes places in two stages: approaching the general and the local 
contexts. Criteria concerning the legitimacy, will and capacity of the agents underpin a 
research  grid  that  helps  to  solve  the  problem  of  joint  management of  development  by 
different local  agents.  A significant constraint on  this  kind  of study is  time,  and  thus the 
resources required. 
•  With a view to obtaining both coherence in intervention, the conjunction of efforts and 
concerted development planning, none of the  main  potential agents of DC  (local  public 
authorities, grassroots organisations, NGOs) should be excluded from the ongoing processes 
nor should any have a monopoly in  them.  Thus,  from  an  operational point of view,  it  is  -
exceptions apart  - undesirable to  entrust one  of the decentralized  agents  with  a central coordination role relative to the other agents in the institutional set-up of DC operations (see 
5.3.2). 
•  There  are  various  ways  of  initiating  DC  operations:  conducting  an  inventory  of 
decentralized agents, orientation studies, missions to identify a DC context, etc. Budget line 
7/6430 and the Delegation's '60,000 ECU facility' can be used for these purposes. 
•  North-South partnerships  should be  particularly encouraged in  future DC operations. The 
notion of partnership can be extended to a wide range of applications and its materialisation 
can help remove some of the constraints on  the participation of different kinds of agents 
respecting basic DC principles. 
Structuring consultation 
•  The multiplicity of decentralized agents, the absence of any tradition of collaboration between 
non-state and governmental agents and the need for a structured dialogue on development 
policies and strategies at different levels are some of the reasons justifying the organisation 
of decentralized agents and the structuring of inter-institutional consultation fora_. 
•  Consultation makes its own demands: it  requires  quality information  on  the part of the 
promoters about the decentralized cooperation offer made (identification of the channels, 
etc.)  and  the  identification  of  structures,  fora  or ·operational  initiatives  allowing 
institutions and  people to dialogue (with a view to building onto existing structures). This 
precondition  arises  naturally  out  of  the  terms  of  reference  of  overall  identification  of 
institutional frameworks and programmes of DC. 
•  Consultation requires that the different agents have a clear awareness of their interests and 
of what is at stake in  any process of planning or programming.  It also requires integration 
between different levels of decision-making and power, an overall approach, the association 
of a broad representation of agents, the establishment of permanent institutionalised fora, 
and the time and resources required to maintain these processes. 
•  It  is essential that decentralized organisational structures should be constructed bottom-up, 
based on consultation among all the relevant agents. Democratic opening-up, the mode and 
the effective level of decentralization of a State all  have a direct incidence on the type of 
structure that should be  established or activated and on the level at which consultation can 
effectively function. Analysis of experience in ACP and ALA countries highlights the fact that 
each framework contains its own determining factors and dynamics relative to the institutional 
forms to be promoted; there is no single model of consultation between agents or indeed 
for DC in general. 
•  It is hazardous to base a DC implementation strategy on the successful process of structuring 
the decentralized agents and on the success of the dialogue to be established between these 
agents, the public authorities and the Commission. This process requires time: distrust has to 
be overcome. It may simply prove unsuccessful. 
•  The  examples  cited  nevertheless  demonstrate that  broad  and  effective  consultation  is 
possible. The donors must make an  effort to  support these processes (and  to  inject new 
energy into them if they can and if they are invited to do so). Indicative programming 
•  The involvement of non-state decentralized agents and the local authorities in the phase 
of EU  aid programming  is  essential not only from the perspective of their taking  part in 
actions,  but above all  as  a means  of  ensuring  that the  aspirations  of  the  population  are 
central to the policies being worked out. The decentralized agents must often combine their 
efforts and exert pressure in order to make their expectations known to their governments. 
•  The decentralized cooperation approach  must be  explicitly specified in  future National 
Indicative Programmes.  This  must  refer  to  the  whole  set  of  policies  and  programmes 
constituting the priorities of the NIP, and not simply to one or more individual sectors. 
•  The decentralized cooperation approach must be given concrete form within the NIP, either in 
specific programmes, or by the participation of decentralized agents in  the realisation of 
goals set in the NIP (using DC as a method in programmes existing or to be implemented, 
e.g.  in  the framework of conventional sectoral or integrated rural/urban programmes) or by 
the allocation of a budget to the funding of decentralized initiatives. 
V.  SETTING UP A DECENTRALIZED COOPERATION 
OPERATION 
Selected intervention areas and guidelines 
•  The intervention areas  selected by the Commission for DC  are: the democratisation of 
society,  political  and  administrative decentralization  an~ grassroots development; 
these intervention areas may also constitute chronological stages in the implementation of a 
coherent DC policy. 
•  DC should not be limited to a new funding possibility for small, isolated material projects. DC 
has  a  potential  enabling  it  to  aim  for  a  more ambitious and  coherent approach to 
development.  Where  opportunities  arise,  it  seems  opportune  to  seek to  prioritize the 
concept of local development, concentrating interventions in  a particular territory and on 
the population and key institutions of this zone. 
Specific programmes of decentralized cooperation 
•  The fundamental  characteristics of  DC  programmes  should  be  (i)  to take into account 
initiatives arising - as  much as possible - from the population and the decentralized 
agents and  (ii)  the participation of the population concerned and the local agents in 
every stage  of  the  process.  The  programmes themselves  can  however be  top-down 
initiatives. 
•  In practice, two types of specific DC programmes can be envisaged: 
0  either a programme of (co-)financing of various local initiatives, which could make use 
of the simplified decision-making mechanism on global authorisation (Article 290 of Lome) 
0  or a conventional development programme (of support for decentralized partners, or in 
which the  execution of  development action  is  entrusted to them)  following  a decision-making mechanism on the basis of a financing proposal (Articles 288 and 289 of  Lome) 
with predifined goals and means. 
•  Geographically, sectorally or thematically structured programmes will often be used, in 
order to ensure coherence and the required emphasis on local development. 
Institutional and operational set-ups: the need for an 'interface' 
•  The need for interfaces is twofold: their proximity enables them to support the operators 
downstream, by freeing them of excessive administrative and financial burdens, while their 
application of the rules of the system offers a guarantee to officials upstream, by freeing 
them of the difficult task of dealing with a large number and variety of agents. 
•  Such interfaces can be created in the form of ad hoc structures or through the use of 
existing structures, especially where these have a representational legitimacy relative to the 
potential beneficiaries of the development action. 
•  The interfaces would take charge of the management/coordination of programmes but would 
also have a further role, that of supporting the grassroots agents. They will have major 
responsibilities in the preparation and selection of cases for funding and should to this end 
rely on  a pluralistic project selection committee. A service contract covering the running 
costs of the interface should be signed between the interface and the donor. 
Guidance for projects/programmes 
•  As emphasised at 3.1 , the development of local capacities must be given a central place 
in  DC  programmes, which  requires that suitable and varied  guidance measures be taken, 
which can be funded within the programme/project framework or independently. 
Programme funding procedures and sources 
•  The choice of a decision-making mechanism will depend on  the type of programme to be 
supported, that is,  on the choice between the first (funding local initiatives) and tha second 
case  (conventional  programme)  specified  above.  Two  decision-making  mechanisms are 
possible, depending on the type of programme: 
0  Normal decision-making mechanism (Articles 288 and 289): a funding proposal based 
on in-depth identification of the DCP in all  its aspects (means, goals, operators, scheduling 
of activities, etc.): so-called 'closed programme'; 
0  Simplified  decision-making  mechanism  (on  global  authorisation,  Article  290): a 
funding proposal based on  identification of the DCP in  broad outline (intervention sectors, 
programme operation mode): so-called 'open programme'. 
•  We must emphasise the  need for communication and transparency on  the part of the 
Commission vis-a-vis Southern agents on the subject of the different sources of funding for 
DC and the conditions of their use. The current budgetary possibilities are as follows: 
0  the European Development Fund for ACP countries; 
0  Financial and Technical Assistance for ALA/MED countries; 0  Counterpart Funds (all countries); 
0  a  large  number of  sectoral,  thematic  or geographic  budget  lines,  accessible to  non-
governmental agents, among which the decentralized cooperation promotion line -and the 
rehabilitation action line should be highlighted. 
VI.  IMPLEMENTATION OF A DECENTRALIZED 
COOPERATION OPERATION 
Preparation and appraisal of  project funding requests 
•  If the logical framework and project cycle management method is applied for DC projects, 
care should be taken to apply it flexibly. This method may prove incompatible with the long 
term  approach,  continuity  and  reactive  adaptation  which  characterise  participatory 
development. It is desirable that project promoters should receive methodological support in 
the preparation of their applications. 
•  Funding request dossiers must comprise a description of the project and of the operator. 
Field visits should be made to inspect the operator•s work. Given Dc·s objective of promoting 
participation and  encouraging democratic processes, this must be  taken  into account and 
form an integral part of the appraisal. 
•  The logic of the appraisal must one of  evaluating operators in  a  quest for better quality 
services. The dossier must be analysed and partners already active at local level or whose 
motivation  and  competence  are  already proven  should  be  sought out.  The choice  must 
necessarily  fall  on  the  operator  which  is  most  competent  and  which  enjoys  greatest 
legitimacy relative to a given framework and problem.  Neutrality and  professionalism in 
appraisal are fundamental to the implementation of DCPs. 
Decision-making processes 
•  The use of an autonomous Management/Coordination Interface (MCI) is recommended, as 
various  responsibilities can  be  delegated to  it;  its  personnel  should  be  contractual  and  if 
possible,  local  (if the interface has to  be  created, the appointment of its  officials would be 
decided by the National Authorizing Officer (NAO) and the Delegation. 
•  In  practice, the appraisal  of projects would  be  performed by  the  MCI,  but a  Project  (or 
Steering) Committee would make the final selection and propose the allocation of funds for 
individual operations to the authorities. 
Contractual commitments, project funding and technical support 
•  Promoters should not ideally become providers of services direct to the EDF. They should 
instead  sign  ad  hoc  contracts  with  the  MCI  (according  to  the  local  legislation,  e.g. 
Agreement  Protocols)  approved  by  the  appropriate  authorities  (NAO,  Delegation, 
Commission in Developing/ALA countries where there is no Delegation). The MCI will then be in a position to play its true role as interface between the EDF and the operators (this is 
the system used in several MPPs). 
•  In terms of procedures, the MCI  is thus fully justified: it is  not simply a 'monitor' imposed on 
operators,  but  has  a  buffer  role  which  enables  it  to  support the  downstream  operators 
(through its proximity) and reassure the upstream officials (as contractually responsible vis-a-
vis the rules of the system). 
•  Where there is no MCI, or for operations on a very large scale, the operators would normally 
become contractual service providers to the EDF or Commission, and  would develop their 
activities on the basis of a Programme-Budget. 
•  Given that the EDF normally finances in  full the programmes/ projects that it  supports, the 
eligibility of a DC operation would not formally depend on a contribution made by the local 
partners. However, in the case of an open programme of support for small local initiatives, a 
contribution by the beneficiaries is  a condition of access to funds  under the provisions of 
Lome IV (2) (Article 251 d). At all events, a beneficiary contribution should be encouraged 
with a view to the partners taking  responsibility for the intervention and  making it their own 
(appropriating it); it should also be encouraged because sharing cost is, after all, the basis of 
participation. 
•  The operators' running costs are among the expenses to be envisaged in the framework of a 
strategy of strengthening agent capacities; these expenses need not necessarily be linked to 
beneficiary-related activities or to the proper functioning of these. They should be  registered 
in the accounts as an  investment in an organisation on which the implementation of the DCP 
relies. 
•  Traditional forms of technical assistance will often prove too expensive in a DCP framework, 
particularly as  regards the programme budget of the partners. Creativeness will therefore be 
required  and  new forms  will  have  to  be  explored  on  a case  by case  basis.  In  selecting 
technical assistance, qualitative criteria must also be adduced. 
Execution, administrative and financial management 
•  Whichever programme-type is adopted (open or closed), its execution must take place on an 
impressed account basis managed by the MCI or the operator (or a specific accounting 
cell,  covering  several  projects/programmes)  and  the  kitty  restocked  on  the  basis  of  the 
justification of the previous stage and of cash-flow needs. 
•  The MCI  will  be  subject to  a Programme-Budget  and  possibly to  a Service  Provision 
Contract if there is exR_atriate personnel to be remunerated. 
Control, monitoring and evaluation 
•  Rigour is one of the conditions of the flexibility desired.  It  is essential that an  adequate 
system of accounts control be put in place, making proper use of a computer system usable 
by all involved; the system should be placed under the responsibility of an ad hoc cell of the 
MCI (or of a specific accounting cell, covering several projects/programmes). 
~  -; •  The constrictive nature of the system of accounting justification should have its counterpart in 
the  regular and  rapid  covering  of the cash-flow needs  of the operators.  A financial 
auditing system would complete the system. 
•  The monitoring  and  evaluation  mechanisms  adopted  must possess a participatory 
character and combine the demands of the exercise with a pragmatic approach. 1.1  HISTORY AND CLARIFICATION OF THE CONCEPT 
'  '' 
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The term  'decentralized cooperation•  emerged  during  the  1980s in  the context of  various 
national cooperation and  development policies. The concept originated in  a rethinking  of the 
conventional development cooperation formulae of the late 1950s. 
Immediately after the decolonisation of Africa and the inauguration of development cooperation 
policies, aid to Southern countries was channelled through the governments of these countries 
and put to work by their administrations in the framework of projects generally benefiting from 
expatriate technical assistance. 
This way of working came to be questioned as a consequence of two observations: 
1)  The  ineffectuality,  especially over the  long  term,  of  the  actions  undertaken  within  the 
framework of the conventional cooperation programmes; 
2)  A general reduction, in the North and the South, of the role of the State in the management 
of  development,  and  in  particular  of  State  domination  of  development  cooperation 
programmes. 
There then  appeared a whole series of new potential partners and  recipients of international 
aid: decentralized administrations (villages, municipalities, regions, local authorities), academic 
institutions, chambers of commerce, networks of associations, NGOs, unions, and professional 
organisations. 
In  fact,  the  germ or premise of the  decentralization  of development cooperation  had  been 
present for some time.  Several  African  states  had,  for example,  ever since  independence, 
based  their development  strategies  on  popular participation  and  on  making  local  agents 
responsible for development,  before  being  forced  to  return  to  the  reassuring  mould  of the 
conventional  project.  Moreover,  the  public funding  of  NGO  projects,  which  illustrated  the 
concept of solidarity and cooperation between peoples,  began at the same time as  or shortly 
before official development cooperation policies in the Northern countries. 
At  all  events,  the  state  of  mind  which  prevailed at the  more formal  birth  of the concept of 
decentralized cooperation flourished during the 1980s, when there was a spectacular increase 
in the channelling of development cooperation resources towards new,  decentralized and non-
governmental - in  the sense of non-Central State - agents.  Some examples of this were:  an 
increase in  resources earmarked for cofinancing  NGO actions, the opening  of many special 
budget  lines  independent  of  the  bilateral  framework,  access  for  operators  other  than 
consultancies to the implementation of bilateral or multilateral projects, and the possibility for 
local  authorities  (in  France,  Spain  and  Germany  in  particular)  to  fund  cooperation  actions 
outside the strict bilateral framework. At  the  same time,  most Southern States were  suffering the  full  effects of  macro-economic 
constraints, and  multilateral agencies such as the IMF or World Bank were imposing policies 
that involved structural adjustment, deregulation, privatisation, and so on. This situation notably 
weakened the Southern States, in  particular in the fields of development decision-making and 
intervention. 
Today this 'everything left to the private sector, everything left to the market' ideology is  itself 
being questioned.  Many have made the point that 'everything left to the State' doesn't work, 
though 'without the State, nothing is possible'. It is against this background of uncertainty about 
the  role  of  the  State  and  declining  ideologies  that  our  effort  to  clarify  the  concept  of 
decentralized cooperat1on  and  the  principles  governing  its  implementation  takes  on  its  full 
significance. 
Although  the  current  tendency  seems  to  be  to  channel  an  ever  greater  proportion  of 
development aid through non-state agents, it  seems very likely that in  the next few years we 
shall see a readjustment in  cooperation policies; one that will allow States to assume a 
new role, and in particular to guarantee a favourable environment and framework for the 
joint efforts of civil society and State in the field of development 1. 
Decentralized  cooperation  is  not,  then,  a  new concept.  Explicit  reference  to decentralized 
agents as the partners of EU  cooperation (notably in  the Lome IV and  IV.2 Conventions) has 
not however led to the creation of a specific new instrument, nor to the determination of sectors 
of  intervention.  DC  is  rather  an  approach:  a  different  way  of  going  about  development 
cooperation. Insofar as  it claims to diverge from the conventional methods of international aid 
and offer responses to the evolution and initiatives of the Southern countries,  it will  inevitably 
take various  forms,  each  adapted  to  the  frameworks  and  requirements  of  the  partners  in 
question. In other words, it will mostly be  made to measure'. It must also demonstrate flexibility 
and transparency. 
Decentralized cooperation must therefore be considered as a structural, gradual process of 
changing the conventional way of implementing development cooperation. 
1.2  A  CHANGE  OF  ATTITUDE  REQUIRED  IN  THOSE  WHO 
ADMINISTER COOPERATION 
In general, the adoption of decentralized cooperation - with all the consequences that flow from 
working with non-governmental agents - requires  a favourable environment in  the country 
concerned: 
•  a State that continues to  be active in  e.g.  the supply of public services and  infrastructure 
maintenance; 
•  democratisation of the functioning  of the  State and the administration;  creation  of fora of 
dialogue with society; 
•  adoption of decentralization policies; 
•  open-mindedness in relation to representative structures arising in civil society. 
Jacques Delors recently asked: 'What if the art of politics consisted of mobilizing people?'. The  development  of  decentralized  cooperation  may  therefore  require  a  clarification  and 
awareness enhancement campaign to promote acceptance of this kind  of cooperation on the 
part of the national authorities, since the concerns they express may seem well-founded. Alarm 
is perceptible,in. certain countries where DC  has already. attained a level which,  in the view of 
those.  State~, has'  created a  rival  to  official  cooperation  (e.g.  Bangladesh).  It  is  therefore 
important to emphasise that DC is not a substitute for cooperation with States, but should 
be seen  as  complementary  thereto.  Where cooperation  missions are  redefined,  it  is  also 
important to explain precisely at what level the cooperation with  States merges with actions 
mainly oriented towards certain categories of agent; this avoids confusion in agents involved in 
the process and States suspicious of approaches which seem to marginalise their role. 
But it is merely realistic to acknowledge that the State is  not a 'neutral' entity and that it is also 
the expression of different social groups defending their often contradictory interests. In DC, it is 
therefore vital to understand the nature of each agent, as negotiation and alliances form a 
large part of DC. The democratic systems under construction in the South are still very fragile 
and it is  difficult to build new cooperation relations while relying exclusively on these systems, 
whose balance of  power and  individual  interests one does not always know.  It  is  therefore 
important to distinguish apparently democratic structures from real grassroots democracy. 
The large scale takeover by the private sector (and by associations) of activities for which the 
State is  normally responsible should not be promoted without due thought. State/private sector 
collaborations may be worth exploring in  certain cases.  In that case, the State would take the 
requirements of the private sector into account when programming its  overall development 
policies, and there would be methodological collaboration, division of labour at various stages of 
intervention, etc. At all  events, it is  important to situate DC  in the more general framework of 
cooperation and of the activities and policies of the State. In an EDF framework, for example, it 
is important for DC to be the subject of upstream dialogue between decentralized agents and 
the  State,  and  that  it  then  have  a  place  in  the  indicative  programme  and  project  cycle 
management. 
On the other hand, DC also requires a favourable environment in the chief donor. For this 
favourable environment to exist will  often  require deep-seated changes of attitude (and 
perhaps of structure) on the part of the institutions and therefore of the officials involved. 
During preparation of this document, we observed that institutionalised participatory culture 
was  weak  or  simply  lacking  in  the  agencies  that  we  visited  and  in  the  European 
Commission. Agencies like the UNDP and the World Bank, for example, have nonetheless set 
up processes of internal review with a view to removing this obstacle (a summary of the results 
of these reviews is presented in the box at point 3.2.3). One of the publications that came out of 
this process2 uses an  imaginary case study to show how officials can  set up  management 
practices better adapted to participatory strategies. 
This new way of working also requires specific competences and personnel who specialise in 
participation; field  experience is  essential  in  decentralized executives who diverge from the 
beaten track but  is  often  lacking  in  the  staff  responsible  for setting  up  operations and  for 
following them up. 
2  Donnelly: Reinventing bureaucracy for sustainable development, see UNDP bibliography. Other constraining factors in cooperation agencies are, for example, the lack of any incentive to 
undertake a  decentralized  and  participatory approach,  the  overload  of  administrative work 
suffered by most officials, and the weakness of these agencies' local representation. 
Finally,  donors'  lack  of  flexibility  in  the  application  of  administrative  and  financial 
procedures also inhibits the adoption of decentralized and participatory development methods. 
To  sum  up,  decentralized  cooperation  and  participatory  development  require  a  particular 
attitude and state of mind on the part of the various participants in the process, and notably on 
the part of the aid managers. These are unlikely to become widespread in donors until they are 
supported by  an  ad hoc institutional culture that encourages innovation, creativeness risk-
taking,  transparency,  openness toward  other ways  of  thinking  and  towards  less  structured 
organisations,  the  adaptation  of  modes  of  communication  and  working,  relaxation  of 
administrative and financial constraints, flexibility in the appraisal of actions, suitable training for 
officials, and reinforcement of the agency's local representation. We should not lose sight of the 
fact that one of the goals of development cooperation, and of DC in particular, is help make the 
populations  and  institutions  of  the  South  more  autonomous,  whereas  we  often  go  about 
cooperation  relying  on  our  own  philosophical,  technical,  accounting  and  administrative 
philosophies. 
1.3  DEFINITION AND GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF THE 
IMPLEMENTATION OF DECENTRALIZED COOPERATION 
An attempt at definition 
As conceived by the European Commission, the objective of decentralized cooperation is,  first 
and foremost,  to  ensure 'better• development, by taking greater account of the needs and 
priorities expressed by the population;  it  thus aims to  enhance the role and  place of civil 
society in the development process. 
It consists on the one hand in bringing together and ensuring the collaboration at different 
intervention levels of the potential economic and social actors North and South. On  the 
other, it consists in eliciting the active and determining participation of direct beneficiaries 
in decision-making and in the different stages of the actions that concern them. 
Implementation principles 
The  substantive  difference  between  DC  and  a  conventional  development  cooperation 
framework lies in  responding to decentralized initiatives, and thus designing and implementing 
development projects and/or programmes in  partnership with  organised agents arising from 
both  Southern and  Northern societies.  The new partners and varied forms of action do not, 
however, constitute the sole difference for aid managers:  DC will be based not so much on 
specific  regulations,  instructions  and  procedures  as  on  basic  principles that foster 
openness,  dialogue,  consultation,  democratic  means  of  expression  and  working,  the 
participation of the agents, and, finally,  the more equitable and  sustainable development 
which is its goal and justification. Administrative management procedures will of course have to  be  applied  (and  adapted  if  necessary),  but  they  must  be  applied  in  the  spirit of these 
principles. 
These principles of decentralized cooperation implementation will guide our thinking throughout 
this work;  some of them will  be  given more thorough expositions.  For the sake of clarity, we 
have  organised  them  on  two  levels:  design  and  instruments.  In  this  way,  we  distinguish 
principles  linked to  objectives from  those  linked to  the  implementation  modalities  (agents, 
methods, means, aid mechanisms). 
D~centralized cooperation  programmes/projects  will  not  be  required  to  fulfil  all  of  these 
principles, which form a kind of evaluation matrix for project promotion and appraisal, facilitating 
the evaluation of proposals. Close attention should therefore be given to these principles in the 
design and appraisal of decentralized cooperation operations. 
Objectives 
1.  Mobilise the population and take greater account of their needs and priorities. 
2.  Enhance the role and place of civil society in development processes. 
3.  Foster equitable  and  sustainable  social  and  economic  development  through 
participation. 
Instruments 
4.  Decentralized cooperation relies on: 
•  a varied and pluralistic range of competent agents and/or representatives in order to 
promote joint efforts by different sectors of society, in particular by fostering exchanges 
of experience and expertise between agents, and the valorisation of local and traditional 
knowledge; 
•  who  consult  among  themselves  in  order  to  reach  a  consensus  as  to 
national/regional/local development priorities; 
•  while remaining autonomous (e.g. in initiative and execution): subject to rigorous control 
but free from interference in their management. 
5.  Decentralized cooperation fosters  coherent interventions by  planning  priorities through 
consultation and by the coordination of means. To this end, it must find a balance between 
the need for flexibility/speed (which implies autonomy from the State) and the need for a 
coherent overall  vision and  for sectoral strategies (which  implies coordination with the 
State). 
6.  Actions  rely  on  the  experience  of  agents  (whose  right  to  learn  and  to  error  is 
acknowledged) and seek sustainability (a necessary condition of participation and capacity 
reinforcement) through  self-multiplying effects, which will, in time lead to increased impact 
(gradual diffusion through space and consolidation in time); 
7.  To this end, the aid  mechanism should seek to  enhance the capacities of the organised 
agents (this  is  a necessary condition  of sustainable participation by  these agents and  of 
their long-term  autonomy),  be  receptive  to  initiatives  arising  from  civil  society  and 
propose  a  form  of  administrative  and  financial  management  flexible  in  its  different 
dimensions, so that it can be adapted to the level of qualification of the agents involved and 
their financial limits (e.g. cash flow). Clearly, these principles, which remain very general, could be applied to any kind of cooperation 
and provide few operational guidelines to development practitioners. They should therefore be 
refined  and  specified  to  meet the  local  context:  greater or lesser demands can  be  made 
according to the possibilities inherent in a particular situation. 
In short, we may say that, by introducing the concept of decentralized cooperation, donors (and 
more  particularly the  European  Commission)  seek  to  renew  the  operating  modalities  of 
development cooperation and to  make it more effective, coherent, suitable, participatory and 
closer to local society, the field and the agents of civil society  . 
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This is not the place for an exhaustive account of the origin and general execution modalities of 
the  Lome  Convention  or  of  cooperation  with  the  Developing/ALA  or  MED  countries. 
Explanations and entire volumes on this subject abound, and, as regards the Lome Convention, 
for example, the NGO-EC LC  manual on  decentralized cooperation  (DC)  presents a useful 
summary (see bibliography). 
We therefore confine ourselves to retracing from its origins the introduction of the concept of DC 
in the Lome Convention and in the regulations concerning Technical and Financial Cooperation 
with the Developing/ALA countries. 
The  general  objectives  pursued  by  the  Commission  in  the  context  of  decentralized 
cooperation are the following: 
•  to mobilise all  development agents and their resources by fostering close relations 
between  the  authorities  (local  or  national) and  private  organisations,  in  order to 
ensure a greater effectiveness and coherence of aid; 
•  to  enhance  the  role  and  place  of  civil  society  in  development  processes,  thus 
contributing to a more participatory democracy and  a redefinition of the role of the 
State; 
•  to ensure that social and economic development is more equitable, sustainable, and 
closer to the population, via legitimate and specific representatives of the populations, 
with their own means and ways of acting, and on the basis of their own initiatives. 
In the context of these objectives,  the Commission further explicitly encourages (see 2.1.1, 
Article  251  b, 
12  of  the  Lome  Convention  IV.2)  North-South  partnerships  between 
counterparts  in  the  ACP  States  and  the  European  Union,  without  this  constituting  a 
condition for projects to be considered as DC actions. 
It  should  be  noted  that the  Commission  in  1992  opened  a  special  credit  line  intended  to 
promote a favourable environment and conditions for DC operational activities, in both ACP and 
Developing/ALA countries (BL 7/6430). Many projects have already been financed by this line. 
2.1.1 . ACP countries 
The premises for the decentralization of EU cooperation first emerged in  1975: these were the 
appearance in the Lome Convention of articles relating to Micro-projects, and subsequently the 
creation of a system of cofinancing with European NGOs. By the use of these two instruments (the first dependent on  ACP  State decisions, the  second  not),  the  Community acquired the 
means  to  support  initiatives  arising  from  the  populations  of  ACP  States  (and  from  other 
Developing Countries via NGO cofinancing) and  their organised  representatives.  In  this way, 
the  Community 'bought into' 1  what  was  then  still  a  rather  embryonic  new  approach  to 
development - even in NGOs: 'grassroots development'. 
During the  implementation of Lome  Ill, the  Community experimented with  a new orientation 
toward  ACPs countries and  European  NGOs.  The  latter were to  have the  opportunity in  a 
certain  number of countries of executing certain  sections of  EDF  programmes. These were 
however to be  implemented overall in  a centralised and strictly conventional manner.  During 
Lome Ill, geographical zones and concentration sectors were the criteria prevailing in relation to 
these programmes. 
These  attempts  to  include  NGOs  in  EDF  programmes  had  mixed  results  and  their 
implementation sometimes caused  major difficulties with  local non-governmental agents (for 
example the Kivu Programme, Zaire or the PPDR in the Cameroon). But relative to the future of 
decentralized cooperation, the geographical concentration choices and the involvement of new 
agents were such as to make these experiments worthy of in-depth analysis and evaluation. 
In the text of the Fourth Lome Convention the formal concept of decentralized cooperation was 
first introduced in articles concerning the objectives and principles of cooperation, the objectives 
and orientations of the Convention in the main cooperation fields, the agents of cooperation and 
their eligibility for funding. These texts  have been  modified within  Lome  IV  (2),  and  the new 
regulations are as follows: 
II First part, Chapter 1,  objectives and  principles of  cooperation: 
Article 12 a 
Recognizing the potential for positive contributions by the agents of decentralized cooperation to the 
development of the ACP States, the Contracting Parties agree to intensify their efforts to encourage 
the participation of ACP and Community agents in cooperation activities. To this end, the resources 
of the Convention may be used to support decentralized cooperation operations. These operations 
shall conform to the priorities, guidelines and development methods determined by the ACP States. 
II  Third Part, Title Ill, Chapter 2, Section 4a, Decentralized Cooperation: 
Article 251  a 
1.  With a view to strengthening and diversifying the basis for long-term development of the ACP 
States, and in order to encourage all agents from the ACP States and the Community which are 
in a position to contribute to the autonomous development of the ACP States to put forward and 
implement initiatives, ACP-EC cooperations shall support, within limits laid down by the ACP 
States  concerned,  such  development  operations  within  the  framework  of  decentralized 
cooperation, in  particular where they combine the efforts and resources of organizations from 
the ACP States and their counterparts from the Community. This form of cooperation shall, in 
particular,  aim  at making available for the development of the ACP States the capacities, 
innovative operating methods and resources of the agents of decentralized cooperation. 
As regards the Micro-projects, the financial outlay was fairly modest, as is clear if we note the amount 
set  aside  for this  purpose  (around  200  MECU  from  Lome  I to  Lome  Ill) and  the percentage that it 
represented  (2.5%)  of total aid  in  project/programme form.  Between  1976 and  1993,  BOO  MECU  was 
channelled into conventional cofinancing (excluding special budget lines) in support of NGO development 
action in the totality of the Southern countries. 2.  The  agents  referred  to  in  this  Article  are decentralized public authorities,  rural  and  village 
groups,  cooperatives,  trade  unions,  teaching  and  research  institutions,  non-governmental 
organizations, other associations, groups and agents which are able and wish to contribute to 
the development of the ACP States on their own initiative, provided that the agents and/or the 
operations are non-profit-making. 
Article 251  b 
1.  In  the framework of ACP-EC cooperation,  special  efforts shall  be  made to  encourage  and 
support the initiatives of the agents from the ACP States and,  in  particular, to  reinforce the 
capacities of these agents. In this framework the cooperation shall support the activities of the 
ACP agents either on their own or in association with similar agents from the Community which 
make their capacities,  experience,  technological  and  organizational capacities or financial 
resources available to the ACP counterparts. 
2.  Decentralized  cooperation  shall  encourage  agents  from  the  ACP  States  and  from  the 
Community to  provide supplementary financial and technical resources for the development 
effort including encouragement of partnerships between such agents. The cooperation may 
provide decentralized cooperation operations with financial and/or technical support drawn from 
the resources provided for this Convention under the conditions laid down In  Articles 251 c, 
251d and 251e. 
3.  This form of cooperation shall be organized in  accordance with this role and the prerogative of 
the public authorities of the ACP States. 
Article 251  c 
1.  Decentralized cooperations may be supported out of the financial resources of the indicative 
programme  or  from  counterpart funds.  The  extent  of  the  support  shall  be  that  which  is 
necessary for the successful implementation of the  proposed  operations provided that the 
viability of the proposed operations has been established in accordance with the provisions for 
development finance cooperation. 
2.  Projects  or  programmes  under  this  form  of  cooperation  may  or  may  not  be  linked  to 
programmes in the sectors of concentration of the indicative programmes, but may be a way of 
achieving the specific objectives of the indicative programme or the results of the initiatives by 
decentralized agents. 
. Article 251  d 
1.  Projects and programmes undertaken within the framework of decentralized cooperation shall 
be  subject to  the  approval  of the  ACP  States.  These  operations  shall  be  financed  with 
contributions from: 
a)  the Fund,  in which case the contribution shall not normally exceed three-quarters of the 
total cost of each project, or programme, and may not exceed ECU 300 000. The amount 
representing  the  Fund's  contribution  shall  be  drawn  from  the  grant allocation  of  the 
national or regional indicative programme: 
b)  the agents of decentralized cooperation, provided that the financial, technical, material and 
other resources brought in  by such  agents shall  not normally be  less than 25% of the 
estimated cost of the project/programme, and 
c)  exceptionally, by the ACP State concerned, either in  the form of financial contribution or 
through the use of public equipment or the supply of services. 
2.  The  procedures  applicable to  projects and  programmes financed  within  the  framework of 
decentralized cooperation shall be those laid down in Chapter 5 of this Title, in particular, those 
referred to in Article 290. 
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In  addition to the possibilities offered to the agents of decentralized cooperation in this section, in 
Articles 252 and 253 relating to micro-projects, Article 278 (2)(c) on technical cooperation schemes 
and  Article  300  on  emergency assistance,  the  ACP  States  may  request  or may  agree  to  the 
participation of agents of decentralized cooperation in the implementation of other Fund projects and 
programmes, in particular, those performed by direct labour in conformity with Article 299 and other 
relevant provisions of this Convention. 
II  Third Part, Title Ill, Chapter 5, Section 3, Financing Proposals and Decisions 
Article 290 
1.  With  a view to expediting procedures and  in  derogation of Articles 288 and 289,  financing 
decisions may be taken on multi-annual programmes where financing concerns: 
(a)  training; 
(b)  decentralized operations; 
(c)  micro-projects; 
(d)  trade promotion and trade development; 
(e)  sets of operations of a limited scale in a specific sector; 
(f)  project/programme management support; 
(g)  technical cooperation. 
2.  In cases referred to in  paragraph 1, the ACP State concerned may submit to the Head of the 
Delegation  a  multi-annual  programme setting  out its  broad  outlines,  the  types  of  actions 
envisaged and the financial commitment proposed: 
a)  The financing  decision  on  each  multi-annual  programme shall  be  taken  by  the Chief 
Authorizing Officer. The letter from the Chief Authorizing Officer to the National Authorizing 
Officer notifying such decision shall constitute the financing agreement within the meaning 
of Article 291. 
b)  Within the framework of multi-annual programmes thus adopted, the National Authorizing 
Officer, or when the case arises, the agent of decentralized cooperation which has been 
delegated functions for this purpose, or,  in appropriate cases, other eligible beneficiaries, 
the  National  Authorizing  Officer and the  Head  of  Delegation  shall  maintain  financial 
responsibility and monitor the operations regularly with a view to enabling them, inter alia, 
to carry out their obligations under paragraph 3. 
3.  At  the end  of each  year,  the  National Authorizing  Officer in  consultation  with  the  Head of 
Delegation, shall forward a report to the Commission on the implementation of the multiannual 
programmes. 
II Annex LXXX : Joint  Declaration  on  the  consultation  and information  of agents  of 
development 
With a view to encouraging the participation of the agents of decentralized cooperation  in  Fund 
projects  and  programmes  and  to  ensuring  that their  initiatives  are  taken  into  account  in  the 
formulation  and in  the  implementation  of  indicative programmes,  ACP  States will  endeavour to 
organize exchanges of views with  such  agents.  The  ACP  States and the Commission will  also 
endeavour to  provide information necessary for their participation  in  the implementation of the 
programmes. 
In  the  context of European  policy,  DC  is  designed to foster the  participation  of  varied 
agents  from  civil  society  in  the  discussion  of  priorities  and  the  implementation  of 
development  actions,  on  the  basis  of  initiatives  emanating  from  these  agents. Decentralized cooperation thus constitutes a participatory mode of operation, but above all 
takes on a much wider function as an  element in political dialogue about cooperation. 
Articles 12a, 251 a and 251 b in particular formulate an important element in the Convention, that 
of acknowledging the vital  role  played by the various agents (economic,  social and  cultural) 
which  have  arisen  from  the  societies  of  ACP  countries  during  the  development  and 
democratisation processes in those countries. 
This acknowledgement and the desire to change the way in which things are done are illustrated by a 
declaration made by Dieter Frish, the Commission's former Director General of Development: 
"Instead of  imposing development from above, we  want to support grassroots development - more 
than we  have done in  the  past - through the participation  of  grassroots organisations in  the ACP 
countries, and of the cooperatives, communities and NGOs of ACP countries, in cooperation with our 
partners here, in the European countries". 
The financial resources available for the implementation of the Lome Convention come from the 
European Development Fund (EDF), which is itself funded by the EU Member States. The main 
characteristic of the EDF, from the decentralized cooperation perspective,  is that all financial 
resource allocation decisions are jointly taken by the ACP countries involved and the by the EU 
(via the Commission and the ad hoc committee of the Member States): 
•  Article 12a notes that 'these [DC] activities must conform to the priorities,  guidelines and 
development methods determined by the ACP States' 
•  Article 251 b specifies that 'this form of cooperation [DC] shall be organized in  accordance 
with the role and prerogative of the public authorities of the ACP States'. 
•  Article  251 d  further  stipulates  that  'Projects  and  programmes  undertaken  within  the 
framework of decentralized cooperation shall be subject to the approval of the ACP States'. 
•  Finally, Article 251 e indicates that 'the ACP States may request or agree to the participation 
of the  agents of decentralized cooperation in the implementation of other Fund projects or 
programmes'. 
Without contesting the need for these provisions,  it  must be  acknowledged that they arouse 
some concern relative to the liberty and autonomy of decentralized agents in certain countries, 
both on the general political level and as regards the implementation of actions. 
It must be stated that these conditions carry within them the seeds of two important risks for 
decentralized agents: 
•  that of being instrumentalised for ends in contradiction with their own objectives; 
•  that of the  creation of  a parallel  network of 'pseudo-emanations' from  society, directly or 
indirectly manipulated by States, and which could request EDF funding (see Article 251 e). 
We shall consider the question of the representativeness of agents in  Chapter 4 and we shall 
see how these different constraints and risks can be overcome. 
Before attempting to evaluate the progress made by DC  in European cooperation, it should be 
noted that, till now, this opening for DC in the Lome Convention has not been translated into the 
provision of a specific instrument of financial and technical cooperation, a fact which may have 
disoriented  not  only  those  who  might  have  promoted  projects  but  also  some  of  the Commission's own managers. The lack of such an instrument has its own logic insofar as DC is 
more  a  different  way  of  designing  development  aid  than  it  is  a  particular  kind  of 
project/programme. As  things stand, a decentralized approach to cooperation that respected 
the basic principles set out in point 1.3. could be applied in most types of intervention (see also 
point  1.1.,  last  paragraph)  and  DC  should  not  therefore  be  considered  merely  an 
instrument or a procedure. 
This situation might nevertheless be modified under Lome IV(2) to the extent that Article 251 d 
insists on  the  instrumental  aspect of  DC  by  defining  an  approval  procedure for grassroots 
initiative support programmes, in a way very similar to that for Micro-projects. ACP States could 
therefore be tempted to opt for this easy solution and reduce DC to an 'improved' form of Micro-
project Programme  (see  2.2.1.).  However,  Article  251 e  rightly  stipulates that decentralized 
agents may take part in the implementation of other kinds of EDF programmes/projects. On the 
other hand,  the more political dimension  of  DC  is  clearly emphasised  in  the  ACP-EC Joint 
Declaration annexed to Lome IV(2). 
As  to  specific  instructions,  Unit VIII/B/2  has  produced  a document offering  answers to  15 
questions frequently asked about the practical implementation of DC, and an instruction note on 
the objectives and methods of DC. A report to the Council on the implementation of DC  gives 
guidelines on  the proposed overall policy  of the Commission  in  regard to  DC.  Moreover, as 
regards Lome IV (2), a note to an internal DG VIII file explicates the conditions in which the new 
DC provisions apply. 
2.1 .2. ALA countries 
Cooperation with ALA countries is based on the mobilisation of a certain number of budget lines 
belonging to the general budget of the European Union (previously the budget of the European 
Communities). 
Since the 1970s, a very large number of  budget lines allowing intervention in  ALA countries 
have  been  approved.  Amongst them,  the  Financial  and  Technical  Assistance  Line  (FTA) 
remains the most important in terms of volume. However, it probably accounts for only around 
50°/o  of the  financial  resources  devoted  to  these  countries,  the  rest  coming  from  special 
thematic, sectoral or geographic lines. The NGO cofinancing instrument, which is 'housed' in 
DG  VIII,  is  not therefore confined to ACP countries, with which that department is concerned, 
but is applicable to all developing countries. 
The provision  within the budget for budget lines  allowing  intervention  in  the so-called  non-
associated countries was not accompanied by the creation of legal bases to govern the specific 
ways  in  which  they can  be  used. The Financial Regulation of the Communities Budget was 
applicable. The specific modalities of the use of the funds are fixed by finance agreements and 
by specific contracts signed with the cooperation partner. A very large number of these budget 
lines still have no legal basis. 
In  1981, a first set of regulations applicable to  FTA was adopted.  It was replaced in  February 
1992 by a  new regulation  applicable to  Financial  and  Technical  Assistance and  Economic 
Cooperation, a new concept, and a new budget line, intended to replace a certain number of 
lines of limited capacity and which had till then  had their own budgets {Training,  Integration, 
Business Promotion, etc.). Other budget lines have, on  occasion, been granted a legal basis (that is,  regulation proposed by the Commission and  approved by the Council), such as the 
ECIP  instrument.  By  the  end  of  1995, the  budget lines  lacking  a  legal  basis should  have 
received one. 
The lack of a legal basis allows great flexibility in the allocation of funds to specific actions. In 
particular,  it  offers great  liberty in  the choice  of cooperation  partner,  which  need  not be  a 
governmental  institution;  there is  no  legal  obstacle to  agreements being  made directly with 
private partners.  The  1981  Regulation  applicable to  FTA was extremely succinct;  it  did  not 
specify and did  not therefore limit funding eligibility. The text of the 1992 Regulation is  more 
extensive and explicitly provides for decentralized agents as possible partners in cooperation. 
The Regulation provides that: 
•  Article 3 
The recipients of  aid and partners in cooperation may include not only States and regions but 
decentralized authorities,  regional  organizations,  public  agencies,  local or traditional 
communities, private institutes and operators, including cooperatives and non-governmental 
organisations. 
The choice of partners in  cooperation and the forms that cooperation takes therefore depend 
heavily on those responsible for the implementation of cooperation: on the hierarchy (Division 
Chief and Directors) and the personality of the managers (Desks). 
The major difference between cooperation with ACP countries and ALA countries is that, with 
the  latter,  cooperation  is  not  governed  by  an  overall  convention  such  as  Lome.  True, 
cooperation agreements have been concluded with countries and regions,  but these are very 
general  and  merely  define  the  broad  outlines  of  the  aid  to  be  supplied.  In  particular, 
commitments are not stated in figures, nor is any detail about procedure included. 
Cooperation with ALA countries does not therefore involve consultation with the governments of 
beneficiary countries in the same way as cooperation within the Lome framework.  Beneficiary 
countries  have  no  say  in  the  negotiation  of  the  overall  budget  available,  nor in  fixing  the 
financial envelope for a particular country or region. The fixing of overall budgets (ALA} is done 
when the general EU  budget is drawn up  and  is  subject to the normal adoption procedure for 
that budget (Commission proposal, decision by the Council after Parliament approval}. 
Decisions concerning  allocation to  specific actions are  subject to  variable  internal  decision 
procedures at levels of the hierarchy determined by the amounts concerned: decision by the 
Commission, after consulting the Developing Countries-ALA Committee consisting of Member 
States' representatives, decision by the responsible Commissioner, decision at the level of the 
General Director of DG  I, or even, in the past, at Director level. 
The modalities of  the  execution  of the  project are  fixed,  as  we  saw earlier,  in  the  funding 
agreements relative to each action. 
We  further  note  the  existence  of  horizontal  instruments  such  as  ALFA  (universities)  and 
ALINVEST  (private  enterprises).  URBAL  and  ASIAURBS  programmes  are  currently  in 
preparation,  and  will  be  similar in  inspiration to  the  MED-Urbs  programme  (see 2.1.3.  and 
2.2.3.). 
'+  ..  · 2.1 .3. Mediterranean countries 
The framework to which cooperation with developing countries designated by the acronym MED 
belongs  (Developing  Countries  of  the  South  and  East  of  the  Mediterranean)  or  PTM 
(Mediterranean Third Countries) shares features with both the ACP and the ALA systems. 
As  is  the case with the  Lome Convention, cooperation with these countries is  on  a largely2 
contractual basis: that of Financial Protocols signed with each of them. The Protocols provide 
for partners in  cooperation which  are  not  public authorities.  However,  all  cooperation with  a 
given country is  subject to  the approval  of  its  government3,  and the forms of decentralized 
cooperation that have developed in the ALA zone are consequently few and far between in the 
MED and PTM countries. 
Moreover,  as  is the case with the ALA countries, the funding source for cooperation actions 
undertaken  in  MED countries  is  again  the  Commission's general  budget.  Each  year,  in  the 
course of the budget process, the successive instalments corresponding to the commitments 
made in the Protocols are written into the budget. 
In  parallel with  the bilateral  Financial  Protocols,  various  budget lines,  which  are  fewer and 
smaller  than  those  for  the  ALA  countries,  allow  the  financing  of  a  certain  number  of 
programmes ex-protocol. Within the framework of its 'Revised Mediterranean Policy', the EU 
has vested a new importance in  regional cooperation,  and  more particularly in  an  innovatory 
form  of  regional  decentralized  cooperation:  it  has  created  transmediterranean  networks 
associating decentralized partners in the two regions. The modalities of this will be described in 
greater detail at 2.2.3.  below,  but we  note for now that this form  of  cooperation essentially 
emphasises the creation or reinforcing of networks, not the funding of particular development 
actions. 
2.2  THE CURRENT STATE OF DC IMPLEMENTATION IN THE 
FRAMEWORK OF EU COOPERATION 
2.2.1. ACP countries 
On the basis of the replies to a questionnaire prepared by Unit VIII/B/2 and sent to the desk 
officials of DG  VIII and the Commission Delegations in  1994, it is possible to obtain some idea 
of  how the concept of  DC  has  been  implemented during the first  part of  Lome  IV  (source: 
Report to  the Council on  the  Implementation of  Decentralized Cooperation  under Lome  IV, 
1996). 
The questionnaire obtained a near 60%  response  rate  (41  countries covered).  29 countries 
report programmes inspired by the DC approach. 54 programmes were ongoing, representing a 
total commitment of 574 MECUs from the 6th and 7th  EDFs (as an  indication,  5°/o  of the 7th 
EDF)  were  reported.  Moreover,  26  programmes  were  being  prepared,  13  of  them  having 
2  We note that various budget lines included in the Budget and not, therefore, forming part of the EDF, 
allow the financing of actions in ACP countries which stand outside the Lome framework. 
3  In  the  MED  countries,  as  in  the  ACP  countries,  the  role  of  the  National  Authorizing  Officer is 
absolutely central. estimated costs of 55 MECU. 12 countries reported no programmes related to DC, for a series 
of reasons which will be considered at 2.3. 
These figures must be taken with a pinch of salt, given the differences in  understanding and 
subjective interpretations of the  DC  concept. They do  however allow us  to  detect a certain 
number of  tendencies  in  this  field  under  Lome  IV.  An  approach  towards  decentralized 
cooperation can be found - with variable intensities - in conventional EDF programmes (mainly 
rural development), in Micro-project programmes, and in the more specific DC programmes. 
Conventional programmes 
A  certain  number of  conventional  EDF  programmes  have  been  implemented  with  a  DC 
perspective. Examples are the following sectoral or integrated programmes: 
•  rural development (Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Congo, Guinea, Mali, Niger, Uganda); 
•  urban development (Mali, Cote d'lvoire, Guinea); 
•  support for the private sector (Dominican Republic, Guyana, Kenya). 
Most of these programmes partly fulfil DC principles, but they are for the most part 'top-down' 
programmes, with limited and supervised participation. For example, they rely for execution on 
decentralized  operators.  These operators are sometimes of  ACP  origin,  but  European 
NGOs are generally involved  (Guinea,  Benin,  Cameroon,  Burkina Faso,  Gambia).  North-
South partnerships between decentralized agents are still very rare. 
Some of these programmes are more substantially guided by DC principles: grassroots groups 
are  involved  in  running  interventions  (Niger),  open  and  modulable  programmes  are  used 
(Cameroon), the NGOs occupy an  increased  role  (Cameroon, Gambia), there is  institutional 
reinforcement  and  development of  local  human  resources  (Congo,  Guinea,  Gambia)  and 
participatory planning occurs (Burkina, Gambia, Congo). 
Some programmes constitute an  excep~ion to this rule,  insofar as they have been designed to 
favour maximum participation by  agents;  this  is  true of the  Dominican  Republic (integrated 
programme of  local development via a 'social forum' constituted by local agents, which has 
created  its  own  technical  bureau  to  which  the  execution  of  the  EDF programme has  been 
entrusted, see 4.2.4 and  5.2.1) and  Cameroon  (urban development actions via  intermediary 
associations, supported by a European NGO to which the execution of the EDF programme has 
been entrusted, see 5.2.1 ). 
Micro-project programmes 
The replies to the Unit VIII/B/2 questionnaire show that the  EDF  Micro-project Programmes 
(MPPs)  are often  cited  as  examples of  DC  Programmes  (DCP).  Can  one on  that  account 
conclude that they are indeed DC actions in the sense defined by the Lome Convention and in 
Commission guideline documents? 
The question can be considered by examining the extent to which MPPs are likely to match the 
main  ethical  conditions  expressed  by  the  decentralized  agents  in  relation  to  their 
participation and  involvement in  the  DCP.  These conditions are:  giving  responsibility to  the decentralized agents, participation in  the different levels of negotiation, autonomy in  initiative 
and execution, recognition of different specific roles, the search for complementarity. 
The data that we have acquired about the MPPs of many African countries leads us to believe 
that they  could  satisfy the  majority  of  these  conditions (if  not  all),  but  rarely do  so  in 
practice.  Conformity with  these conditions is  potential  in  the  MPPs,  but rarely realised at 
present.  Moreover, the  institutional frameworks and  practical  procedures of the  MPPs vary 
strongly from one country to another. 
But then, will there be differences between DCPs and  MPPs, and  if so, what will they be? The 
differences should be most noticeable at the level of the content of these programmes. 
MPPs are often confined to an offer of certain kinds of intervention, for the realisation of which a 
contribution is requested from the local group; they are still too often conceived as infrastructure 
construction programmes (in  reaction,  it  is  true,  to  needs expressed at grassroots level,  and 
meeting national priorities: schools,  health centres, water supply systems, etc.);  but they do 
not  generally  lead  to  true  participatory  procedures,  nor  to  the  reinforcing  of  the 
capacities of the beneficiaries, nor to development dynamics at local level; they are more 
generally a relatively _incoherent package of isolated implementations. Further, the MPPs 
are generally managed in very centralised fashion, either directly by the local administration, or 
by  a specific cell (often comprising an  expatriate technical assistant) located within or directly 
dependent on the authorities. 
However,  these  defects  (in  MPPs)  are  not  inherent in  Micro-project Programmes;  they are 
consequences  of  the  way  in  which  this  type  of  programme  is  applied.  Micro-project 
Programmes could be assimilated to DC insofar as they favour: 
•  a more programmatic approach to support for grassroots initiatives; 
•  the joint efforts of the various agents (local authorities, grassroots groups, NGOs, unions, 
chambers  of  commerce,  etc.)  to  establish  a  more  coherent  view of  the  needs  in  local 
development; 
•  a procedure which depends more on participation than contribution; 
•  a more autonomous and decentralized management of the programme; 
•  the development or reinforcement of the capacities of the grassroots agents by more 
integrated  actions  and  by  responses  to  more  transversal  priorities  (training,  follow-up, 
institutional support, communication, consultation between agents), thus remedying some of 
the defects found in most of the MPPs; 
•  the taking into account of accumulated experience and the reinforcement of the existing 
programmes of agents already in the field. 
The amounts authorized for MPPs under Lome IV had attained 105 MECU by late 1994. Of the 
36 MPPs approved,  around a third  incorporate at variable levels one or more aspects of a 
decentralized orientation: 
•  greater involvement of and  transfer of responsibility to  the beneficiary population 
thanks to previous training or information actions (Senegal,  Zambia,  Uganda, Zimbabwe, 
Lesotho, Niger, Tanzania, Mozambique), to the bringing together of NGOs, local authorities 
and  beneficiaries  on  the  programme  pilot  committees  (Mozambique,  Sierra  Leone, 
Swaziland) and to the establishment of local users' committees (Mozambique, Burundi); 
•  emphasis on the reinforcement of the role of local authorities which may be the explicit 
objective  of the  intervention  (Burundi,  Mozambique,  Mali);  local  governments  are  also 
.::: ..  .- .,  ~ ·~ \.~: . brought into the identification, implementation, monitoring and/or management of equipment 
(Zambia, Botswana, Zimbabwe); 
•  having recourse to NGOs for the identification, implementation and monitoring of projects 
(Togo, Mozambique, Angola, Botswana). 
Decentralized Cooperation Programmes 
Some  programmes claimed  to  be  using  DC  methods  during  the  7th  EDF  (Benin,  Ghana, 
Madagascar, Niger, Senegal). 
The  Benin programme aims to  reinforce  the  role  and means of action and organisation of 
representative partners in  civil society.  It consists of supporting local initiatives  via  several 
interfaces (European NGOs, semi-public or  private local entities). An overall funding agreement 
has been signed for the programme with the National Authorizing Officer. The various operators 
to  whom  the  financial management,  control and monitoring are delegated were  chosen  in 
advance. As to  the actions to be taken,  the NAO has delegated decision-making power to  the 
decentralized operators.  Local intermediaries (local authorities, local civic and/or professional 
associations) are given  the  task of monitoring the progress of the action and resolving any 
implementation  difficulties.  Each  operator establishes an  annual work schedule  which  he 
presents  to  the  Commission  Delegation.  Finally,  protocols  for each  individual action are 
established between operator/interface and beneficiaries. 
Certain other interventions should also be  considered  as  'specific• DC  actions,  such  as the 
programme of support for decentralization in Burkina and Mali, the programmes of support for 
municipal  development  in  Cote  d·lvoire  and  Guinea,  the  programme  reinforcing  the  local 
authorities in  Benin, the 'Divisional Development' programme in  Gambia, etc. Other examples 
are programmes being prepared in various countries (Burundi, Mauritius, Nigeria, Zimbabwe). 
Some of these programmes will  be  based  on  existing  MPPs and  will  attempt to broaden or 
convert them into DCPs. These are support programmes for various grassroots initiatives or for 
decentralized local development. The decentralized agents are brought together with the bodies 
concerned  with  decision-making  and/or  execution  of  actions,  and  their  institutional 
reinforcement will be  one of the explicit objectives of these programmes. They are interesting 
experiments, in which a new programme is  built on existing foundations by capitalising on  the 
achievements and practices of previous programmes 
2.2.2. ALA countries 
The census performed by DG  VIII/B/2 did not include all the ALA countries, and our perception 
of decentralized cooperation events in those countries is necessarily fragmentary. 
In  general terms,  it  can  be  said  that  Financial  and  Technical  Assistance  (FTA)  takes very 
traditional forms in ALA countries. The FT A budget line has de facto been allocated above all to 
the funding of governmental projects or those of multilateral organisations (World Bank,  I  DB, 
ADS, UNICEF, etc.) with a strong element of expatriate technical assistance provided by private 
consultancies.  This  was,  however,  mainly the  result  of  a  certain  institutional  culture  and 
particular administrative constraints, rather than legal constraints. There  have  been  exceptions.  Notable  progress  in  decentralization  has  been  observed  in 
countries or regions  where  the  Commission's services  have shown  particular creativeness, 
open-mindedness and innovation. 
In  Asia,  considerable proportions of the budget have been allocated to  private organisations 
under the  heading  FTA  in  projects  directed  against  poverty:  in  1994 in  Bangladesh,  for 
example,  90°/o  of aid  was  channelled through  NGOs (in  particular BRAG  and  PROSHIKA). 
Comparable situations have occurred in India and Sri Lanka. 
In  Central America,  a funding  agreement was signed  with  a private foundation  for an  FTA 
project relating to the problems of indigenous peoples. The regional programme PROCOOPCA, 
whose goal was the development of the cooperative movement, involves decentralized agents 
in  the definition of  priorities, the running  and  execution of actions. The regional  programme 
ALFA, which deals with universities, is  intended to mobilise European decentralized agents in 
the context of  North-South networks.  In  Peru,  the  drinking-water supply programme for tAe 
shanty towns of Lima largely depends on  the participation of neighbourhood committees and 
NGOs. 
The other kinds of budget lines for the ALA countries have been widely accessible to all kinds of 
agents. The Economic Cooperation line -and above all the lines that it has replaced -have been 
very widely used  to  fund  the  projects of decentralized partners  (training  institutes,  peasant 
organisations, universities, unions, chambers of commerce, etc.). 
In other cases again (for example, the budget line for the self-sufficiency of refugees, returnees 
and  displaced  persons),  funding  has  been  broadly  spread  between  'official'  partners 
(governments and  multilateral  organisations,  such  as  UNMHCR,  in  the  example cited)  and 
private partners, mainly but not exclusively European NGOs. A further case is the budget line 
for the support of democratisation processes, which  was allocated almost exclusively to the 
direct funding of (projects by)  local partners: official organisations (electoral tribunals, human 
rights  ombudsmen,  etc.)  but also,  in  very  large  measure,  to  private organisations  (NGOs, 
associations,  indigenous  peoples'  organisations,  etc.).  Finally,  the  cofinancing  of  NGOs  is 
increasingly practised for Latin America, and to a lesser extent, Asia. 
It  can  therefore  be  said  that,  in  ALA  countries,  it  has  been  possible  to  practise 
decentralized cooperation, in the strict sense - based on  the decentralized status of the 
partner without major regulatory obstacles. In some cases, it has also taken a direct form, 
with an agreement signed directly between the Commission and the local partner, without 
any State intermediary, or even any form of previous consultation or approval request. 
This  does  not  necessarily  mean  that  the  cooperation  met  the basic  conditions,  particular 
objectives  and  methodological  characteristics  that  should  be  considered  specific  to 
decentralized cooperation, that is: the objective of contributing to the democratisation of society 
and the use of participatory intervention methodologies. 'Decentralized' cooperation might in 
this sense include, for example, programmes of training, trade promotion, etc. for investors or 
entrepreneurs from privileged social classes. In the same way, the actions funded may have an 
assistance-oriented  or vertical  character,  rather than  that  (decentralizing  sensu  stricto)  of 
mobilising the capacities and initiatives of target-groups. 
It  should also be  noted that the choices  made by  DG  I in  decentralized cooperation favour 
economic development (decentralized  cooperation  through  enterprises)  rather than  social 
development. 2.2.3. Mediterranean countries 
This is not the place for an exhaustive review of the different forms of decentralized cooperation 
practised in  this region.  As we saw above, the DG  VIII/B/2 census confined itself to the ACP 
countries. It nevertheless seemed to us of interest briefly to touch on the new programmes of 
partnership and network creation bringing together decentralized partners in the two regions. 
To date, four crossborder programmes of this type have been established:  MED-Urbs, MED-
Campus,  MED-Invest,  MED-Media;  a MED-Techno programme to which  NGOs have  more 
direct access has also been introduced, and a MED-Associations programmes is in preparation. 
These programmes are  intended to  encourage collaborations and  transfers of  competence 
between  the  individuals,  groups,  and  organisations  of  the  two  regions,  via the creation  of 
decentralized networks constructed around certain cooperation themes such as urban planning 
and  management,  university  teaching,  media,  etc.  The  networks  bring  together  the 
municipalities, universities, business milieux or medias of the two regions. The partners thus 
comprise both official decentralized partners and private partners. 
Each of the programmes established allows the funding of a certain number of sub-projects: 
_research projects, training  action~ seminars and meetings, the creation of services (in particular 
computer services),  etc.  Thus the  programmes  do  not involve the funding  of  development 
actions vis-a-vis particular target-groups. These projects address European partners no  less 
than third partners and the funding benefits the organisations of both regions. 
The  overall  management  of  these  various  programmes  has  led  to  a  rather  sui  generis 
institutional set-up, which is also based on partnership. It comprises the following organisations: 
•  the Transmediterranean Network Agency (TMNA), a non-profit-making association created 
for the  purposes of the  overall  programmes,  which  is  responsible for administrative and 
general management of the foyr specific programmes; 
•  a Selection Committee for sub-project selection, composed of Europeans and Mediterranean 
citizens, which controls the specific commitments and financiat agreements of the various 
sub-projects; 
•  a Technical Assistance Bureau which helps with the execution of programmes and ensures 
monitoring. 
For each  of  these  programmes,  a  funding  proposal  is  submitted  to  the  decision-making 
committee  (the  Developing  Countries-MED  Committee,  comprising  representatives  of  the 
Member States), the EU contribution being paid from the budget line for the funding of regional 
cooperation with  the Mediterranean  region.  On  the basis  of the  modalities  provided  by the 
funding proposals, a funding agreement taking the form of a contract is signed with the TMNA. 
Four agreements of this kind exist to date, one for each of the four programmes cited. 
The selection and funding of a particular sub-project must be subject to the previous approval of 
the Selection Committee. It is conditional on the previous creation of a network associating 
partners in  the two regions. The allocation of contracts to  a particular network is  done by 
tender. The Sub-project Contract is signed by one of the members of the network, the 'Network 
Head', which can be either a European or non-EU organisation. 
This modality of decentralized cooperation, based on  intensive partnership, clearly relies on  a 
set of specific characteristics, and  more particularly on the proximity and close links between two regions and between the countries and societies which compose them: the countries and 
peoples who live on the shores of the Mediterranean have a long shared history of cultural and 
trading links and reciprocal migratory movements. 
To give  some idea of scale,  the financial commitment for the four programmes cited for the 
period 92-94 was 43 MECU, which represents the equivalent of  1  °/o  of the 4th Mediterranean 
Protocol 92-96.  It should be  noted that, subsequent to the Euro-Mediterranean Conference in 
Barcelona in November 1995, the different MED programmes were frozen and are subject to an 
evaluation of their relevance and implementation modes. 
NGO-cofinancing has not been widely practised in  the Mediterranean countries; it represents 
only  5°/o  of  the  total  allocated  to  NGOs  on  this  budget  line.  The  cofunded  actions  are 
concentrated in Lebanon and Palestine. 
2.3  MAIN CONSTRAINTS ON A DECENTRALIZED 
COOPERATION APPROACH 
As we noted in  the preceding point, the concrete results of the implementation of DC  in  the 
context of the 7th EDF remain, for the time being, unspectacular. 
Of  course,  it  could  not  be  expected  that  the  introduction  of  a  new  concept  within  the 
Convention,  involving  a  different  way  of  implementing  development  cooperation,  should 
produce a massive reversal of the trends in European cooperation. And it is also true that many 
specific DC programmes are in preparation or just beginning. Nevertheless, during the first part 
of Lome IV,  if we put aside the Micro-project Programmes (whose form of implementation has 
not basically changed to date) and some more conventional programmes in  which some DC 
principles  have been adopted,  only a small  number of  specific DC  programmes  have been 
implemented in ACP countries (see 2.2.1.). We must emphasise, however, that this observation 
is not particularly revealing, to the extent that a DC approach should be possible in any kind of 
intervention. 
In the ALA/MED countries, certain steps (essentially individual steps taken at the technical unit 
and desk official level) also favour decentralized cooperation. But these initiatives did not, until 
recently4 ,have the benefit of the guidance and connection with a specialist DG  I service (as is 
the case with  DG  VIII,  where the  service is  in  constant interaction with  the  desk officials). 
Moreover,  no  explicit  political  will  seems  to  have  been  shown  relative  to  DC  within  this 
Directorate General. 
This  fact gives  some  idea of  the  incomprehension,  doubts  and  difficulties  experienced  in 
relation to  DC  by aid  managers and  decentralized agents.  It  is  therefore necessary to seek 
some explanation of these mediocre results, in order to find some clues as to a solution5. 
4  An  official  has  recently been  made  responsible for Decentralised Cooperation with  Latin America 
within DG I (ALA and MED countries). 
5  This passage is broadly inspired by Jean Bossuyt's paper · Decentralised Cooperation and the African 
Public Sector: Severai"Actors" [Agents] in Search of an Author'. Bossuyt, who works at the ECDPM, gives 
a very clear analysis of most of the factors that cast light on the situation. 2.3.1. The nature of the Lome Convention 
As  explained at 2.1.1., the Convention confers on  ACP  States,  via the  National Authorizing 
Officer,  a preponderant role  in  the  identification,  implementation, and  management of EDF 
projects/programmes. However, the NAO can formally delegate these powers to decentralized 
agents.  This possibility was  added to the text of  the  Convention after the  mid-term  review 
(Articles 290.2b and 312). 
Nevertheless, the programmes must also, at the end of the appraisal process, be approved by 
the EFD Committee, composed of representatives of Member-States) and by the Commission. 
These are onerous and often long drawn-out procedures, which may discourage decentralized 
agents and  limit their autonomy;  they are,  overall,  unfavourable to  a  bottom-up  notion  of 
development. The simplified decision-making mechanism allows these difficulties to be avoided 
to some extent. It requires less preparation time (programmes need be defined only in outline), 
approval is  quicker (on the basis of a sum to be allocated to one or several countries), and it 
subsequently allows project proposals to  be quickly processed when the projects have been 
identified. 
2.3.2. Lack of information about the Convention 
The content and practical provisions of the Lome Convention are still very little known within the 
ACP countries' societies, and the latter therefore make very little use of the possibilities that it 
offers. Potential or actual beneficiaries of DC thus know still  less about the introduction of DC 
into the Convention; it  is  a little-publicised novelty. This was amply proven during the Harare 
seminar on  DC,  organised by the NGO-EU LC,  where it became clear that few of the African 
NGOs present had even a slight knowledge of the arcane detail of the Lome Convention. 
It is already clear that a well-designed, wide-ranging and effective strategy of communication 
will constitute one of the preconditions of the success of a decentralized cooperation policy. A 
positive step in this regard is the inclusion of a didactic 'chapter' on the Convention in the DC 
manual prepared by the NGO-EU LC for the ACP NGOs (see author bibliography). 
2.3.3. Divergent interpretations of the DC concept 
It was clear at the Harare seminar that not all the 'actors' (agents) in the DC 'play' were using 
the same script: 
•  the representatives of the ACP  states put forward possibilities for decentralized agents to 
participate in the execution of EDF projects/programmes; 
•  the African and European NGOs present made clear their desire to take part in the definition 
of policies; 
•  the representatives of the Commission and  neutral observers attempted to  reconcile these 
points of view and imagine solutions that gave priority to consultation and dialogue. 
The  positive  aspect of  such  meetings  is  that they  themselves  constitute  opportunities for 
dialogue which  have  proved extremely fruitful,  to  the extent that they allow these divergent 
views to  be  heard,  noted,  and,  if  possible, accepted (the Harare seminar was,  moreover, for 
most of these agents,  their first opportunity to  come into contact with  one  another).  Several 
similar meetings have already been or will  shortly be organised in the ACP countries, both at national (Senegal, Zimbabwe, Zambia, Ghana) and regional level. This field of intervention is a 
particularly fertile one for BL 7/6430, which funded most of these meetings. 
2.3.4. Lack of knowledge of the associative fabric 
As  a consequence of several other points already dealt with  in  this chapter, the associative 
fabric of the  civil  societies  of the  ACP  countries  is  little known,  badly identified,  and  lacks 
structure in the eyes of both ACP States and the Commission•s representatives. 
It  is  thus logical that several  actions financed  in  African  countries by the  Commission•s  DC 
budget line should have been meetings/agents• workshops - with a view to structuring them in 
preparation ,for  a  dialogue with  the  Government  - or  studies  intended  to  identify the  key 
institutions of a country. Another encouraging step worth noting is the creation, at the initiative 
of  several  EU  Delegations,  of  inventories  of  local  institutions.  Associative  networks  (e.g. 
DENIVA in Uganda) are, in turn, creating databases on local NGOs. 
2.3.5. Lack of response capacity on the part of EU Delegations 
It is clear that EU  Delegations in ACP countries are poorly equipped to manage the multifarious 
relations  implied  in  DC.  They  lack  both  human  resources  in  general  and  staff  who  are 
experienced in dealing with institutions arising from civil society. 
To the extent that the ACP country decentralized agents are, at best, in the throes of structuring 
it  is  difficult for Delegations to dialogue with the  representative decision-making bodies of a 
society. Moreover, in  many ALA/MED countries, the EU  simply lacks any physical presence in 
the field (there are no Delegations). 
Given this situation, the search for interfaces (whatever form they take) is a sine qua non of the 
design and implementation of DC actions. In this perspective, we go on to recommend recourse 
to permanent and autonomous interface structures. whose role-definition would include a series 
of prospection and'  public relations• tasks. 
On the other hand,  it  is clear that, as  it is  a new approach, DC implies that Delegations must 
venture  off the  beaten  track and  take  risks,  which  they  are  not  all  inclined  to  do.  Some 
Delegations also need to raise their awareness of DC. 
2.3.6. Lack of frank commitment and political will within the 
European Commission 
For various reasons - lack of habituation, the complexity of the operations required, and the lack 
of  appropriate  instruments  and  'institutional  culture·  in  relation  to  participation  and 
decentralization in  EDF-funded actions - the Commission has shown no  great enthusiasm for 
the application of the concepts and principles of DC.  European cooperation shows a notably 
high degree of centralism in decision-making at the Commission in Brussels; this inhibits flexible 
implementation of DC. We must therefore again emphasise the need for the decentralization of 
certain decisions to Delegation level. A clear will and commitment at the different decision-making levels of the Commission is basic 
to DC.  It is also necessary for the various officials concerned to appropriate the theoretical work 
on  DC  and  other  connected  themes.  The  creation  of  a  working  group  on  participatory 
development in  rural areas, which occurred at the initiative of the Unit responsible for sectoral 
policies,  is  one step  in  the  right direction.  Moreover, the  efforts to  raise  awareness of and 
promote DC undertaken by e.g. Unit VIII/B/2 should prove fruitful in the medium term. 
2.3.  7. Absence of specific operational instruments 
We have already pointed out that no specific operational instrument was designed in the Lome 
Convention  IV  in  response  to  the  concept  of  DC.  As  we  noted,  this  was  not  altogether 
necessary, as DC is much more than an instrument; it is a different approach that should find its 
place in most major intervention types. 
But the lack of such an instrument has disconcerted many officials who confess that 'they don't 
know how to set about it'. Lome IV.2, in its new provisions (see 2.1.1.), offers a response to this 
legitimate concern. However, as we pointed out at the end of 2.1.1, this response is somewhat 
reductive in character (Article 251 d). As for the preceding point, the work of Unit VIII/B/2 seems 
fundamental if consciousness about DC is to be raised within the Commission. 
2.3.8. Existing mechanisms ill-suited to DC 
With the exception of the simplified decision-making mechanism on global authorisation (Article 
290,  very frequently used for Micro-project), which  allows an  programme to be  presented in 
broad  outline  for  the  approval  of  the  EDF  Committee  and  the  Chief  Authorizing  Officer 
(Commissioner)  and  subsequent decisions on  actions  at  country  level  to  be  taken  by  the 
National Authorizing Officer and the Delegations, the decisional and operational mechanisms of 
the EDF are ill-suited to decentralized cooperation and a participatory approach. 
We might cite in evidence of this: 
•  the central and preponderant role played by the  National Authorizing Officer; 
•  the EDF project cycle, which  is  ill-adapted to participatory methods and  must be flexibly 
applied, so  as to leave open the possibility of readjustment in the light of the results of the 
previous stages  (see,  for example,  how the  CIDA designs its  management policy in  the 
context of its strategy of capacity development, point 3.1.2.; see also box on point 6.1.2.); 
•  the administrative and financial procedures (signing of contracts, programme-estimates, 
disbursements, financial  control  mechanisms,  etc.)  which  are often  difficult to  respect for 
organisations with limited financial and management capacities; 
•  the management of contracts with  operators at EDF  programme level,  which often  cause 
liquidity crises. Non-governmental agencies are unlikely to survive these; 
•  the eligibility criteria for access to EDF contracts and tenders, which  exclude (where 
there is no derogation, see '6.2.2) non-profit-making associations from contracts and tenders 
for service provision (Article 295 of Lome IV); 
•  the fact that the Commission seems increasingly reticent (reacting, apparently, to  financial 
control pressures) when it comes to entrusting the execution of an action to an operator 
which has identified the action and is its promoter. This problem has  already arisen at 
.. , .•  ,  .... DG  I (in  relation to Peru and Nicaragua), and given the more constrictive regulations of the 
EDF, seems likely to arise at DG  VIII  too;  it is crucial  in  relation to DC,  to the extent that it 
penalises decentralized local initiatives. 
Many practical questions thus arise in relation to the procedures and mechanisms of the EDF, 
and the answers will  no  doubt lead to  some  modification or at least relaxing  of them.  Some 
modifications, such  as  Delegation of the NAO's powers,  greater financial and administrative 
flexibility vis-a-vis decentralized agents, and access for DCPs to accelerated procedures, have 
already been incorporated into Lome Convention IV.2. 
It  may  however seem  paradoxical  to  seek  the  participation  of  new  agents  in  European 
cooperation, with  the concomitant recommendation of a favourable attitude and  a degree of 
flexibility in  the application of procedures, when one observes at one and  the same time an 
increase in  budgetary rigidity and  control,  etc.  It is  therefore important to  bear in  mind that 
procedures should only be  considered as  instruments in  the service of a policy and 
should never constitute obstacles to the implementation of that policy. Procedures all too 
often  constitute  an  excuse for  the  rejection  of  innovations.  They  must  be  adapted  to  the 
strategies defined and to practices in the field. If they become an  inhibiting factor, they must be 
modified. 
2.3.9. Resistance from Southern States and administrations 
The principles  of  DC  often  come  into  collision  with  two  characteristics  of  international aid 
management: 
a)  the Lome Convention has always emphasised a centralising notion of EU  cooperation with 
the ACP States; 
b)  the ACP States themselves have always seen cooperation in terms of centralisation. 
Certain ACP states have resolutely set about decentralizing their activities (this is mainly but not 
exclusively true of Anglophone states). But this policy has been exercised mainly in favour of 
regional and/or local administrations. There is considerable (and  reciprocal mistrust relative to 
non-governmental initiatives and agents. Governments fear delegating their responsibilities and 
thus losing a part of their share of the control of aid resources.  Political considerations often 
take precedence in this area over the contribution of non-governmental agents to economic and 
social development. On  this subject, the language of the Commission Vis-a-vis governments 
must be clear,  and in  some cases Delegations will have to devote effort to imparting greater 
awareness and even to persuasion. 
It should nonetheless be pointed out that in some countries (for example Zimbabwe, Senegal, 
and  Niger),  broad  consultations  on  the  subject  of  the  implementation  of  decentralized 
cooperation  actions  are  currently  taking  place  between  the  States  and  civic  society 
organisations, notably NGOs and grassroots organisations. 
In  implementing  DC,  it  is  important to  retain  a certain  flexibility,  to  impart an  experimental 
character to  the  programmes,  and  to be  attentive to  their pedagogic functions  by  bringing 
different levels of officialdom into close association with the structures created (such as project 
selection, programme steering and monitoring committees). Experience shows that things go 
much better when the agents of the State are involved than when they are excluded. 2.3.1 0. Limited capacities of potential operators 
It is clear that the different types of decentralized agents, especially in the ACP countries, suffer 
from  serious weaknesses  in  their financial  and  administrative and  cashflow  management 
capacities. These weaknesses make them unsuitable to become partners of ACP States or the 
EDF in the immediate future; they have insufficient absorption capacities. 
A  significant  effort  must  be  undertaken  to  remedy  these  deficiencies,  which  is  why  we 
recommend, on the one hand, a firm commitment on the part of the Qommission to a policy of 
capacity reinforcement in the ACP countries, and on the other, specific actions to this end in the 
framework of  projects/programmes  implemented.  This  necessarily involves devoting  more 
resources than before to programme support and partner guidance measures. 
It is in  this framework that North/South partnerships (and even South/South partnerships, via 
the creation of networks and synergies on the basis of regional programmes) take on their full 
meaning. These should not,  however, be partnerships based exclusively on financial aspects 
alone; they should extend to transfers of competence, with the intention of consolidating the 
decentralized agents in the fields of management, organisation, methodology, techniques, etc. 
The decentralized agents insist, on  the other hand, on  the ·made to measure' aspect of DC 
actions, and thus on the importance of sufficient resources being available for the often long 
and delicate programme-preparation phase. For too  long the  notion of  development was  reduced to an  essentially economic and  social 
concept (improvement of living conditions). But it has been enriched in  recent years by these 
two concepts at least: 
•  the concept of ·democratisation', that is, a primarily political concept, one of the dimensions 
of which concerns the role of civil society and the relations between the population and the 
authorities. Democratisation refers to notions such as representation, participation, and the 
reinforcement of the capacities of civil society.  It  is  a process which can  be  promoted by 
decentralized cooperation. 
•  the  concept of  · sustainability'. To improve living conditions  in  an  assistance-oriented' 
fashion,  or  in  a  way  that  is  not  economically  or  ecologically  sustainable,  is  not  true 
development. 'Sustainability' is an environmental but also a financial and institutional concept 
(assuming financial responsibility and ensuring continuity after the end of a project, creating 
sustainable  capacities,  etc.).  In  this  area  too  decentralized  cooperation  has  much  to 
contribute. 
If the implementation of decentralized cooperation is  not to result in effects contrary to those 
sought (i.e.  in  'aid-sprinkling', lack of coherence and  sustainability, decentralization without 
democracy, etc.), it must rely on three key strategic principles: 
•  the development of institutional and human capacities as a central element of actions; 
•  the participation of the population in the development process which concerns them; 
•  support  for  the  administrative  and  financial  decentralization  process~s of  the 
Southern States. 
These three principles should, in our view, constitute the foundation of the European Union's 
development policy.  Decentralized cooperation would be  one of the essential components of 
this policy. 
3.1. CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT 
One difficulty that faces many programmes which involve private associations is that the latter 
are often limited in their technical, professional and organisational  capacities (see 2.3.1 0.). This 
concern was explicitly raised by many of the agencies that we visited during the preparation of 
this paper, and it is one shared by the Southern countries' governments and the Commission's 
Delegations. 
It seems that these deficiencies do not merely constitute a problem  in  themSelves  but have 
distorted the targeting of actions. It is not easy to reach the most penurious in society, and there 
is  a tendency to  satisfy those  who  contrive  (because  they are  capable  of  this)  to  make themselves heard rather than those most in  need. The World Bank has, for example, observed 
(in the context of a study on Social Funds) that the lack of institutional capacities in rural areas 
can distort programmes so that they favour urban milieux, or at least the main institutions and 
decentralized administrations that are based there 1. 
The development and reinforcement of capacities should therefore oc.cupy a central role 
in EU decentralized cooperation policy. 
3.1.1. Conceptual guidelines 
The notion of capacity development (CD) does not merely cover improvement of the technical 
capacities of the local agents. Its central and final objective is the eventual autonomy of those 
agents. 
By technical capacities, we understand those that allow concrete actions to be designed and 
carried through in the context of processes of development or change. These include: 
0  aptitude for implementation of projects and competence in  quality control, financial control 
and management, and promoting the emergence of high level operators; 
0  institutional reinforcement; 
0  capacity to mobilise persons and social groups; 
.0  ability to discuss, with a vision of the available space for solutions, to  offer diagnoses, to 
organise  and  order  problems  hierarchically,  to  choose  intervention  sectors,  to  define 
objectives, to establish priorities, to identify implementation levels; 
0  management of contacts and networks; 
0  effective use of resources. 
With the autonomy of  agents as the long-term objective, this first stage must necessarily be 
accompanied by a reinforcement of analytical capacity, and of the ability to reflect, to establish 
strategies, to negotiate, to inform and to enter into dialogue. This requires setting strategies for 
raising  awareness  and  for empowerment at the  community  level,  coupled  with  synergies 
between grassroots movements, local or regional governments and the international scene. The 
objective is to make use of intermediary structures to set up a process of profound reflection at 
grassroots level, so that society's projects can be influenced by the grassroots. 
All the agents are involved 
Capacity development addresses itself to agents at various levels and must therefore address 
the individuals no less than the organisations that support the development process: States, 
institutional donors, support structures (NGOs and  all  agents able to intervene in  a particular 
programme) and grassroots groups. 
The  NGO Proshika  in  Bangladesh,  which  we  visited during preparation of this  document, 
develops what one might call 'training through organisation', that is,  its principles of action with 
the poorest populations (its target-groups) consist in incorporating them into an organisational 
Another World Bank study,  on  the  implementation of  Pronasol  in  Mexico,  showed that municipal 
capitals, through which funding was channelled, were often favoured over rural communities in terms of 
projects. process with an emphasis on training and vocational education.  The  formation of groups is the 
first stage of Proshika 's intervention: belonging to a group is a precondition of membership and 
access to the NGO's services. In turn,  the group is the foundation on which most activities 2 are 
organised. A recent evaluation makes it clear that the effects of belonging to a group and the 
training action that accompany this had a real impact on the empowerment of the population, in 
terms of both personal attitudes (e.g.  the increased power of women in  the decision to  send 
children to school) and group attitudes (representation of groups in  village tribunals,  taking part 
in committees, etc.). 
On the other hand,  this NGO itself suffered from lack of capacities.  The  CIDA,  in addition to its 
share  in  funding  Proshika,  also  performed continuous  monitoring  throughout  the  89-94 
implementation of the  NGOs programme.  This  support at first took the  form  of a  resident 
consultant,  then of periodic visits by the consultant when it was considered that Proshika had 
developed sufficient capacities of its own in relation to monitoring and management. 
Starting from what there is 
Capacity development must be understood as a developing and evolving process, related to the 
multidimensional local context. It cannot, for example, be separated from the culture, the modes 
and means of communication and information, the living and working habits, and the reference 
and value systems of the society under consideration. 
It thus implies that any and every population has its own know-how. Actions must be based on 
this know-how in  the early stages of structuring and acquisition of new skills.  It  is  essential to 
take the existing capacities as  the point of departure. The question is  how best technologies 
can  (in  the widest sense of the term) be put at the service of local knowledge and transfers of 
skills be organised so as give concrete responses to the problems posed. 
CD  requires that the local  people be thoroughly informed whenever a development action is 
proposed, so that it can be accepted or refused in full awareness of what is meant. This briefing 
must  be  included  in  the  concept  of  'participatory  diagnosis'.  The  priority  is  to  foster 
communication and direct contacts between agents. 
Role of the support structures 
The emergence of grassroots initiatives, the design and setting-up of projects, etc., requires ad 
hoc capacities.  Donors cannot hope that task will  immediately be taken  on  by beneficiaries. 
Structures of a kind suited to the provision of support to grassroots groups or to civil authorities 
are necessary. This guidance must consist both in supervising and assisting grassroots groups 
and in verifying the capacities of the operators, providing technical assistance for the realisation 
of actions and  raising the awareness of  States about the need to take  account of their civil 
societies. Support structures also have an  important mediation role to play between grassroots 
groups and administrations/donors. 
2  Currently,  many organisations only propose activities to groups.  It should not on  that account be 
believed - on the basis of the positive results obtained by these methods - that they should be applied in 
the same way in  all cases: populations can prove quite hostile to  the  forms  of organisation imposed, 
unless motivated by a very strong incentive (e.g.  financial).  There can be no ready-made solutions and the 
minimum level of organisation of the population will not necessarily be the same in  every context and 
every culture. The importance of integration into networks 
It  would  be  foolish  to  suppose that every grassroots group  will  be  able  to  acquire  all  the 
competences  required to  solve the technical or organisational problems with  which they are 
faced or accomplish the changes that they desire. Capacity development must be constructed 
with  a  view  to  insertion  into  networks  already constituted  or  in  course  of  establishment. 
Networks favour exchanges of experience and facilitate access to a wider range of technical 
assistance  services,  competences  and  a  larger scale  of  funding.  They  are  also  fora  for 
communication, creation and imagination. 
Limits 
Among the major problems that CD programmes may face is this: they are intended to  bring 
about a change in attitudes, but such changes are extremely difficult to evaluate from the point 
of view of methods, criteria, or even visibility. 
The culture of functionaries and their'  obligation' to obtain tangible results is also an impediment 
to long, costly programmes, whose results are often difficult to perceive. 
Depending on perspectives, objectives, urgency or need, working out self-originated responses 
- even at the technical level -is  demanding in  terms of time,  money and the consolidation of 
structures; specific competences are needed and a great familiarity with the context as a whole. 
The choices made at the outset of the project may have to be revised. 
Conclusion 
As will now be clear, CD is a complex overall strategy and not simply a sectoral programme. It 
is long-term, costly in time and resources, and its goal is wholesale appropriation by the South 
rather than just acceptance. In  other words,  one must be aware that it is  not a path to quick, 
easy results. Costs must be considered as investments and be related to social and economic 
impact. 
Thus, to attend to capacity development is: 
•  a method for working  more effectively (CD  of the intermediary organisations)  and for 
truly collaborating with the target population (CD of grassroots organisations); 
•  an  end  in  itself  insofar  as  it  contributes  to  the  reinforcement  of  civil  society 
(reinforcement  of organisations  at  different  levels)  and  its  structuring  (favouring  the 
emergence of structured expressions of the grassroots working for its empowerment), and 
thus ultimately to the reduction of inequalities and the democratisation of society. 
3.1.2. Methodological example 
The methodologies applicable in capacity development programmes will vary with the situation, 
the know-how of the agents, the objectives envisaged, etc. The design of support programmes 
must take account of the many possible avenues of approach if they are to respond to different 
situations. By  way  of  example,  we  have  noted  down  the  approach  proposed  by  CIDA  (Canadian 
Cooperation), as  this  agency is  outstanding for the in-depth  reflection  it  has  devoted to the 
question of capacity development and the systematisation of its approach. 
For CIDA, capacity development constitutes the basis of sustainable development, which is the 
first priority of Canadian cooperation. But it is a difficult method insofar as it attempts to take full 
account of the complexity of the situations it encounters. Despite this complexity and its rather 
theoretical aspect, we thought it would be interesting to present the Canadian approach3, since 
it provides an interesting conceptual framework for one indispensable aspect of DC. 
Definition 
Capacity development (CD) is defined thus by CIDA4: 
1/A  process by which individuals and systems, operating in a dynamic context, improve 
their abilities to develop and implement strategies in order to attain goals of sustainable 
improvement in their achievements". 
For CIDA, CD is  in fact a relatively new concept, the most recent conclusion of its reflection on 
development and institutions. Inspired by and including its predecessors 'Institutional Building', 
Development Management' or'  Institutional Development'5,  CD  is  intended as  a broader yet 
more precise notion than these. It differs from them mainly by its inclusiveness: it does not limit 
the implementation capacity of a development process to the improvement of the management 
capacities of an institution, nor to the greater or lesser reinforcement of any individual institution. 
Instead, CD insists on the fact that the improvement of development performance is linked 
to a series of interconnected factors in society as a whole. Work on this environment is 
therefore just as important as work on the institution itself. 
Characteristics 
The CIDA internal working group considered the bases of CD and identified a certain number of 
characteristics: 
•  more than any other institutional concept, CD concentrates attention on  management of the 
interdependence and coordination between organisations; 
•  it  is  integra~ed into a dynamic context, which implies cooperation mechanisms which are 
also dynamic: 
•  CD,  in this perspective, must bring together all of the levels and spheres of the society 
(national, regional, municipal, private sector, public sector, and civil society); 
•  CD is a participatory process in, which agents are made responsible for their actions; 
3  See  C/DA Support of Capacity Development: a Synthesis, May 1993 (Report of CIDA working group 
on  capacity  development)  and  Capacity Development: a  conceptual overview by J  Loubser,  Director 
General of the Policy Unit of CIDA. 
4  For a more complete definition, see the texts and diagrams of J. Loubser. 
5  For a historical analysis of  these ideas,  see 'Capacity Building  - an  overview' prepared by· Peter 
Morgan. •  it is conceived as a long-term process; 
•  given that it  is  multisectoral and  based  on  interconnection, CD  requires that progress be 
made on  several fronts. This requires  a critical mass of interventions and  coordination 
among the donors (see 4.2.5.). 
Framework for the promotion of capacity development 
CIDA has established a conceptual framework for CD promotion. This is an analytic tool for the 
use of officials planning programmes. The objectives of the framework are to: 
•  develop a consensus on objectives among the donors; 
•  evaluate the milieu, the agents and the system of interrelations; 
•  identify the problems or 'capacity gaps'; 
•  identify the appropriate activities by adapting strategies to the existing capacities; 
•  encourage synergies between activities; 
•  facilitate implementation by using  flexible approaches which  ensure appropriation by the 
beneficiaries; 
•  develop a feed-back system to feed  information into  activities which  evolve in  a dynamic 
context and thus favour adaptation. 
The framework reflecting these objectives is presented on the following page.  It comprises five 
preparatory stages. The system of retroactive loops indicates that though the succession of the 
stages follows  a  logical  and  chronological  order,  it  may  nevertheless  be  appropriate  -
depending on circumstances and available information - to  return to a previous stage. 
Development needs are thus constantly redefined, adjusted and modified. By its very nature, 
this process influences the way in  which the project cycle is  managed. The five stages of the 
process are: 
1.  Pe.fi.o.e  ..  Q.bj~~~jy~s 
The first stage is  to establish  a consensus between the  agents as  to the objectives to  be 
reached  in  CD  in  one sector or relative to  a specific development theme. Thus it is  a basic 
principle that the establishment of the policy framework is not the prerogative of the government 
alone. This process must take place at the various levels that enjoy CD support. 
2.  Analy~~.  th~.  ~o.c.i.@l  ~Qn~~xt 
This means an analysis of the various sub-systems which interact within a society, notably the 
social, cultural, political, ecological and economic. This analysis must allow the factors of the 
context which favour or constrain CD to be identified. 
If such an analysis were extended to society as a whole, it would, of course, be impossible. In 
fact, it is  limited to cooperation themes and fields of activity determined by the political context 
and the experience of the agency in the region. Diagram of Jan LOUBSER, in  Capacity Development- A conceptual overview (see CIDA bibliography) 3.  -~~~ntjfy  _  ~~p~_c;_i~.i~~ 
Before designing a CD programme, it is vital to evaluate the existing capacities in  relation to the 
objectives and themes of the programme. This is precisely the object of the identification stage, 
which must determine: 
•  _  what is available and what is necessary for these objectives to be attained? 
•  how are the existing capacities shared out among individuals, organisations and institutions? 
•  what are the capacity gaps that prevent society as a whole being reinforced? 
The following questions help to mark out the identification process: 
•  what organisations are dominant, and why? 
•  who depends on who for what? 
•  what legitimacy do the institutions possess? 
•  who controls what resources? how? 
•  what are the conflict resolution and collaboration modes? 
•  where are leadership capacities found? 
•  who are the key persons? 
4.  _l;_$~_c;~_bli~h.  a~u~:m  .P.ri9r.il.i~~ 
Establishing priorities in a country is not a formal process based on a series of pre-established 
criteria. It is  rather an  iterative and interactive process. This does not prevent the agency from 
considering that a certain number of conditions must exist in  the country if a CD  process is to 
have any chance of success. Among these conditions, we may cite: 
•  a strong commitment to CD at all  levels, in particular, support for CD in  influential spheres 
and among the leaders, whether at local or national level; 
•  the existence i.  of personal and institutional aptitudes to steer and foster the process and ii. 
of resources devoted to CD; 
•  acknowledgement of the long-term nature of the process. 
It is also essential that at the end of this stage of the process, the local agents involved should 
continue to feel that they are making the priorities their own ('appropriating' them). 
s.  _l;_$tc;~_bli~h.  pr.Qg_r:~_ro.r:n.i.og_  .$~r.~teg_i~~ 
The programming of activities brings with it a certain number of strategy choices. A set of six 
strategic choices should be discussed, viz.: 
•  .Ctl.Qng~  .the. q:mt~~l.  in .whi.Gh.  th~  .CO. j~  P..erf9rm~d. 
Examples: adapt structural adjustment and regional  integration policies, international trade 
agreements, etc. 
•  .Cr~at.e.  n~w.  GaP.Q.Giti.e.~. 
Examples: support the policy research and analysis capacity of the NGO sector, train forest 
agents in the rational exploitation of forest resources, etc. 
•  _E;Jjmi.nQJ~.  GQP..~Gi.ty_  !Q$.~. 
Example:  simplify  the  laws  to  facilitate  the  process  of  permit  applications  for  small 
enterprises. 
•  _I;Jjmi.o~t~.  QO_$t~GI.e~  .to  ..  CO. 
Example: simplify the laws for obtaining licences for small enterprises. •  f_q.youx .b.ett~r.  us.e. Pf.  ~~i~ti.ng_  G9:P.c;l.Giti.e~. 
Example: support the improvement of institutional performance by better resource use. 
•  .Re.d.lJG~  .tb.e. d~mao.o.  Pn -~-~j~ting.  Cc;l.P~Gi.t.i~~·-
Example: development of small decentralized public service units (health and others) vyhich 
do not require major State funding. 
In  practice,  CD  support  activities  will  take  forms  corresponding  to  the  different  elements 
constituting the  capacity,  as  defined by Loubser in  his  conceptual  document for Canadian 
cooperation: 
•  support for the definition of laws, rules and norms; 
•  development of leadership and management capacities; 
•  reinforcement of policy and strategic planning; 
•  development of human resources; 
•  mobilisation of resources; 
•  institutional and organisational development. 
CIDA thus possesses a conceptual framework intended to orient the overall development policy 
of the agency, and to order entire projects/programmes. It seems unlikely that the same could 
be done within the EU, as this kind of reflection has not yet developed to nearly the same extent 
within the Commission. This framework ought nevertheless to be applicable to specific sectors 
or themes of CD,  in the form of guidance measures for conventional/CO projects/programmes. 
Some examples of these are to be found at 5.4. 
3.2.  PARTICIPATORY DEVELOPMENT 
3.2.1. Definitions, evolution of the concept, different perceptions 
The concept of 'participation• is nothing new in the theory and practice of development. We saw 
in the first chapter that it was one of the preoccupations of many decolonised countries in  the 
early 60s.  But the  concept  has evolved  and  only  in  recent years  has  a  consensus·  as  to 
principles appeared  in  the  discourse of cooperation agencies on  the need for grassroots 
participation if development is to be sustainable 6. 
This recognition  has emerged from  a questioning of traditional  development approaches,  in 
particular doubts as to their capacity of sow the seeds of sustainable development. However, 
the degree of participation envisaged, and the objectives pursued by the agencies who favour 
this path, vary from agency to agency. 
6  The OECD has for some time organised a working group on this subject- under the impulse of CIDA 
in particular - which brings together the majority of donors. Some definitions of participatory development (PO) 
The World Bank, which has devoted considerable resources to theorising participation and 
its implementation, gives the following definition: 
"A process through  which the various agents influence and share control over the 
development initiatives, decisions and resources that affect them". 
This definition has the advantage of simplicity, but it must be borne in mind that the main 
objective of the  World  Bank in  its  desire  to  promote participation is  to  improve the 
effectiveness and sustainability of the programmes that it funds.  The objective is  thus 
confined by being that of a banking institution anxious to improve the results of its  long 
term investments. 
For many  other donors,  private  and  public,  participation is  more than  a  means of 
increasing the effectiveness and ensuring the viability of its projects; it is  an end in itself. 
Starting from the principle that the power to influence decisions by which one is affected is 
a fundamental human right, one of the objectives of cooperation must be to reinforce the 
capacities of persons and institutions so that they can determine and take responsibility for 
their own development priorities. 
The UNDP defines grassroots participation as: 
"A process whose objective is  to  make people capable of initiating an action for self-
reliant development and of  acquiring the capacity to  influence and manage change in 
their society''  7• 
Promoting participation is,  in  this  sense,  nothing other than  fostering  the exercise of 
democracy in both political and economic fields. The result of a development action which 
considers participation as an objective will be less a result quantifiable in economic terms, 
more an  increase in people's capacity to initiate actions by themselves, to carry them out, 
or again to influence the decisions of more powerful agents. This aspect of participation is 
essential to sustainability. 
For CIDA: 
"Participatory development refers to a process by which society is actively involved in all 
the phases of  a development action. It must therefore lead to  a greater equity in the 
distribution of  political and economic power. It involves more democracy, an increased 
role for local organisations, respect for human rights, the full participation of  women in 
all decisions, a greater freedom of  initiative, and the creation of  the conditions necessary 
to make this process sustainable"  B. 
This definition indicates that PD is  a conception of development which deals with the 
democratic functioning of a given society  in  an  overall perspective that transcends the 
limited framework of the development project or programme. 
It is  the  CIDA definition which  seems  best to match the various objectives pursued  by the 
European  Commission  in  the  context of putting  into practice the  concept of decentralized 
cooperation. 
7  UNDP  Governing  Council,  document  DP/1 992/7,  cited  by  Donnelly-Roark  in  Reinventing 
Bureaucracy, p6 (see UNDP Bibliography). 
8  Discussion paper of the CIDA Policy Branch  (1 991) cited by Beaulieu and Manoukian in Participatory 
Development, pp. 12-13 (see CIDA bibliography). It should be emphasised at this stage that considering participation as an  end in  itself - with a 
view to  the  sustainability of actions - has  major implications for the  design of development 
proj~cts and for their objectives. 
In general, taking PO as an overall approach to development involves setting up mechanisms 
to involve the population - from the start - with the different stages of the development 
process.  It  will therefore be  necessary to consider participation at all the  different decision-
making levels: 
•  the local level, the context for decisions on actions to be undertaken vis-a-vis the beneficiary 
population (projects, materials and capacity enhancement); 
•  the meso level, the context for decisions concerning programmes, but also of the institutions 
which apply the policy decisions taken at the macro level; 
•  the  macro  level,  in  which  political  decisions  are  taken.  As  regards  the  EDF,  this  will 
principally  include  indicative  programming  and  the  sectoral  choices  determined  in  that 
framework. 
Work  is  necessary  to  ensure  the  articulation  of  the  different  levels.  For  example,  the 
development of a local space (that of a grassroots group, or the zone of influence of a support 
organisation) cannot be designed without articulating it with  national policies. Things must be 
done such that the population has the opportunity to express and formulate  its  potential and 
desires but also the capacity to influence the sectoral development choices made at the macro 
level  (see 4.3.1.). Organisations arising from civil  societies  in  the South  have also - rightly -
expressed the desire to be take part in the definition of national development priorities. 
In  the  context of the  Lome Convention,  the  potential agents of many ACP countries  have 
expressed the  desire  to  participate  at every stage,  starting  with  indicative  programming. 
Participation of this kind can however cause practical problems (lack of structures representing 
the decentralized agents and of formalised consultation fora)  or political problems (the  States 
are opposed to  this),  and could on  occasion be difficult to  realise given the deadlines for the 
drawing up  of National Indicative Programmes (the programming exercises for Lome IV (2) 
have, for example, already begun). Let us nevertheless recall that the Commission and the ACP 
States are committed (by the declaration annexed to  Lome IV.2,  see 2. 1. 1.)  to  attempting to 
organise  exchanges  of  view  with  the  decentralized  actors  concerning  the  indicative 
programmes. 
Finally,  it seems obvious that the effects of a participatory conception of development can  be 
appreciated only in the medium or even the long term. This implies the need for continuity in the 
commitment  of  the  donors,  and  that  they  agree  to  value  results  other  than  short  term 
implementations. 
In  terms  of  agents,  the  partners  of  governmental  agencies  for  the  implementation  of 
development projects have traditionally been States. This approach was questioned by certain 
agencies  in  the  context  of  their choice  in  favour  of  participatory  development.  This  new 
perception of development leads them to  give a central place to the main protagonists of this 
process: the beneficiary population  and  the  organisations that arise out of  it.  The  donors, 
official as well as-non-governmental, must therefore accept that they are agents external 
to the process taking place, and that their function  is the support and guidance of the 
population rather than direct intervention. Support structures like NGOs and certain private sector organisations also have essential roles 
to play. The latter can be instrumental, in the sense that their basic task is to make it possible 
for the  individuals  that  they  represent  (and/or  for  which  they  work)  to  participate  in  the 
development  process9.  However,  these private organisations, through which  it  is  hoped to 
realise the decentralization of cooperation, do not necessarily contribute to the democratisation 
of society. They are not necessarily representative of the sectors and  causes to which they 
claim allegiance, nor do they necessarily act in their favour.  It is not inherent in their nature that 
they should adopt participatory rather than dirigiste or assistance-oriented methodologies and 
pluralist rather than sectarian/authoritarian methods of functioning. 
It will  be the donor's business to  undertake the analyses and  evaluations that will  allow it to 
choose the  most  suitable  cooperation  partners,  to  verify their methodologies  and  the  real 
content  given  to  concepts  such  as  participation,  a  positive  gender approach,  democratic 
functioning,  etc.  To  this  end,  at  4.1.1.  we  present a methodology for the  identification  and 
evaluation of the key institutions of a given society, and of the potential roles and characteristics 
and of the main decentralized aqents at 4.1.4. 
3.2.2. Advantages of participation 
Today's  participatory rhetoric  has  won  over almost  all  donors,  to  such  an  extent that the 
advantages of participatory development are known to most cooperation programme managers. 
Among the main advantages, we may cite: 
In general 
•  a better identification of the needs and priorities felt by the population; 
•  control  of  the  relevance  (especially for the  poorest)  and  suitability of  the  development 
process ensured by the interventions of one and all; 
•  a greater effectiveness, a greater comprehension and a better designed programme, since 
the projects are based on the preoccupations and ideas of a greater quantity of agents; 
•  a better balance between human capacities and investments in physical capital; 
•  a greater transparency, everyone made to feel more responsible, and improved institutional 
performances; 
•  a greater fluidity in the exchange of information; 
•  greater equity thanks to the involvement in the process of development of the poorest and 
most marginalized; 
•  self-multiplying effects, the successes of some inciting others to form groups; 
•  more complete results at certain stages, such as that of evaluation, thanks to the multiplicity 
of points of view and greater impact, since the beneficiaries are involved in the process and 
can more easily appropriate the results. 
9  The  World  Bank  (Bhatnagar,  see  bibliography)  presents  various  agents  as  'instruments'  of 
participation: local organisations, intermediary NGOs, Apex NGOs,  agents of local development, central 
government agencies, and private sector mechanisms. For the agents 
•  a greater commitment and  better appropriation of the policies and projects, which can take 
the form of a desire to share costs and an interest in maintaining the benefits of the actions; 
•  reinforcement of their capacities as a consequence of their participation in the development 
initiatives; participation developing both their personal capacities, in  leading them to give of 
their best,  and their feeling of belonging to the community, which  increases their sense of 
responsibility relative to what becomes a'  common good'; 
•  a strengthening of the links between the  members of a community who at the same time 
acquire a wider vision of their involvement. 
It  should  be  noted  that the  best  results  with  the participatory approach  are  obtained  when 
actions have a direct economic effect and tangible results for the population supported. 
3.2.3. Constraints and limits of participation 
Participation has gained a vast amount of ground in the discourse of donors, but, alas, 
little ground in fact. During the study-missions and research undertaken in the context of this 
work on  the development activities of the World Bank,  UNDP,  UNFE,  CIDA,  and  Dutch and 
Danish  cooperation,  which  included  several  of  their  projects,  we  attempted  to  find  out  in 
interviews the reasons for this wide gap between practice and theory. 
Contacts with these agencies brought to light three categories of constraints and limitations: 
Constraints and limits inherent in the participation process 
The main constraint in the participation process is that it  requires a great deal of time: time for 
the identification of the key agents and the local leaders; time for dialogue with the agents in 
general  and  for the  strategy  revisions  that  this  might  imply;  time  for  the  processes  of 
participatory evaluation, which take much longer than external evaluation; finally, and above all, 
time  for  capacity  and  institutional  reinforcement  which  is  the  keystone  of  participatory 
development.  This  means  that  participatory  development  requires  of  its  various  external 
participants (including donors) long term commitments. 
By way of example,  we note a rBcent commitment of 16 years made by GTZ to partners in  the 
context of a development programme in Senegal. 
In  Uganda,  the  overall commitment of DANIDA  to  the  Rakai project (cited at 3.3.6.) is  tor a 
period of 15-20 years. 
Setting  up  this  process thus  requires  a much  slower approach  than  conventional .projects, 
without any visible results during the early stages. Some have gone so far as to suggest that 
the first step consists of 'doing nothing',  i.e.  to  take the temperature,  listen,  look,  meet,  and 
understand in more or less informal fashion. 
The  desire to  involve the  poorest and  most  marginal  populations  in  development support 
programmes often meets with  practical obstacles such as distance, the lack of communication 
infrastructures, and language. Participation also comprises risks in that it can cause or renew conflicts between agents who 
have different  priorities  and  interests.  The  search  for the  consensus  which  underpins the 
participatory approach many in some cases lead to a lack of decisions and inertia. At the local 
level, that search may be prevented or even threatened by obstacles at other levels (political, 
economic, environmental, contradictory intervention methodologies of the aid agencies, etc.). 
Another risk  relates to  the fact that the expectations generated  by the implementation of a 
participatory process may prove impossible to satisfy for reasons, political, economic or social. 
Finally,  one  of our interlocutors pointed out that the process of participation was difficult to 
implement because  mentalities and  behaviour are  naturally 'centralist'. This psychological 
consideration is  excessively general,  but no doubt contains an  element of truth.  It draws our 
attention to the fact that participation is  not simply a political or methodological challenge, but 
requires first and foremost profound changes of attitude. 
Constraints and limitations related to national contexts 
A favourable  political  environment  is  a  necessary  condition  of  the  implementation  of 
participatory projects, particularly for governmental or multilateral agencies which are under an 
obligation to work with States. In any development process, centralism, bureaucracy, the lack of 
participatory  tradition,  and  sometimes  even  the  repressive  behaviour  of  certain  local 
governments,  can  inhibit  the  participation  of  civil  society  in  general  and  of  the  most 
impoverished  in  particular.  Participation  also  requires  setting  up  a  political,  legal  and 
administrative framework that constitutes  an  enabling environment.  Under this  heading,  we 
might  cite  the  fact  that  various  countries  are  implementing  policies  decentralizing  their 
administrations  (Anglophone countries  in  Africa,  Senegal,  Burkina  Faso,  Bolivia)  or social 
policy (Mexico). See examples at 3.3 and 4.2. 
Relative to the attitudes of governments vis-a-vis a participatory approach to development, we 
note that these are not generally monolithic and that various shades of opinion may appear in 
government. It can therefore be crucial (though, in the case of the EDF, the role of the National 
Authorizing Officer is fundamental) to identify a'  champion• of participation in the government (at 
political or high-tier administration level) who can facilitate the adoption by the government of a 
participatory approach such as the Commission recommends. 
Another fundamental  constraint is  the  difficulty of  finding  local organisations which  are 
genuinely representative and  possess  the  structural  and  managerial  capacities  and 
specific competences to  put participatory methods  into practice.  They must have sufficient 
managerial  capacity  to  prepare,  negotiate  and  implement  development  projects  and 
programmes.  The  limits  of the  organisations  arising  from  local  civil  society often  form  an 
obstacle to the promotion of participatory development on a scale above that of micro-actions. 
There  is  also  the  danger that elites may appropriate the participatory process (this is 
similar to the idea of development 'brokers•1°). One path to follow in the light of all this would be 
the creation of ad hoc structures, financed by the funding source, managed by contractual staff, 
independent of the State and neutral vis-a-vis the decentralized agents and potential operators. 
We present this kind of set-up at 5.3.5., on the basis of a GTZ example in Benin. 
10  See J. P.  Oliver de Sardan and Th. Bierschenk:  Les courtiers locaux du developpement  [The Local 
Development Brokers], author bibliography. Finally, an unfortunate consequence of participatory development in sectors normally supported 
by the State might be a loss of interest on the part of the State, which can neglect or withdraw 
from social or other services for which it is,  in theory, responsible. 
Constraints and limitations related to donors 
The analyses of the various donors have all tended to suggest that many major obstacles to 
participation are internal to the development agencies themselves. 
Several times we heard mention of the lack of an 'institutional culture•  of participation. In 
practise,  this  means  a  certain  reserve  or  even  distrust  within  agencies  relative  to  both 
participatory processes and civil society organisations which possess different logic's or modes 
of functioning.  Moreover, the officials of development agencies naturally seek interlocutors of 
the same level as themselves, that is, local civil-servants. 
Civil  servants often show a lack of clear understanding as  to why agencies have adopted a 
participatory strategy in their projects. The fact that North/South relations have traditionally been 
paternalistic in character or based on the balance of power add to their incomprehension. There 
is then  a danger that they perceive the participatory strategy as a fashionable  rather than  a 
responsible choice. 
Often,  those  who  wish  to  promote  participatory  development  within  a  multilateral  or 
governmental development agency are discouraged by the  lack of support or incentive from 
their institution. The criteria used to evaluate the work of functionaries are more often based on 
rates of disbursement and  respect for deadlines than on the quality or viability of the projects. 
This does of course form an obstacle to the implementation of participatory projects, which, as 
we have seen,  require a lot of time. We might add frustrated expectation of visible results or 
changes within the deadlines imposed. 
The  lack of institutional culture favourable  to  participation  is  also  indicated  by  the  lack of 
personnel  specialised  in  this area and  the complete absence of  general  training for 
functionaries in the demands of participatory development and its methods. Functionaries 
in charge of projects do not necessarily have any field experience, and this makes it difficult to 
establish good relations with local organisations and limits their capacity correctly to analyse the 
results of monitoring operations  11. 
The overwork borne by many functionaries and the weakness of the local representation of the 
agencies are also  important limiting  factors.  Another is  the  rotation  of  executive personnel, 
since participatory projects require  more preparation and execution time and  above all  more 
personal involvement. 
We must also mention a further constraint that had been analysed in  depth by certain donors 
and  which  could  indeed,  in  certain  cases,  considerably  hinder  the  implementation  of 
decentralized cooperation.  This  is  the  lack of flexibility  of  administrative and  financial 
procedures and above all  in  their application. These bureaucratic mechanisms cause delay 
and administrative difficulties which sit uneasily with the activities of grassroots communities. 
11  It should be noted that the agencies of the United Nations system that we visited regularly recruit their 
staff from the NGO milieu. More particularly, traditional project cycle management, as generally applied by the agencies, is 
much  criticised  in  the context of participatory development.  It  is  often  accused of being the 
reflection  and  the  instrument of top-down conceptions of development and  of  reflecting  the 
perspective of persons external to the development process. More precisely, it is criticised for its 
lack of flexibility. 
Among  other inhibiting  factors,  we  should  also  note  inadequate  monitoring,  the  failure  to 
document evaluations and thus to capitalise on experience, weak internal analytical capacities, 
and a constant lack of attention to questions of gender. 
A  series  of  observations  about the  obstacles  internal  to  aid  agencies  and  their ways  of 
overcoming them is presented below. It is based on visits to the different agencies and on their 
publications 12 . 
Overcoming certain obstacles to Participatory Development 
internal to aid agencies 
In terms of the ways in which aid agencies work, the lack of a stimulating culture and of 
adequate training or consciousness-raising can  impede Participatory Development. The 
same is true of working habits, procedures (time and budgetary constraints are no incentive 
to  Participatory Development), the contradiction  between work evaluation criteria and 
Participatory Development, and the apparent incompatibility between individual career 
objectives and PD constraints. 
It is  important to identify the factors that impede work in Participatory Development and 
eliminate them. Several agencies have proposed paths around these internal obstacles. 
For example, there may be tension between the continuity of personnel necessary for PD 
and the individual's career perspectives (e.g.  where promotion is  linked to the number of 
posts a person has occupied, staff are likely to be rotated). But this is not a good reason to 
'marry' staff to projects since the consequence would probably be that no PD projects at all 
would be initiated. A  better course would be  to  seek methods that allow contacts and 
experience acquired since the  beginning of the  project to  be  conserved (methods  for 
conserving institutional memory). 
Over  and  beyond  these  practical  obstacles,  the  implementation  of  Participatory 
Development basically depends on attitudes to it: on its valorisation within aid agencies. It 
is  vital that the whys and wherefores of PD and  its methods be understood, and that the 
cultural and practical obstacles to it be eliminated. 
It should not,  however, be thought that a 'magical operation' can change the balance of 
forces within an  institution. For example, creating a bureau specialising in the gender and 
development questions does not necessarily create respect for this kind of analysis and does 
not prevent some officials considering it a new fashion which is not really worth listening 
to; habits die hard, especially when they are rooted in our stocks of prejudice ... 
.  .. ; ... 
12  Cf Bhatnagar, Chs 2 and 8 (see World Bank bibliography); Schneider (see OECD bibliography) and 
Donnelly (see UNDP bibliography). Among the factors that can favour DP, we note the need to have more personnel trained and 
experienced in the institutional and socio-cultural aspects of development (for example, to 
recruit more specialists in the human sciences, recruit local personnel rather than foreign 
consultants  ... ). Multidisciplinary teams are another necessity. 
Finally, it seems that in certain agencies, in particular the World Bank, the lack of practical 
experience in  PD work is  much regretted, and  it  has  been  pointed out that this  is  not 
necessarily characteristic of a particular training; some engineers have more experience than 
anthropologists who have never worked at grassroots level. The personal qualities of project 
managers can prove more important than their academic training. 
Two  actions  can  be  taken  to  meet  these  perceived  needs  in  aid  agency  personnel 
competence: recruit further staff where possible (obviously, such possibilities are limited); 
and reorient the institution's personnel in a way that encourages and motivates Participatory 
Development work in the institution. 
Where administrative pressures cause attitudes in the staff that inhibit their working with 
PD, staff evaluation criteria should be  modified to avoid this. B.  Bhatnagar suggests four 
methods of doing this: 
- conduct training sessions on reasons, methods, and case studies; 
- set up an incentive (stimulation) system,  which does  not mean bestowing financial 
advantage on functionaries who take PD initiatives, but that the hierarchy should clearly 
acknowledge PD; or that initiatives and positive experiences of PD should be valorised 
and their visibility maximised (favour experimentation, encourage innovation). 
- use promotion to favour experiments and recompense initiatives in PD; possibilities and 
criteria of promotion vary  from one organisation to  the  next (and according to  their 
hierarchical organisation) and such a proposal may require modifying these criteria; 
- undertake  staff exchange  programmes  with  NGOs,  that  is,  create posts  in  the 
operational departments of the aid agency which are occupied in rotation by local NGOs. 
3.2.4. The cost factor of participation 
All  the  agencies consulted agreed that the  participatory approach  meant increased  project 
costs, mainly in the design and preparation phases but also for supervision. But this judgement 
should be qualified, since the increase is probably less obvious if the improved appropriation of 
results and greater viability of actions is taken into account. 
Some donors report a 1  0-30o/o  increase in wage costs relative to conventional projects, mainly 
in  the design and  preparation  phases,  in  the form of  weeks of  man-hours and  supervision 
missions. This increase in medium and long term costs is also related to technical appropriation 
and  beneficiaries  learning  and  taking  responsibility,  that is,  to the very process of capacity 
development. 
By contrast, some programmes (for example, ALA Drinking Water in  the shanty towns of Lima 
and Micro-enterprises) consist in organising and reinforcing the capacities of local institutions 
which are the main agents and partners in the actions.  The technical assistance costs allocated 
to  these programmes are  extremely low (16%  in  the  case  of the  Drinking  Water project) 
compared to the T  A cost of conventional programmes,  where they can reach up to 50%,  and 
sometimes more, of the European contribution. In  any case, where a participatory approach is  adopted, support measures for projects should 
no  longer be  considered  as  technical  support in  the  strict sense,  but  rather as  guidance, 
supervision, extension and facilitation. The costs of these measures must therefore amount to a 
high percentage of the overall programme ·(30% seems a reasonable limit) given the multiple 
tasks facing the interface structures responsible for the support programme (see 5.3.3). 
Against these cost increases  must be  set the advantages,  some of which  are  quantifiable, 
deriving  from  the  participatory  approach.  It  is  therefore  necessary to  consider costs  in 
relation to the long term benefits which result from the better appropriation of the instruments 
and objectives. 
We note, in particular: 
•  decentralization and participation cause greater attention to expense, and in general a more 
rational use of resources by the beneficiaries. On the one hand, they feel  more responsible 
as agents; on the other, when the resources are tax revenue (and thus their own taxes), they 
have a more acute awareness of the origin of the funds; 
•  improved staffing in  certain fields such as  health, where health assistants can prove more 
effective than doctors and nurses while costing less; 
•  the possibility of increased voluntary contributions, whether in terms of money, time or work; 
•  insofar  as  there  is  real  appropriation  of  tools,  the  beneficiaries'  mastery  of  the  tools 
considerably reduces breakdowns and maintenance costs; 
•  greater recourse to local resources (consultants, grassroots organisations created to serve 
their members, NGOs, etc.) can limit cost increases. 
Moreover, in traditiol)al approaches, the local agents, who are rarely integrated into the process 
of projects,  have the feeling that they are dependent on  agencies or local government. They 
find that they have little or nothing to  say about development. This can  lead to  indifference, 
accumulated resentment, and even to deliberate obstruction of projects imposed from without. 
3.2.5. Participation mechanisms 
Since the theme of participation should be at the heart of decentralized cooperation, this seems 
a good time to describe some of the mechanisms which allow its implementation. They are 
placed in order of the intensity of participation that they allow: 
1)  .lnJ.Q.r:IJJ.@.ti.o.n .!?.l:l.~r.i.ng  ..:o.e~tJ~ni~m$ 
Dissemination of oral  and  written  information,  if  possible in  the  language of  the various 
agents,  information  seminars,  public  presentation  of  information  relating  to 
programmes/projects. 
2)  .C.9.0$.\I.I.t@_ti.o.n .r:o.e~tJ~ni~m$ 
Consultation meetings, interviews in the field at different stages of the programme. 
3)  J~~ntjf_i~~ti9.n~.m9.nit9.rh19.  ~n~J9.int~v.~l&J~t.i~n.  m~~hanl$.r:tJ.!? 
Use  of  participatory  methodologies  for  identification,  monitoring  and  joint  evaluation 
activities. 4)  .P~_c;:_i~j~:m.  ~h~ring_m~c.b~n.i~m~ 
Participatory programming and planning techniques, workshops and seminars to determine 
priorities and roles, diffusion and revision of'  draft' versions of documents by all the actors. 
5)  Co.U~.b.ox~_ti.o.n  .oo.e.ch~nj~m$. 
Formation  of  committees  with  the  representatives  of  the  various  agents,  joint working 
groups, and making the agents feel responsible for their part in the execution of the action. 
Participation in costs might also be mentioned under this heading. 
6)  Cap_~_c_i~Y- r.ejnfQ_r:c.e_m.ent ~mt  ~mP.PWe.r:ro.e.o.t  .oo.e~h~ni~m$. 
Reinforcing the  capacities of  individual  agents and  organisations  representative  of the 
various agents,  delegation  of  powers and  self-management,  support for new initiatives 
proposed by the agents. 
The three first mechanisms are preconditions of the participation of the agents, while the last 
three  represent real  opportunities to  influence and  share power over actions,  decisions and 
resources. 
Conversations with  agency officials,  mainly from  UNFE,  made  it  clear that  each  of these 
different mechanisms of  participation are  appropriated to a  greater or lesser extent, 
depending on  the sector  involved  in  the  programmes,  the  size  of  the  programmes,  and 
whether the agents have been made responsible for their long term financing. Some examples 
can be given: 
In a water supply programme,  it is important that users who are to  take responsibility for the 
recurrent charges related to  installations should have their decision-making and management 
capacities reinforced as soon as the design phase of the project begins. 
In a programme of seed-credit tor small enterprises, by contrast, it is not wise tor the enterprises 
to  have a say in  decisions about credit allocations, as there are conflicts of interest.  It seems 
particularly advantageous, in the case of seed-credit, to involve the beneficiaries in  the control 
of operations. The system of common-interest groups, based on social pressure and the mutual 
control exercised by the beneficiaries, has proved effective in certain cases. 
In  a major communications infrastructure construction programme,  the  State should consult 
those who will be affected. It should not,  on the other hand, delegate its decision-making power 
or entrust the management of the infrastructure to users. 
It  is  of course very difficult to establish a typology of the mechanisms best suited to particular 
sectors;  mechanisms  must  be  adapted  to  the  context.  But  it  would  be  useful  to  have 
instruments that helped to clarify the situation; experience shows that various donors often tend 
to opt for a minimal element of participation. The elaboration of such instruments requires in-
depth work which goes beyond the framework of this reflection on decentralized cooperation. 
To  sum  up,  participation  mechanisms  must  vary  with  the  agents  and  the  maturity of  the 
grassroots groups. Progressive introduction of participation is required. 
The methodologies of intervention used in urban and rural milieux are similar if not identical, but 
the approach must be very different. 
An example from Benin shows that the situation in rural milieux is often clearer: there are fewer 
agents and the relations between people are stronger, rural populations are often more strongly organised and are still based on traditional structures.  In urban milieux, the social diversity,  the 
absence of collective memory, and political interference mean that the least activity requires in-
depth analysis of the  agents and their 'struggles',  and the  implementation  times are often 
longer. 
Another example,  from  Chili,  suggests  that  things  are  completely different  there:  urban 
populations have a long associative tradition and are 'ripe' for participatory activity, whereas it is 
difficult to  work with  the  rural population in  this  way,  as rural organisations suffered severe 
repression during the dictatorship. 
Finally,  the emergence of well-structured urban associative movements in Mexico subsequent 
to  the  1985 earthquake,  when governmental incapacity was clear to  see,  show that external 
factors can make a participatory approach easier in urban milieux. 
As to the form which participation should take at the different stages of a project, though there 
are  'participatory'  methods,  there  are  no  'off-the-peg'  solutions.  There are,  of  course,  the 
participatory methods of the local population, which should be taken into account. 
In Chapter 6,  whose subject is the implementation of decentralized cnoperation, we therefore 
present a certain  number of  guidelines relative to  participation,  which  it  seems to  us  vital to 
respect at the key stages of the project (identification and selection of actions, implementation, 
monitoring and evaluation). 
3.2.6. G~neral recommendations for improving participation 
It is difficult to make general recommendations because the situation in the country in question 
will create or eliminate fundamental obstacles. But certain points,  relating to certain agents or 
steps in the process, should be taken into account. 
•  Support  local  governments  in  the  steps  they take  to  set  up  a  suitable  form  of 
decentralization at both local administration and local elected authority level. This should 
take the form of introducing the proper legal measures, by the participation of the maximum 
number of functionaries in  the elaboration of  policies and  the  maintenance of  a political 
climate favourable to public debate. 
•  Encourage  governments  to  establish  clear  political  choices by  sharing  out  public 
finances  in  a  way  which  prioritizes  investment  in  sustained  training  and  education 
programmes, and programmes of human resource promotion and development. 
•  Start from what there is and from what is most visible by initiating actions which have the 
highest chance of success, mainly in communities which already have participatory practices, 
and, where possible, building on previous programmes governmental or otherwise. 
•  Create pilot-projects. Since the participatory approach is  still at an  experimental phase, 
pilot-projects should be  designed to test participatory mechanisms, and the capacities and 
sense of responsibility of organisations before introducing larger scale programmes. 
These pilot-projects  make allowance for the  right  to  error,  but  at the  same time  help to 
develop  rigorous  monitoring  and  evaluation  systems.  Donors  must  make  provision  for 
organisations to adapt to the situaUons that they find;  there must therefore be a desire to 
learn not only from one's own experiences but also to adapt to the realities of the situation. 
Control and evaluation activities are essential to this goal. •  Organise  meetings  between  groups  which  have  different  perspectives  on  the 
participatory approach, that is, those which are favourable and those which are opposed to 
or critical of it.  Not everyone and not every group in the community will have a positive view 
of participation. Such meetings are therefore an essential way of preventing conflicts. 
However, conflicts represent divergences of interests and it is not always appropriate to seek 
a  consensus.  The  expression  of the  conflicts  within  a participatory procedure  will  have 
undeniable pedagogic effects. Care must be taken to provide similar means through which 
divergent interests can express themselves. 
•  Identify and actively involve de facto leaders or progressive elements, which are to be 
found in  most communities. They can play a key role  in the process through their influence 
on other members. 
•  Set  out  co-responsibility  frameworks,  by  encouraging  the  signing  of  contractual 
agreements  between  the  agents  and  the  beneficiaries,  allowing  each  to  limit  their 
responsibilities  and  contributions.  To  obtain  sustainable  results,  all  the  agents  and  in 
particular the beneficiaries must understand as far as possible their institutional role and the 
implications of their participation. 
There is  a balance of forces between the target populations and the intervening forces.  In 
participation, it is no solution to do everything that the target-groups desire. That would fail to 
take account of the co-responsibility of target-group and support organisation in the process. 
It  is  important that the support organisation should make its own ideas known and argue for 
them  without  imposing  them  and  that  people  should  be  familiar with  the  organisation 
intervening. The beneficiaries  must have the  right to  criticise the donor and  possess the 
means for this. They must also be able to choose a structure to  represent them. All this will 
contribute to their sense of responsibility. 
•  Consult together (donor and decentralized agents) about new kinds of indicators, criteria 
and  methodologies  of  monitoring  and  evaluation  of  participatory  processes. The 
institutional  attitude  of  the  donor  is  not  necessarily  very  favourable  to  participatory 
methodologies,  as  the  results  are  often  slow to  come,  less  visible  and  more difficult to 
quantify. 
•  Facilitate exchanges of experience and  meetings  between  communities in  order to 
obtain a greater impact at national or regional level and increase the self-multiplying effects. 
This  is  a  particularly  effective  learning  method,  whose  effects  should  besides  allow 
communities to develop a more complete view of the process. 
3.3  DECENTRALIZATION  OF  POWERS  AND  CITIZEN 
PARTICIPATION 
The globalisation of the economy and the growing aspiration of the Southern populations call for 
new forms  of  State  intervention  that  are  adapted  to  the  evolving  context  and  require 
redefinition of the role of the State. Decentralization constitutes one of the major elements in 
the process of  reform taking  place  in  many Southern countries.  These processes are  often 
confused, and even conflictual, but there is a dynamic in favour of change which will no doubt 
prevail in time over traditional behaviour. 'The State should be able to elicit a national consensus, based on wide participation, which 
ensures that citizens are an integral part of the development process,' says one IDB expert 
in 'modernisation of the State'. 'It must also be able to provide the public services which 
are its  responsibility, but also ensure economic competitivity and promote equity, which 
markets are not in themselves able to do'. 
The reforms planned for the coming years will be  effective only in  a more decentralized State 
which  is  in  better contact  with  people.  The  State  must  be  able  and  willing  to  change  its 
relationship to  society. In this perspective, it is clearly essential to reinforce the participation of 
citizens  in  order to  develop  solid  democratic institutions  which  open  up  the  possibility  of 
effective and responsible government. 
Processes decentralizing the power of the State and promoting popular participation are taking 
place in  various countries. Certain African countries, such  as  Senegal and  Cote d'lvoire, are 
well advanced in their decentralization policies and have elected local representatives.  In  Latin 
America,  for example,  Bolivia  has  initiated  a wide-ranging  reform  of  its  public  sector and 
promulgated its famous Popular Participation Law (see 3.3.4.). 
A decentralization policv. Example: Senegal 
In  Senegal,  the national decentralization policy has been in  course of realisation ever since 
independence via  reforms and programmes whose stated objective was the involvement in and 
responsibility of the population for the management of its land. 
The  agents of this  decentralization  are:  in  rural areas,  rural communities  (RC),  peasant 
organisations and professional organisations with  their respective federations; in  urban areas, 
the public authorities the groups and associations of civil society; and more generally, training 
and research organisations,  elected officials and local authorities such as the  national and 
international NGOs. 
The  objective is  to  establish a collective development project for the whole of society via  an 
overall plan.  Three major kinds of  programme have been defined: local integrated development 
programmes, programmes of support for the  emergence and reinforcement of professional 
organisations and thematic programmes.  The  current dynamic makes it possible to  identify 
experiments and transitory phases, and to put forward suggestions intended to make the whole 
process more coherent.  This decentralization policy of course otters a favourable context for 
decentralized cooperation. 
3.3.1. Decentralization and popular participation: the issues at 
stake 
Decentralization: a political or development issue? 
Most  governments  seek  sustainable  economic  and  social  development for their country. 
Decentralization generally seems a purely political question: an unavoidable element of a series 
of politico-administrative reforms desired or imposed from without. 
When  asked about this,  Burkina Faso peasants wanted to  see the concept of development 
prioritized and considered as the central element or powerhouse of the decentralization process 
taking place in  their country.  They hope that this will prevent decentralization becoming overly 
politicized. The view adopted by the EU and that of this study is obviously a vision of development, but one 
which emphasises the political environment and implications in  which decentralization actions 
take place. 
The role of the State and the dynamic effects of a  decentralization 
policy 
The state can play different roles  in a popular participation process: it can be the powerhouse 
(for example, Bolivia); it can be the catalyst; it can be an impediment. 
In the words of President Museveni, in the decentralization policy being implemented in 
Uganda:  'The  central  government  should  simply  be  a  facilitator,  as  sustainable 
development can only be assumed and managed locally. The role of the centre will be to set 
the scene but not to act out the whole play'. 
The  decentralization  of  the  State  can  be  considered  an  important factor  in  the  citizens' 
participation in decision-making and the management of public affairs. This process cannot be 
studied  in  isolated  fashion.  It  belongs  in  an  overall  national,  regional  and  international 
framework, which determines its  ripeness and  provides the  impulses necessary for change. 
These changes, which normally take the form of a series of abrupt breaks with the past,  are 
caused above all  by the evolution of society,  with  its  aspiration to  more genuine democracy 
(going  beyond  the  mere  label  displayed  by  certain  States)  and  by  nee-liberal  expansion 
strategies, which seek to transform the world into a huge market ruled by its own laws, in which 
the State would play a secondary role. 
Decentralization in this perspective can be considered both a means (of increasing popular 
participation and contributing to the stability and effectiveness of the system) and an end  (civil 
society is  better represented,  more involved in  choices, and the State thus acquires renewed 
legitimacy). 
3.3.2. Three indissociable aspects of decentralization 
Decentralization  is  not  of  course reducible to  the  de-concentration  and  transfer of  techno-
administrative services to the level of provinces, regions, districts or municipalities. It must also 
be  accompanied by a veritable transfer of power.  On  the  other hand, the  process can  only 
succeed  if  decentralized  entities  possess  sufficient  financial,  human  and  technological 
resources,  and  where there  is  a genuine desire for political  change.  A policy or strategy of 
decentralization  must  therefore  include  political,  techno-administrative  and  financial 
aspects. 
The movement toward a sharing of  responsibilities with local authorities occurs at a time when 
most countries are committed to structural adjustment policies which restrict their capacity to 
combine transfer of power to the constituencies with a concomitant transfer of resources. 
There must therefore be a clear desire on the part of governments to bring about this process, 
giving  it  priority  and  continuing  to  accord  it  the  resources  required  not  only  for  its 
implementation but for the viability of the system. It is interesting to consider the case of Bolivia and its Law of Popular Participation (see 3.3.4.), 
which defines this transfer of resources toward the decentralized entities in  relatively equitable 
manner (in particular the per capita notion). 
In  Uganda,  the government is currently involved in a general decentralization plan, intended to 
reinforce local government.  To  this end, it has adopted a strategy of phased implementation. A 
new legal status has been adopted for local government. The central government is also ready 
gradually to  decentralize funding from  the centre  to  the  districts.  In  this  context,  the  role of 
central government agencies is  to  ensure micro-macro coordination and sustainability (for 
example, in the funding of recurrent costs).  Political representation is based on direct elections 
at village level, but on indirect ones at other levels, including that of the district. 
In most West African countries,  the commune (parish: village or local administration) has been 
designated the lowest level of decentralization in both rural and urban areas.  Communes have 
a  different role  in  each  of three  systems  of government of different degrees  of political 
decentralization.  In  the first category (examples: Benin,  Ghana,  Burkina Faso),  the comn:une 
possesses legal and financial autonomy but has no elected representatives.  In  the second and 
larger category (examples:  Guinea and Cameroon),  the  deliberative bodies are elected but 
guided by a mayor appointed by the central government; this produces a functional duality, as 
the mayor represents both the central and local authorities.  In  the third category (examples: 
Senegal and Cote d'lvoire), all local representatives are elected. 
In  almost all these cases, decentralization, with the transfer of political powers, constitutes a 
historic process, bringing about important changes in the definition of the role of the State and 
of the  behaviour of  potential  actors  in  this  process.  All  this  may eventually  bring about a 
thorough-going transformation of society. 
3.3.3. Limits, risks, obstacles 
Prudence is required in any action involving decentralization. The latter constitutes an important 
aspect of the various measures comprising in-depth reform of a State.  It  is  also a means of 
eliciting greater participation from decentralized agents. But it brings its own risks, and currently 
presents  some  limitations.  A  decentralized  approach  is  a  necessary  but  not  always 
sufficient condition for increasing participation. 
Fear of loss on the part of some actors 
Governmental  actors  generally  fear  that  they  will  lose  part  of  their power by  committing 
themselves to decentralization processes. The same is true for some non-governmental actors, 
such as the unions in  Bolivia, which are very powerful and very centralised, and are opposed to 
the government's Law on  Popular Participation. They fear that powers will  be transferred to 
grassroots membership groups. 
•  _w~~k~ning  _  Qf_th~  _Stat~ 
A  badly  prepared  decentralization  can  have  undesired  effects  and  simply  lead  to  a 
weakening of the state. We  should not forget that certain current tendencies,  based on 
nee-liberal extremism, include the wholesale suppression of national policies. •  .~lmit!lliQn~.  Qf. th~.  f!~c.e.o.trali~~d.  ag~n.t$. 
One must be  aware of  the limitations of the decentralized agents of civil  society as 
agents  of  development. These agents,  including  NGOs,  lack strength  and capacities, 
particularly in  the area of organisation; doubts have been expressed about their ability to 
produce significant effects on  policy reform 13.  Reinforcing the capacities of these agents 
thus becomes a priority. 
•  .fl.f]_t~_uv~.  )n~rtia~ 
Decentralization is a process that mobilises people and local institutions in contexts in which 
the notion of time is different from that of the Northern countries. Bringing people together, 
taking part in  dialogue, initiating new forms of consultation and decision-making normally 
requires  more  time  and  longer  deadlines  than  those  provided  for  in  the  context  of 
conventional  development projects or programmes.  Support actions must therefore take 
account of this duration. 
3.3.4  Motivations for the implementation of decentralization 
policies 
Decentralization policies may originate in a growing pressure from the grassroots who aspire to 
greater democracy, the incapacity of the central State to manage conflicts at the local level, an 
alignment with conditions imposed  by  certain  donors,  or the  search,  on  the  part of political 
leaders, for a new legitimacy acquired by bringing power closer to the citizens. 
From the point of view of States, there are three families of motivations advanced to justify the 
implementation of decentralization policies 14: 
1.  It is  a  modality favouring the  mobilisation of the  population  and  thus  sustainable 
grassroots  development  (this  is  the  priority  of  the  countries  that  have  long-standing 
decentralization policies, such as Senegal, Cote d
1lvoire, Kenya); 
2.  It  is  a  means of  consolidating and  enrooting democracy at the  local  level  (stated 
vision  of  countries that  have  initiated  a  democratic transition,  such  as  Benin,  Congo, 
Zambia); 
3.  It  is  an  attempt to  restructure  the  country  and  re-legitimise  public  institutions 
(countries  like  Madagascar and  Guinea which  have  experienced  regimes  of  Marxist 
inspiration, followed by military regimes, prior to democracy). 
Decentralization  constitutes  in  many  cases  a  means  of  mobilising  the  population  in  the 
perspective of  sust2inable development. The participation  it  produces  makes  it  possible to 
deepen and enroot of democracy at local level. This twofold motivation is consonant with the 
official priorities of the current Bolivian government. 
13  A.  Fowler, INTRAC, 1991  (see author bibliography). 
14  La Decentralisation en Afrique au Sud du Sahara [Decentralisation in Sub-Saharan Africa] by Jean-
Pierre  Elong  M
1Bassi,  the  coordinator  of  the  West  African  module  of  the  Municipal  Development 
Programme,  which  is  supported  in  particular  by  the  World  Bank  and  the  French  Ministere  de  Ia 
Cooperation (see author bibliography). The Popular Participation Law (PPU of the Bolivian government 
The  Popular Participation  Law constitutes  the  endpoint and practical  realisation  of the 
decentralization of political power in  the  Bolivia State,  a process in  which  the Private Social 
Development Institutions (PSD/s) and NGOs have played and continue to play a major role. 
The  key elements of the PPL are i.  a legal definition of the  transfer of resources and ii.  the 
definition of the municipality as a responsible counterpart of government and site of a local 
concentration of power. It also responds to some elements of previous demands such as the 
recognition  of the  legal personality of local grassroots organisations  (LGOs),  ethnic and 
peasant organisations (which allows them to participate in  local decision-making),  the concept 
of traditional authority, the territorial notion and the alternative or common (custom) law. 
The  implementation  of the  process  depends  on  the  active,  consultative  and  effective 
participation of the various public and private agents involved at the  various levels of decision 
and intervention, on the basis of common objectives of  popular participation. The success of the 
operation also  depends  on  rapid and adequate responses  from  external donors,  and the 
coordination of their efforts. 
The results of the application of the PPL have been substantial, but many questions remain and 
must be  .resolved in the short term. 
A priority intervention strategy might consist of support for the  TGOs and Municipalities.  A 
balance must be sought as regards  the  role  played by the  Development Corporations at 
regional level.  And the manipulative efforts made by both the political parties and the private 
sector,  which are in  danger of perverting the process,  must be countered.  It is  essential to 
pursue  and intensify  the  process  of reflection  on  the  PPL,  its  context,  limitations  and 
perspectives,  so that the population acquires a capacity for criticism and people can decide 
their own fates.  Capacity reinforcement is,  of course,  the basis of any strategy in this area. At 
this level the PSDis and NGOs have a responsibility and a vital role to play. 
The strategy of the government in  Bolivia is  not without its  own ulterior motives, just as the 
impetus coming from the donors is not without ideological motivation.  The fact remains that the 
process tor the first time offers the Bolivian people and the  various decentralized agents the 
possibility of  playing a role in the management of their destiny and country.  The time seems to 
have come when some (notably the powerful Bolivian unions) must redefine their role in society 
and everyone take their place in this historic process. 
3.3.5. A  decentralization triggered by grassroots pressure and 
passed on by the local authorities 
A decentralization inspired and triggered by the grassroots 
In Latin America in particular, and in some African countries (Benin in particular) there has been 
a strong demand from the grassroots for civil responsibility. Civil society is becoming organised, 
though  the form  and  extent of the  organisation  vary with  the  political  context.  People  are 
demanding the  right to express themselves,  be  heard,  and  to  have their political demands 
incorporated  into  policies  adapted  to  their choices.  In  some  countries,  this  movement is 
congruent with government policies, which facilitates dialogue between the actors. But, if we put 
aside the extremes of repressive totalitarianism, neither a lack of decentralization policies nor 
the frequent  position  where  policies  are  ill-defined  and  ambiguous  seem  to constitute  an 
obstacle to organisation and participation. Where there is a reaction against the political system, one frequently finds a greater aspiration and motivation to dialogue with the State and to create 
more democratic methods of managing the common weal. 
A process of organisation at grassroots level and  a management process bringing together 
local politico-administrative structures can  be  the first step in  a bottom-up movement toward 
dialogue and the construction of a society both more democratic and closer in its structures and 
functioning to the citizen. 
The importance of local authorities 
Local authorities, though they have a political legitimacy different from that of the central power, 
are State agents. Their main characteristics are to be both 'local' and 'public authorities'; in this 
way, they can position themselves on both planes and play an important role as interface. 
One of the main functions of local government is to ensure this link between the agents of civil 
society and the authorities, to help the interests of the different levels to converge, and to seek 
the funding means best suited to this goal. 
Where local authorities are not directly involved in the development process, their approval and 
moral sanction should at least be systematically sought. 
Thus  one specific objective  for DC  might be  to  take  into  account the  needs  of both  local 
government and national ministries, and to provide financial means enabling them to play their 
planning and coordination role to best of their abilities. 
Macro-meso-micro articulation 
Town and country planning is a necessity at all  levels.  It is the vocation of neither international 
NGOs nor sectoral federations (socio-professional or other) to design this kind of policy.  In the 
approaches prioritized by DC,  local officials become developers, organisers, and facilitators of 
local development; they also take on  an  urban and  rural  planning role.  At this level,  micro or 
meso, the connections must be made with macro or sectoral policies, and complementarities 
can come into play. 
3.3.6. Intervention strategies and methods 
Establish the link with national decentralization policies 
DC does not simply come down to working with local associations or grassroots groups. It also 
requires linking up with the authorities, politicians and  other potential actors. The interests of 
these actors should not be neglected; they are an integral part of the situation, and without them 
the fora and  margins required for DC  will be  lacking.  It  is  important to find  a modus operandi 
and vivendi with these actors. 
Interventions suited to the situation in the field 
When supporting municipal associations, it is no use forcing the pace. There is a real danger of 
disjunction  between  the  socio-political  reality  of  the  country  and  the  work  to  be  done  at 
association  level.  To  plunge  headlong  in  to  pro-association  lobbying  with  the  municipalities, especially where the agents in  the field are not responding, is  a grave error.  Difficulties of this 
kind have occurred in a number of countries. The strategies and the c~mmitments of the donors 
must go hand in hand with the progress of the action. 
Giving priority to 'front line' agents 
'Front line' agents are those who take risks,  who are really prepared to act in  the field. These 
agents must constitute a point of reference and be given priority in the DC context. 
Decentralization culture 
It  is  important to  construct a decentralization culture. This concept obviously has a different 
significance in  each country and  above all for the different agents.  Generally, for grassroots 
agents,  it  has  no  significance at all.  It  is therefore not easy to firmly establish the theme of 
decentralization and this requires a set of specific actions (information, awareness-raising) to be 
conducted in the framework of a specific strategy. 
Consolidation of the intermediate agents 
The consolidation of the intermediate agents is a priority in  several African countries today.  In 
Latin America, the intermediate agents exist {local, professional and campaigning associations) 
and possess varying resources and degrees of organisation. It is therefore necessary to accord 
a priority to actions intended to structure the agents, while taking care to differentiate actions 
according to the differences of situation and framework between countries. 
Consultation  is indispensable 
Decentralization  brings  with  it  major modifications  of the  functioning  of the  State  and  of 
decentralized entities.  Functions and  roles  are  reconsidered,  and  everyone must reposition 
themselves in the light of the new policy. The State must be able to initiate a dialogue within its 
own structures, with a view to restoring the equilibrium that allows the administration to function. 
Then there is consultation with all the entities, all the potential non-governmental agents. 
A decentralization process must therefore be  accompanied by the creation of new structures 
able  to  undertake  the  indispensable  functions  (indispensable  to  dialogue,  see  4.2.)  of 
consultation, programming, coordination and technical support, etc. 
Decentralization must proceed from governments 
Structural adjustment programmes are currently laying the monopoly of power hitherto enjoyed 
by States open to question. The State has till now been the main and almost exclusive recipient 
of international aid, and today its monopoly and prerogatives in the matter of funding allocation 
are  crumbling  away.  Governments  moreover find  themselves  subject  to  norms  of  good 
governance. A minimum of ethical integrity is obviously essential to the management of a State, 
and it is easy to understand why donors require guarantees concerning the management of the 
aid which they bestow. On the other hand, it is inappropriate and dangerous to become involved 
in the affairs of a government on the grounds that it is not conducting decentralization policies, 
or is not doing enough to that end, or not doing it quickly enough, and to suggest that it should undertake reforms where political will is lacking or which it has no interest in undertaking. For a 
government to be committed to decentralization policy, it must have internalized the policy and 
consider  it  a  dynamic  reform  factor.  Decentralization  should  therefore  proceed  from 
governments and reflect not the will of the donor but an expectation on the part of civil society. 
Supporting the process taking place with the appropriate measures 
There can therefore be no question of forcing the pace, still less of imposing decentralization by 
using, as  some donors have done,  arguments and  pressure.  It  is  more a question of taking 
appropriate measures to support the process taking place in  a particular country, and  paying 
close attention to the reality and particularities of the local context. 
A gradual, case-by-case approach 
A case-by-case approach is  required.  It must also be gradual, so as to avoid any abrupt break 
with the past.  The implementation of  institutional  reform  requires a simultaneous change in 
mentalities and this needs time. As  regards supporting decentralization, this must take place at 
two levels: a macro (State) level, affecting structures and policies, and a second level, which is 
that of the  practical  reality of the  policies  adopted,  and  which,  depending  on  the  politico-
administrative system prevailing, refers to districts or communes. 
In Uganda, for example, the development programme for the Rakai district,  which is the product 
of an agreement between the Ugandan government and DANIDA, belongs within the country's 
decentralization policy.  Its  overall goals are: a.)  to  assist the  government and the  district 
administration to reinforce sustainable social and economic development in the district and b.) 
to stimulate and increase local production and trade with the goal of broadening the economic 
base and reinforcing the administrative, social and physical infra-structure of the district. 
The programme might in some sense be described as supporting decentralization at local/eve/ 
(the district scale), though it is directly linked with decentralization policies at government level. 
This  is  highlighted by the support (institutional and budgetary) that DANIDA provides for the 
'decentralization secretariat', an implementation unit based in the Ministry of Local Government. 
It nevertheless seems that the  central government has a limited role  in  the  creation of an 
environment favourable to decentralization. 
In  this  project,  DANIDA  has  chosen  to  give  full  support  to  the  political  process  of 
decentralization of the Ugandan government. The advantage gained is to work with the existing 
str~ctures, which are likely to  remain  (greater chances of sustainability).  This  can also be a 
disadvantage, in that DANIDA may become embroiled in local politics and excessive emphasis 
on official bodies may make true popular participation more difficult. 
3.3.  7. Forging the tools required 
The different strategic elements which we have described above show that a perfect knowledge 
of both national contexts and the decentralization process under way is vital. This suggests the 
need  to  acquire  the  appropriate  analytic  tools  and  more  particularly  a  typology  of 
decentralization processes. The use of a  typology of decentralization processes 
To define a typology of the decentralization processes under way would allow one to obtain an 
accurate picture of the existing situations and would avoid the application of standard models. 
Without such a tool, the donor is leaping in the dark. If one intervenes in a country, one must be 
able to orient oneself relative to the complexities of the decentralization process under way. 
Different cases were described at the June 1995 round-table (Kenya, Zimbabwe, Ghana); the 
characteristics that emerged allowed intervention strategies to  be adapted in  consequence. A 
typology allows  a  better understanding  of  the  origins  of  the  decentralization  process,  the 
perceptions of the different agents (politicians and managers) and grassroots expectations. It is 
a practical instrument which could usefully be added to an interpretative model. 
Points of reference and best practices 
Today we  need  success stories  which  can  act as  markers  when  it  comes  to  proposing  or 
developing DC working methods.  It is  important to analyse apparently successful experiments 
and to take to pieces the mechanisms and factors which contributed to that success. The notes 
that can be made on the basis of such analysis are interesting tools of reflection and analysis. 
3.3.8. Decentralized cooperation without State 
decentralization? 
Action  remains  possible  in  countries  where  the  government has  a tentative  or ambiguous 
decentralization policy. 
Appropriate strategy 
Strategies must be adapted to an  unfavourable environment.  In this case, one possible format 
might be to  identify and bring together favourable agents at the local level, and,  on that basis, 
make approaches to desirable interlocutors at higher levels. 
Encourage dialogue 
One of the methods to  be followed is to stimulate, encourage and support dialogue, trying to 
reach people, local communities and workers. One can attain significant results with little outlay. 
(This  has  been  done with  the  project of the  NGO Towns and  Development  in  Mombassa, 
Kenya, where, amongst other activities, 30,000 women have been supported in this way using a 
very low budget.)  The  Northern  partner must be  able to  help  locate funding  thanks  to  its 
contacts. 
Favour the emergence of a democratic and organised civil society 
In  the case of Benin and Burkina Faso, the local context meant that DC and decentralization 
found  themselves spontaneously part of the same debate,  without the donors exerting any 
pressure.  In  other countries,  it  will  be  necessary to  place  a  greater emphasis  on  actions 
promoting organisation and reinforcing civil society. 3.3.9. Principles and fields of application of a  decentralization 
policy when supporting a decentralization process 
In Sub-Saharan Africa 15  ,a  reinforcement of the national decentralization policies could take 
the  form  of  support for  States  in  the  implementation  of  decentralization  policies,  through 
institutional  support  programmes  and  municipal  development  projects.  Support  for  the 
establishment and  formalization  of  a legal  framework of distribution and  exercise of  power 
between the different levels of the administration is the most important element of cooperation 
programmes  supported  by  the  partners  of  African  countries.  As  regards  rural  areas,  it  is 
important  to  bear  in  mind  that  decentralization  is  only  credible  when  the  decentralized 
constituency has a positive impact on the local economy. 
Fields  of  application:  a  support  policy  oriented  towards  practical  achievements  must 
distinguish four milieux: metropolitan regions,  middle-sized towns, small towns and the rural 
milieu. Policies must be specific to each: 
•  In metropolitan regions, support must be conceived in a macro-economic perspective, with 
a view to regional integration. 
•  In  Sub-Saharan Africa, the problem of communications and  local citizenship is  essentially 
one  of  the  medium-sized  towns  (50-500,000  inhabitants).  At  this  level,  investment 
programmes must be added to institutional support projects. If investment is  not relaunched, 
private savings cannot be mobilised and local taxation is a non-starter. 
•  In  small towns, the support should consist of taking into account the dynamic of trade with 
the rural milieu. 
•  In  rural  areas, the  essential  preoccupation  must be  the  viability of  the  local  authorities. 
Making available local investment funds will cause the rural population to organise in order to 
take charge of the financing of equipment and services, and to take a more critical attitude to 
the  management  provided  by their  representatives;  they  are  therefore  a  good  way  of 
preparing the advent of local citizenship in  rural milieux. 
In  Latin  America,  the  lnteramerican  Development  Bank is  currently centring  its  efforts on 
reform of the State and has specified its priorities for support. Support will focus on: 
a.  governmental management: objectives: reinforcing the regulatory functions of the State, 
promotion  of  a  sense  of  responsibility  in  public  service,  aid  to  decentralization  and 
rationalisation of government functions; 
b.  civil society: objectives: support for education in citizenship and promotion of participation; 
c.  legislation: objectives: the modernisation of parliamentary institutions, the establishment of 
new systems for informing the  public and  promoting civil  participation  in  the legislative 
process; 
d.  the legal system: principal objectives: better access to the law for citizens and promotion of 
alternative systems for the resolution of conflicts. 
Of note that Peru,  in  the wake of Costa Rica,  has launched a technical cooperation action for 
the creation of an information system for Congress.  The system will supply the legislator and 
the public in  general with information relative to  legislative matters,  helping to accelerate the 
processing of draft laws and increase the participation of citizens in  this process.  This  is  an 
15  Cf J-P.  Elong M'Bassi,  op.  cit. interesting initiative,  which takes account of  the importance of  appropriate and functional laws in 
the decentralization and popular participation process. 
In  South Asia,  local  powers are  taking  on  a larger role  and  measures  have been taken to 
facilitate the activities of NGOs.  Institutional reforms are on  the agenda everywhere, with the 
support of the major international donors. The intervention strategies of these donors must of 
course be oriented in  the direction of the reforms undertaken by the governments in  order to 
dynamise the processes under way. 
Bangladesh has undertaken to  reorganise  its  local authorities in  order to  increase popular 
participation in  the  design and execution of programmes intended to  enhance the  value  of 
human  resources  and develop  the  infrastructure.  District  elections  have  taken  place. 
Development coordination committees have been created at sub-district level.  The restructuring 
of local authorities should be completed by mid-1994. 
India  has just adopted a  reform  measure intended to  broaden  the  functions  of the  local 
authorities while ensuring equitable representation for marginalized populations (3CY'Io  women, 
30% lower castes). 
These examples show the direction that could  be  taken  by an  EU  policy of  support for the 
decentralizations under way in Southern countries. They also serve to outline how different are 
the  various  situations  and  developments  in  these  countries  and  therefore  the  need  for 
interventions which are carefully designed to accommodate the reality of an individual situation. 
To conclude, we surmise that there will  be  a direct and close relation between the impact of 
decentralized cooperation and progress made in  local decentralization processes (above all in 
their effectiveness) and  in the participation of the local population in  them.  Experience shows 
that  it  is  both  possible  and  necessary to  act  in  politically  unfavourable contexts.  It  is  the 
responsibility  of  donors  to  correctly  identify the  problems,  places  and  strategic  levels  of 
intervention, by sub-dividing the problems into questions to which a response can be found  in 
the form of actions and concerted strategies. In the preparation phase of a decentralized cooperation operation, the central issue is  not the 
actions  to  be  undertaken  but  the  identity  of  the  agents  involved,  their  roles  and  their 
responsibilities. 
This  does  not  require  drawing  up  a  list  of  the  various  official  agents  involved  in  the 
implementation of the EC cooperation, or of the decentralized agents who are potential partners 
for the EDF or the Commission, as these are already specified in the Lome Convention or in the 
ALA  regulations,  and  their  form  and  status  vary  with  the  different  legislative  and  other 
frameworks;  they can  moreover take  new forms.  At  4.1.4.  we  shall  study their typological 
characteristics as these relate to the roles envisaged for them. 
It means, instead,  defining certain preconditions with a view to approaching partners and 
ensuring  that  collaboration  is  effective  but  also  respectful  of  the  interests  and 
prerogatives of all  involved. These preconditions relate to the identification and selection of 
the key institutions of the country under consideration, and to the structuring of these agents, 
with a view to the creation of a dialogue between them and the State. 
This preparatory phase will involve Delegations and desk officials of the Commission, probably 
in  a manner concomitant with the  EDF programming for the country under consideration. An 
overview of what adopting the policy and practice of decentralized cooperation involves in terms 
of Indicative Programming is therefore presented in the conclusion of this chapter. 
4.1  APPROACHING POTENTIAL PARTNERS 
Besides effective decentralization of decision-making bodies,  it  is  clear that participation and 
capacity development constitute the two fundamental elements of DC. We saw in the preceding 
chapter that  reinforcing  civil  society  is  impossible  without that  society  taking  part  in  the 
development process affecting the country, and there can be no sustainable participation in this 
process without enhancement of the capacities of the persons and institutions who constitute 
this civil society. 
Now,  participation and capacity development require  above all  an  in-depth pre-identification 
phase. A start must be made with the process of identifying the key institutions C  institution-
mapping') that can be associated with the programme. The goal of this exercise is twofold: 
•  to identify potential partners and interfaces and understand their strengths and weaknesses; 
•  to detect development opportunities, which can themselves suggest key fields and sectors 
for future interventions. 
Institution mapping by country is  a task of the  utmost importance.  In  the  implementation of 
cooperation programmes/projects, one seeks to rely on competent, legitimate institutions (which 
may or may not be representative of civil society), institutions which will asked to collaborate in 
the  quest for common  development goals.  It  is  vital  to  take  account both  of  the  relations 
between these institutions and of the institutional aspect of this work. 4.1.1. Institution mapping/inventory study 
Setting up a decentralized cooperation operation in the form required by a specific programme 
will probably require a preparation/mapping study of the decentralized cooperation framework. 
This must include identification of potential agents. At very least, Delegations should undertake 
an inventory of the local agents. Where a support programme for small local initiatives has been 
approved on the basis of an overall budget (Article 290 of the Convention), the identification or 
inventory work may prove necessary at this stage. 
An identification study in the DC context will aim to: 
•  identify potential partners and suggest operator selection criteria; 
•  propose programme objectives and orientations and priority intervention themes; 
•  propose an institutional set-up (or at least a framework) for the programme, and,  in 
particular,  put  forward  selection  criteria  for  an  interface  which  can  take  on  overall 
management, and define its functions and responsibilities in relation both to the operators of 
individual projects and to the donors. 
A  certain  number of  basic  questions  must form  the  basis  of the  institution  mapping  (for 
examples of questions, see 3.1.2., identification being one stage in the elaboration of a capacity 
development strategy). This is a complex task which requires the use of specific methodologies. 
By way of example, we present the methodology of the IUED and the SEREC in the framework 
of the 28th Swiss National Research Programme  1. 
Method of approaching local development agents 
The IUED and SEREC suggest a method of studying what constitutes 'local government'. 
By this term, the two institutions mean: 
"All those functions contributing to the production and management of  public or general 
interest goods and services accomplished by public or private,  modern or traditional 
institutions". 
This method defines local government by examining the functions that it performs rather 
than the legal status of the institutions which accomplish these functions. It thus broadens 
the notion of local government to  include agents who do not belong directly to the public 
service but who produce goods and services of general or public interest. This means that 
private agents can be included in the notion of local government and that there is therefore 
no division between public and private in this context: 
- the traditional public agents are the decentralized politico-administrative agents to which 
the State has  delegated its decision-making powers, and the decentralized ministerial 
services; 
- private agents can be either 'membership' communities (people have the right to join the 
community simply because of their birth, or the group or ethnic group to which they 
belong) or 'joining' communities (individuals enter a collective of their own free will). 
The role of local administration is fairly easy to understand in its role as institutional agent; 
the role of communities can be  understood above all by their role in  the management of 
goods  (land,  pasture,  application  of common  law, etc.) and  by  their  contribution  to  t}le 
...  f ... 
J.-P.  Jacob,  F.  Margot,  P.  Sauvain,  P.  Uvin,  Guide  d'Approche  des  Institutions  Locales (GAIL): 
methode d'approche des acteurs Jocaux dans le  monde rural [Guide to Approaching  Local  Institutions: 
approach  method for local agents in  rural  areas],  serie  ltineraires - Notes de travaux no  40,  SEREC, 
Vissoie and IUED, Geneva, March 1994. constitution of common goods and  services.  They may,  for example,  take  a  share  in 
equipping the village with infrastructure (roads, well-drilling), though this contribution may 
also serve to develop local production (better access to fields or to markets in the case of 
improved roads). 
The method is divided into three stages: 
- app:r:o~~hin.g.t.b~.OY.~fqlJ.~olJ.t.~xt: this means a certain number of themes: the local human 
and socio-cultural milieu, laws,  lay-out, programmes and policies affecting the milieu 
considered, organisation of public services, planning and resource conservation strategies, 
local socio-economic structures, peasant organisations, social movements, aid program-
mes, etc. 
- fi.~lo.s.t.lJQY., whose goal is to supply complementary information for the analysis of 'local 
government'. 
- app:to'J..Ghing .th~  .loc.~l.G~mt~~.t  .'J..u.d ..  id.~ntif.i.Gation  .ofJ.b~  .ins.titu.tio.o_ql..a.~toxs. This phase 
begins with a description of the general characteristics of the region and continues with an 
identification of the actors present, which should be characterised according to their 
thematic  and  geographical fields  of action,  so  as  to  identify  overlaps and potential 
alliances. The suggested features for characterisation are: 
•  the constituencies of the local administration 
•  the identification of a membership community or communities 
•  the identification of formalised and organised local organisations, at local level and 
beyond 
•  the identification of relations between the local agents. 
The method then suggests a study model based on three analytic concepts which make it 
possible to approach the problem of joint management of development by the different local 
agents: 
- legitimacy: are the agents acknowledged by others? 
- will: do they want to collaborate? 
- capacity : are they capable of collaborating? 
It also proposes study techniques (reading the available sources, direct observation, and 
structured,  semi-structured or free  interviews)  and  insists  on  the cross-referencing  of 
information obtained, in  order to clearly differentiate between theoretical norms and real 
facts. 
In conclusion, the method presents a series of tools and examples to facilitate the collection 
and processing of information and the presentation of results: an approach to decision-levels 
via selected examples (matrix identifying  [horizontal plane]  the  actors  concerned and 
[vertical plane]  functions  relating to  the  constitution and  management of the goods or 
service selected), a  synoptic diagram of local  institutions (making it  possible to  detect 
institutional weaknesses, and conflicts of powers or representation) and a check-list to aid 
diagnosis. 
One major constraint on this kind of study is the time and the means that must be devoted to 
it. On the basis of experience in several countries, the authors suggest the folJowing norms 
per country-study: 
- general context approach: one week/3 persons. 
- field study: three weeks/3 persons. 
- identification of the institutional actors and diagnostic aid; one week/3 persons. 
- analysis and report time. 
In  certain  cases,  complementary  reports  on  the  general  context  (administrative  and 
associative context) were requested from research organisations or local consultants. The 
studies were generally conducted by two expatriate experts (socio-anthropologist and agro-
economist, both having an interest and competence in institutional analysis) and an  expert 
from that country (a university fellow in social sciences). 
:6ti.· .. 
...  ;,.'.;,-,:.;.:.'' Other methodologies should be noted: they are methods for the study and analysis of a local 
context  preliminary to  planning  a  support  intervention.  They  generally  include  an  agent 
identification component to establish which agents have a key role  in the local processes, and 
on  which  agents  intervention  should  rely.  Among  those which  concern  Participatory  Rural 
Appraisal  (PRA)  methods,  we  should  cite those  in  liED publications (Rapid  Rural  Appraisal 
Notes);  the  'Guide Methodologique  de  Planification  du  Developpement  Local'  of  CIEPAC 
[Methodological Guide to Planning Local Development], published by the French Ministere de Ia 
Cooperation; or our own methodological work concerning the different phases of the study of a 
project 'Cheminements d'une action de developpment: de !'identification a !'evaluation', COTA 
(see bibliography). 
For studies intended to  identify the key-agents, then, the emphasis should be placed on  the 
three criteria of legitimacy, will and capacity. The importance of these criteria will however 
vary according to the level of interaction at which the relation takes place (micro, meso, macro) 
and the kind  of responsibility to be entrusted to each agent.  In  other words,  if the issue is  at 
macro level and  if the responsibility of the agent will  include taking part in  a dialogue with the 
State on  national development priorities, the legitimacy criteria will be the most important. If,  on 
· the other hand,  we  are  dealing with  a micro  issue,  and  the  agent's  responsibility will  be  to 
implement and technically support an action, the capacity criteria will be conclusive. 
A programme of participatory development promotion must, by its very nature, be worked out in 
the most participatory way possible. Generally entrusted to consultants (local and  European), 
this task must thus be  undertaken in  close collaboration with the partners  (in  the case of 
ACP countries, the national authorities must of course form an integral part of the consultation). 
Any overall  study intended to  define a future  DC  programme should  rely on  the operators' 
knowledge of the field, and benefit from their participation in the choice of priorities, objectives, 
intervention strategies and activities to be implemented. 
With  this  in  view,  the  identification  of  partners  precedes  or  accompanies  the 
identification and formulation of the programme as a whole. The study must provide matter 
for Delegation,  operators and  authorities to  reflect  on.  More formal  consultations  might for 
example take the form of seminars or workshops, which requires the budget for identification to 
provide for these activities (or the use of ad  hoc budget lines)  not simply for the funding of 
experts' reports. 
To facilitate operations in certain countries,  inventories of decentralized agents on a national 
scale have been undertaken at the initiative of several Commission Delegations.  BL 7/6430 has 
been used to fund these identification studies (in Mauritius and Nigeria), as has the 60,000 ECU 
facility which Delegations have access to, and which was used to finance (on an EDF budget) 
inventory studies (for example in Zimbabwe, where the study was entrusted to a local NGO and 
in  Senegal, where it was conducted by a European NGO). We should also note that,  in  the 
framework of BL  7/6430,  Unit  VIII/B/2  of the  Commission formulated  indicative terms of 
reference for identification missions. The main advantage of this is that it is suited to EDF rules 
and to defining a framework (indicative programming) or a more concrete DC programme. Creation of a data-base on potential partners 
It is  important to be aware of the diversity and profusion of potential non-governmental 
agents. In the NGO field, the EU Delegations tend only to know the European NGOs and 
the main local NGOs in the country. 
A close knowledge of the agents (in relation to their legitimacy, technical specialisations, 
specific  skills,  management capacities, etc.)  will be  one of the  bases of effective and 
coherent decentralized cooperation. Moreover, this point must be considered alongside the 
fact that an ever greater proportion of the community budget is  channelled in  some form 
(conventional cofinancing, special budget lines, intervention in the EDF context, food aid, 
etc.) towards a very large number of NGOs and other kinds of decentralized agents. 
These two elements  make clear the  need for a  more manageable and optimal  relation 
between the Commission and the decentralized agents. This would also be to the advantage 
of the agents, as many of them, whenever they approach a new EU funding-source, have to 
begin a long, laborious task of presentation and approach-work all over again; this also takes 
up a lot of functionary time within the EU. 
It would therefore be advisable to establish a complete, coordinated data-base. It could be 
based at Unit VIII/B/2, which has  a tradition of relations with NGOs and has acquired 
considerable knowledge about them. The data-base would then be in a position to offer a 
solution to the problem of the organisation of this unit by European country and of the lack 
of capitalisation on the local organisations in Southern countries that has resulted. The data-
base could be constituted firstly from the inventories of decentralized local actors created in 
several  countries  (mainly  on  the  initiative of the  Delegations)  and  then  by  various 
Commission services which have to deal with decentralized actors: Unit VIII/B/2, desks, 
special line managers, Unit A/2 (Evaluation), Food Aid, ECHO and Delegations. 
This  data-base  should  be  held  in  common  with  DG  I,  and  would  involve  European 
organisations such as  local organisations (ACP and ALA/MED). It should, of course, be 
open  to  telematic  consultation  by  the  Delegations.  To  manage  this  instrument,  the 
responsible  Unit  within  the  Commission  should  be  endowed  with  adequate  human 
resources,  on  the  occasion  of the  setting  up  of the  system  and  permanently  for  the 
processing of information and its encoding. This would, in our view, prove an indispensable 
instrument, which would allow all parties to gain time, and whose implementation, despite 
the difficulties and internal resistance which it might elicit, seems both realistic and feasible. 
4.1.2. Eligibility, status of partners, preliminary contacts with 
the Commission and EDF 
Both the Lome Convention and  Developing Country/ALA regulations (see 2.1.1. and  2.1.2.) 
stipulate that all economic, social and cultural agents of the countries involved must be 
supported  in  their  effort  to  develop  (Lome  IV(2)  imposes  a  condition:  non-profit 
organisations, which excludes enterprises). For ACP countries, this support is conditional on the 
limitations fixed  by the ACP States.  As  we  saw at 2.1.,  here  is  one of the  main differences 
between ACP and ALA countries. In Developing Countries/ALA, the approval or authorization of 
the government probably has to be sought, but is not an indispensable condition. The eligibility of an operator for the implementation of DC actions will depend to a large extent 
on its previous performances in the field and the relations  (if any) it has established with the 
Commission  (and  with  the  ACP  State  in  the  Lome  framework),  but  above  all  on  its 
implementation  competences  and  capacities  (notably  working  methods  and  internal 
procedures). However, within the Lome framework,  in which all decentralization of cooperation 
in the EDF framework is subject to State authorisation, the political and/or social context of the 
country can  also influence the eligibility of one organisation  relative to  another.  For example, 
one country may be more willing than another to cooperate with a trade union. 
As  to  the  status  of  organisations,  it  is  often  an  administrative  requirement  that  the 
organisations benefiting from international cooperation funding enjoy a recognised legal status. 
Here a distinction must be made between financial beneficiaries (who may present actions 
for funding) and  operators (see 5.3.) who manage projects/programmes (or parts thereof). The 
demands  should  in  fact  be  the  same  for  both  kinds  of  agents:  the  operators,  whose 
interventions will be subject to  contract, will certainly have to  meet the conditions concerning 
legal status, but the final beneficiaries should be able to escape this condition. 
As  soon as an  organisation  (or consortium  of  organisations)  has an  idea or project,  or 
expects to present a project to the Commission or an ACP government - or merely wishes to 
prepare  a  relationship  in  the  framework  of  cooperation  between  the  EU  and  the  country 
involved- it should immediately make contact with the Commission Delegation, with the 
competent administrative service,  or with  the  interface  representing  them.  For  ALA 
countries, this first approach will depend on either i) the presence of a Commission Delegation 
or ii)  the  agent's  ability to  travel  to  the  nearest  Delegation  or iii)  contact the  Commission 
headquarters through European partners or by travelling. These first contacts should be made 
with the goal of: 
•  making themselves known; 
•  discovering the conditions of cooperation particular to the country concerned; 
•  giving an account of their record in development actions or promotion; 
•  making possible evaluation of their record and current activities by the administration of the 
country, by the EU Delegation or by experts engaged by either of these bodies. 
The  need  for  these  preliminary contacts  will  of  course  depend  on  the  form  that  the  DC 
project/programme will take. The contacts will be absolutely imperative when the organisation 
deals next with the administration or the Delegation. They are less absolutely necessary when a 
specific interface structure will be  responsible for these relations (see 5.3).  A prerequisite for 
these first contacts is that the Commission and/or the government should set up a strategy of 
communication  with  potential  partners and  ensure the widest possible diffusion  of 
information about the DC possibilities in that country. 
The contacts and relations maintained by decentralized bodies with their administrations and 
the Delegations should ideally take concrete form in official and formal recognition as a potential 
partner.  In  some countries, official status as  a body taking part in  development (generally as 
NGO, as in  Senegal, but this has been extended to grassroots agents in  Bolivia) has already 
been  bestowed  by  government and  could  constitute a  basis  for establishing  decentralized 
cooperation relations. This type of recognition could  be  extended to  other types of potential 
partners  in  a  DC  framework2.  The Commission  should,  moreover,  where  necessary,  exert 
2  Such recognition on the part of the authorities could be very useful - even indispensable - in obtaining 
tax exemption for imports of equipment. pressure to obtain the recognition of organisations which it wishes (after proper consideration) 
to support financially or with which it wishes to establish a partnership relation. 
4.1.3. Absorption capacity 
If the promotion of the  role  of civil  society organisations  is  in  itself a goal  of  decentralized 
cooperation,  it  should  not be  thought that partnership  should  be  limited  to  recognised 
organisations  (which  guarantees  a  degree of  efficiency);  efforts  should  also  be  made  to 
promote nascent organisations and initiatives. The partner organisations of a development 
operation  will  therefore  be  at  varying  levels  of  competence,  experience,  capacity  and 
structuring.  There  can  be  no  uniformity,  then,  in  the  kinds  of  intervention  vis-a-vis  such 
organisations, and it will be necessary to adapt a progressive support procedure calculated 
to match the degree of development of the decentralized partner. The absorption capacity 
of young organisations will of course be slender, and DC operations will have to: 
•  on the one hand,  take care not to inject such organisations with substantial financial 
input too quickly; 
•  on the other, be aware of the fact that the allocation of such resources will vary with the 
degree of development attained by the organisation (a organisation that is just starting 
up will, for example, need less support for running costs). 
During the preparation of this work,  we  witnessed a good example of progressive support with 
Proshika in  Bangladesh: support by a Canadian NGO at first,  then bilateral cooperation with 
Canada,  then with a consortium of NGOs and official cooperation agencies (including the EU) 
for steadily increasing amounts that corresponded to  the increasing capacities and improved 
performance of Proshika. 
It would for example be sensible, with a young organisation, to offer a micro level role and  start 
intervention, at the same time as operational activities were begun, with a programme of 
capacity development, while financing its activities of participation and empowerment vis-a-vis 
its target group; all of this should be subject to rigorous monitoring. When a reasonable level of 
empowerment had  been  reached  by the  beneficiaries  and  the  organisation  had  attained  a 
reasonable  level  of  capacitation,  the  organisation  could  be  supported  in  its  grassroots 
development activities in the social and economic fields. The result of this strategy, and perhaps 
its  goal  too,  would  be  to  allow the organisation to  become  not only an  effective partner for 
international cooperation, but increasingly autonomous. 
4.1 .4. Characteristics and potential roles of the main agents 
The main potential agents of decentralized cooperation operations should be the local  public 
authorities  (LPA),  the  NGOs  and  the  representative  organisations  (ROs)  of  developing 
countries. However, these three types of agents do not often find themselves working together 
in  the  field  (with  the  exception  of  NGOs  working  with  grassroots  ROs)  and they often find 
themselves at loggerheads as  a result of divergent interests, the balance of power and their 
positioning strategies. Training should therefore be envisaged for each category with the goal of 
improving their mutual understanding. Indeed,  one  of  the  keys  of  decentralized  cooperation  (and  development  in  general)  is 
conjoining the efforts of different sectors of society with a view to attaining common 
development objectives.  It  is therefore evident that none of the agents should be  excluded 
from a process already under way or being planned. On the contrary, all the potential agents 
should be taken into account, experiments should be  undertaken, no doors should be closed, 
fora should be created, while maintaining a priority criterion: the concrete effects perceived by 
the beneficiaries of the action.  There must be no monopolies of one or another kind of agent 
in  decentralized cooperation.  This  is  in  line  with  Commission's own  concerns:  it  generally 
accords a greater importance to the competences or professional experience of the operators 
than to their other characteristics. 
From an operational point of view, it seems undesirable to give one of these categories of 
agents a central coordination role relative to the other agents in the institutional set-up 
of DC operations. This  is  one of the  reasons  why we  recommend that,  when  an  operation 
brings  together agents  of  different  kinds,  coordination  be  undertaken  by  ad  hoc  interface 
structures which  should  be ·independent and  permanent in  kind  (with  some exceptions,  see 
5.3.2.).  In  this  framework,  the  different  potential  agents/partners  would  have  the  role  of 
operators and would enjoy a wide-ranging autonomy in  suggestion and executing actions. All 
these agents would,  however,  possess  an  identical  status  as  regards consultation  and  the 
planning of the actions to be undertaken. 
Local Public Authorities 
We  have seen (1.1.) that the concept of DC was launched (in  particular in France, Spain,  Italy 
and  Germany)  as  a  way  in  which  local  authorities could  sign  and  implement cooperation 
agreements with similar entities in Southern countries (towns, regions). The major advantage of 
the local administrations of the South is  that they are,  by nature, permanent structures, which 
makes their integration into and participation in the DC structure essential. They are structures 
which will continue to exist when any one  aid  intervention has ceased,  and  which,  when  an 
administrative decentralization policy is implemented, will be invested with new financial powers 
and  capacities.  In  the  long  term,  they are therefore  bound  to  play a decisive  role  in  local 
interests and in the evolution of societies. 
In the short term, however, it is important to examine their possible role in the implementation of 
DC programmes with a measure of caution: 
•  on the one hand, these entities traditionally have few or no financial resources, and do not 
generally have alternative sources of funding as NGOs, for example, generally do. There is 
therefore a risk that their commitment to the concept and implementation of DC programmes 
is circumstantial; 
•  on  the other hand, these entities, although they are an  integral part of 'Local Government' 
(as  defined  in  the  Swiss  method  presented  at  point  4.1.1.),  often  have  no  role  in  the 
organisation of local development, but rather one of providing public services and acting as a 
catalyst for aspects of regional planning; 
•  it must be  remembered that one of the desired results of  DC  is  the empowerment of the 
population: that the population should be in a better position to  make itself heard, defend its 
rights  and  obtain the  equitable provision of public and  private services that is  its  right.  It 
would then  be paradoxical to  give to local  public authorities a central  role  in  programmes intended to make the population more critical and more demanding in  relation to the services 
these authorities are supposed to supply; 
•  finally, such authorities often have a tradition of clientelistic management. The political will to 
take part in the democratisation of society and the political system, to  adopt a participatory 
approach and  be  at  the service of the population as  a whole  is  often  lacking; this  partly 
depends on whether the authorities are elected or nominated. 
The  case of the Mexican  'war on  poverty' (PRONASOL)  is  illuminating in  this  respect.  The 
government initiated PRONASOL and chose to  make the  municipalities a kingpin of a very 
decentralized programme which  made much of the  aspect of popular participation.  These 
choices gave excellent results (which may indeed be irreversible as regards participation) where 
the municipal authorities obeyed the rules in terms of transparency and democratic functioning. 
However,  when  local  authorities  preferred  to  block  the  campaign,  choosing  traditional 
caciquismo, preferential treatment and protection of privilege such as occurred in  the state of 
Chiapas, the results were catastrophic and particularly discouraging for the population. Despite 
the  official statistics,  which  indicated that  Chiapas  had been  the  main  beneficiary of the 
programme in  financial terms,  PRONASOL failed there and could not attenuate the conflicts, 
which, as we know, eventually took the form of armed rebellion. 
It is therefore necessary to be cautious, at first, in involving local authorities; they should not be 
systematically entrusted  with  a central  coordination  role  in  DC  institutional  set-ups  at  the 
expense of  other agents  (see 5.3.2.).  They should  be  treated  on  the  same  basis  as  other 
agents. North/South and even South/South partnerships between local administrations, on the 
basis  of  the  transfer of  specific  competences  and  know-how,  can  prove  useful  points  of 
entrance and  safeguards in  this area  (see 4.1.5.).  Direct and  sustainable  relations  between 
local administrations North and South, based on  relations of trust between elected officials and 
populations, can  help  LPAs to  fulfil  their roles  better within  the framework of  decentralized 
cooperation. LPAs are generally aware that they have a role to play, but do not always perceive 
what that role is and how they should perform it.  It is therefore extremely useful to place North 
and South together so  that they can share their experiences and create fora for North/South 
dialogue. 
NGOs 
Since there is  a tendency to perceive all organisations called NGOs in  the same way,  it  may 
help at this point to give a brief typology of NGOs: 
1.  NQ11h~rn.  NJ~Q$ 
These often confine themselves to funding actions and  establishing partnership relations 
with counterpart NGOs in  the South;  others execute actions  in  the field  themselves,  or 
conduct support (technical, methodological, etc.) activities vis-a-vis their local partners; 
2.  $.Q.Vtl:l.~.~o  .NG.Q~ 
These  rarely  take  part  in  the  funding  of  actions  (except  in  the  form  of  valorisation  of 
buildings,  material  and  staff)  but  obtain,  channel  and  often  manage  the  funding  of 
international  cooperation.  In  this framework they  have  a  role  as  the  organisers  of  an 
operation and support grassroots groups or organisations with which they have established 
collaborative relations. 
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_;_ ..  _:-:·  .. :::  ...  :::: .. ·:;·_:::.:·:~:.,:··-::'::_::::~:  :::_·:.::·::~:·:-·  .. -•·_;_·.::..  :-:::::··::J,~.;~~~~  ..  .,.,;~::::~;:~E~A'f:a(.),.._:::_·:-..  _-.:-.~: :  ·.·. NGOs generally enjoy favourable  presumptions as  regards  their proximity with  grassroots 
groups, their participatory methodologies, their knowledge of the mechanisms of cooperation, 
etc. They nevertheless have some limitations: 
•  their relations with civil society organisations are often deficient, as NGOs have no social 
basis; 
•  Northern and  Southern  NGOs are  mostly financially  dependent  on  donors  (public  and 
private), which still further weakens their position relative to the other local agents; 
•  questions also arise as to whether their way of working is genuinely democratic, and in 
some cases as to their competence and capacities; 
•  in most cases, they suffer from a lack of legitimacy in the eyes of the population; they are 
not qualified to represent the population in consultation processes; 
•  moreover, their supervision of grassroots associations is often heavy-handed. 
•  they are structures which  are theoretically less  permanent than  LPAs  (although the 
great majority of them are perpetuated by external funding), and can therefore be vulnerable. 
It must be admitted that NGOs too often seem the exclusive representatives of civil society. By 
maintaining close,  lasting  relations with their donors, they can  act as 'screens'. Their use  is 
often an 'easy option' and can, moreover, reduce the legitimacy of the local agents. NGOs often 
substitute themselves for the  local agents by monopolising resources and are alarmed if this 
monopoly is threatened. They should more often be placed in  competition with other operators 
who may present a comparative advantage. The considerations evoked above about the role of 
LPAs in  DC operations may therefore also apply, for different reasons, to NGOs. NGOs should 
not therefore  have  a predominant place  in  DC  programmes  relative  to  other agents.  Their 
possible roles should be defined in  relation to the strong points and advantages of the different 
types of NGO. The following criteria are not exhaustive: 
•  placing  grassroots  organisations  or  groups  in  contact  with  the  institutional  agents  of 
international aid (States, administrations, local representations of donors); 
•  implementation of different kinds of capacity development actions (see 5.4.) 
•  setting up operations with different grassroots groups and presentation of them to donors; 
•  coordination of stages of operations vis-a-vis their target-groups; 
•  technical support for the implementation and follow-up of actions; 
•  design of and participation in a system of participatory monitoring. 
Experienced  NGOs working  in  networks can  play a facilitating  role  in  cases of conflict or 
incomprehension between grassroots agents and donors. Their task is to undertake measures 
to smooth out conflictual situations and promote the evolution of points of view. They thus have 
a pedagogic function. 
To the extent that their strong points and advantages mean that they are considered rather as 
service providers to third parties, the problem of their lack of legitimacy or representativeness 
is  less  significant.  The  criteria for their selection  for intervention  in  a  DC  operation should 
therefore  be  based  on  their professionalism,  methods  of  intervention,  and  management, 
execution and monitoring capacity. 
NGOs too  have of  course an  important  role  to  play,  like that of  other kinds  of  partners,  in 
concerted planning at national or local level. Representative Organisations 
These organisations can be of various kinds (unions, peasant organisations, social movements, 
groups of artisans, professional organisations, etc.). Their basic characteristic is that of being 
organisations of members, which the public joins freely in function of particular interests (this is 
a notion close to that of·  membership' communities, see square at 4.1.1.). 
To this extent, their major advantage is their representativeness and their legitimacy: they 
can not only represent their members, and thus sectors of society, in consultations, but they can 
also present a programme of action in the name of their members and subsequently implement 
it. 
In relation to this characteristic, it is logical that an  interface role should be entrusted to them in 
the context of a programme whose objective is the resolution of a problem specifically affecting 
th~ir members  (see  5.3.2.).  In  such  a case,  if  it  is  the  donor that took the  initiative of  this 
intervention, the organisation should nevertheless be active over the whole of the geographical 
zone considered (country or region). 
It is,  for example, quite conceivable to entrust the management/coordination of a savings/credit 
programme to a federation of  peasant organisations of national ambit, or that of a programme of 
information and education in  social/ security/ working conditions and hygiene legislation to a 
nation-wide union. 
4.1.5. North/South or South/South Partnerships 
Bringing together partners both European and Southern for the carrying out of an  action or a 
programme is a practice already frequently encountered, in  particular thanks to the support of 
EU and national NGO cofunding systems. These partnerships constitute a form of DC explicitly 
encouraged in  the Lome Convention (Article 20,  see 2.1.1.). The Joint Assembly of  ACP/EU 
parliamentary  representatives  of  September  1995,  too,  in  a  resolution  on  decentralized 
cooperation,  emphasises the importance of North/South  partnerships,  in  particular between 
local authorities; this should, in the view of the assembly, constitute a priority direction for DC in 
the EU framework. 
The notion of partnership between Northern and  Southern counterparts obviously has a wider 
frame of reference than NGO partnerships and extends to activities such as: 
•  inter-university cooperation (for example, joint research projects); 
•  collaboration  between  enterprises  (for  example,  exchanges  of  experiences  between 
production cooperatives); 
•  inter-union cooperation (for example, common reflections and joint action over globalisa_tion 
issues); 
•  original set-ups allowing different public, parastatal and private partners with interests various 
but complementary in  their specificities, to  come together to  realise common actions and 
objectives; 
•  development actions  at  local  level  (for example,  common  methodological  reflections  by 
Northern and Southern organisations); 
•  cooperation between regions/municipalities/communes,  going beyond twinnings of cultural 
kind;  there could for example be  cooperation  in  specific technical  areas  - administrative, 
social or political (democracy, rights of man). As  regards the last of these,  DC could indeed favour interaction between the civil societies of 
European and  Southern countries, by playing the  role  of a bridge between  local authorities. 
Cooperation relations between towns have evolved considerably  ~uring the last 20 years and 
are constantly increasing: at first intra-European and essentially cultural in tendency, twinnings 
have  gradually widened  to  other continents,  including  Southern  countries.  A  solidarity  has 
grown  up:  specific  cooperation  structures  have  been  created,  which  have  an  important 
consultancy role,  for example, the association Cites  Unies Developpement (CUD), the Local 
Government Management  Board  (LGMB)  and  the  International  Union  of  Local  Authorities 
(IULA)3.  International municipal cooperation has thus grown considerably more professional in 
recent years  .. Nevertheless, according to a recent study4, it still suffers from a certain weakness 
at the level of financial and human resources at a time of general budgetary reductions. 
The advantages of cooperation between local authorities are the diversity of the agents involved 
and the multiplicity of the themes and aspects it covers, which may thus lead to original forms of 
cooperation. It can rely on the intervention of elected officials, specialist functionaries, etc., but 
also associate the different agents of a constituency, such as  unions, associations (economic, 
social,  cultural,  environmental,  political. .. ,)  or  again  economic  agents,  in  a  an  overall 
management procedure. According to those who practise it,  the effectiveness of this  kind  of 
cooperation depends strongly on the personal commitment of individuals and increases when 
local authorities form networks in the North and the South. Thanks to its very concrete form, this 
form  of  cooperation  plays  an  important  role  in  educating  Northern  populations  about 
development.  One  of  the  issues  raised  by  this  form  of  cooperation  may  also  be  the 
reconciliation of the civil societies of the Southern countries with their representatives (this has 
occurred in  many Latin American countries and some African countries, such as  Madagascar, 
Mali or Guinea). 
The  example of the Support Programme tor Coastal Communities in Cote d'lvoire (financed in 
the EDF framework),  whose overall objectives were support for decentralization of government 
and reinforcement of the capacity for initiatives and management of local authorities, is worthy 
of mention. Among the specific objectives of this programme were increased financial, planning 
and management capacities within the communities' administrations so that they could properly 
carry out their functions.  This stage has enjoyed support in  the  framework of a partnership 
between Cote d'lvoire and European local authorities under the responsibility of CUD. 
In Central America, the budget line 7/6430 made it possible to fund an ambitious programme of 
support tor national associations of towns and reinforcement of the central American network of 
towns,  with the organisations CUD,  VNG (Holland),  CUF (France) and Spanish local authorities. 
Moreover, direct links can  be established between the European Union, a European partner 
and  a  Southern  partner.  This  form  of  triangular cooperation  was  developed  between  ALA 
countries  in  the  framework  of  the  ECIP  programme  (European  Community  Investment 
Partners), which aims to encourage the creation of joint-ventures bringing together European 
and  Southern investors and  entrepreneurs. The existence of a partnership is  a condition of 
eligibility for certain of the programme•s facilities. 
3  Cites Unies Developpement is the  association of the French local authorities, which has a mission 
primarily political but also operational. The Local Government Management Board  is a support structure 
for the management of local powers. 
4  SCHEP Gerrit Jan, ANGENENT Frank, WISMANS Jeroen, HILLENIUS Michie!,  Local Challenges to 
Global Change: a Global Perspective on Municipal International Cooperation, published by IULA/SGBO/ 
VNG/SDU, The Hague, 1995. The partnership formula can  be  expanded to  include  not  only the creation  of  collaboration 
between European and Southern partners, but also between partners from different Southern 
countries (South/South cooperation).  But one cannot speak of partnership unless these are 
genuinely integrated regional programmes, not simply a list of individual projects; the creation of 
links and collaborations between sub-projects and operators is central to the programme. 
A  certain  number of  EU  regional  programmes  have,  in  varying  degrees,  possessed  this 
characteristic. This is  more particularly true of its  programme  in  Central America,  where an 
important policy of support for regional  integration has been developed, which  matched local 
integration  initiatives,  including those emanating from  civil  society groups and organisations. 
Various  decentralization  projects  have  included  support  for the  association  of  groups  of 
producer organisations, local NGOs, popular movements, committees for the defence of human 
rights,  etc.  for the  performance  of  common  tasks.  The  cooperation  relation  was  however 
generally established with a single partner whose activities were regional in character. 
The notion of South-South partnership can take on  a meaning both broader and more specific 
when it consists of supporting not a single 'regional• partner, but of bringing together in a single 
project/programme partners from different countries or indeed continents. 
A very intensive form of partnership, which integrates these two dimensions - bringing together 
Europeans  and  others  as  well  as  partners  from  different  non-European  countries  - was 
described at 2.2.3.  in  the context of decentralized cooperation with  Mediterranean countries. 
The programmes MED-Urbs,  MED-Campus,  MED-Invest and  MED-Media are true  regional 
programmes which bring together European partners from different countries and local partners 
also from  different countries,  all  of  them  associated  in  a single  programme.  The  notion  of 
partnership inspires both the institutional functioning and the programme•s content.  It  should 
however be  noted that the goal  of such  programmes seems to  be  a certain  kind  of  regional 
integration, through the establishment of a network of similar bodies from the North and South 
of the Mediterranean, rather than specific regional development goals. 
4.2. STRUCTURING CONSULTATION A) BETWEEN 
DECENTRALIZED AGENTS AND B) WITH THE STATE 
If institution mapping and capacity development seem fundamental to a coherent DC  strategy, 
the structuring of decentralized agents and the creation of fora of dialogue between them 
and the official agents of cooperation (administration, Commission) seem equally indispensable, 
for four main reasons: 
1)  The number of NGOs, grassroots organisations and associations of all  kinds in the 
Southern countries has  risen  astronomically over the last ten years. The associative 
fabric is  now extremely complex.  It is therefore particularly difficult to  know who·s who and 
who can  do  what,  and  with  what  legitimacy.  At  all  events,  it  is  difficult to  see  how the 
administrations of the countries involved and the Delegations of the Commission could deal 
with hundreds of NGOs and other types of agent. 
2)  Non-governmental development agents generally have little or no tradition of working with 
the public authorities, whether at national or local level. There is often a climate of mistrust 
in  relations between these parties.  It  is therefore useful to create consultative fora so that 
they can get to know and understand each other. 3)  A true participation of society in the development process cannot really take place without 
dialogue about development strategies and policies at national level, priorities at the local 
level and the form  of partnership operational between the  agents (see the example from 
Ghana at 4.2.2.). 
4)  If  one  really  wishes  i.  to  obtain  joint  efforts  from  different  partners  in  a  particular 
geographical  zone  in  favour  of  local  development  and  ii.  to  attain  coherence  in  the 
interventions, structured dialogue at this level is clearly indispensable. 
These different elements  indicate the  need  for a form  of  organisation  of  the decentralized 
agents that allows them to dialogue with the State in  structured fashion, through coordinating 
structures and  on  the basis of common  and  representative platforms.  Various experiments 
currently taking place (examples are presented below) show that broad and yet effective inter-
institutional consultation is possible. There is a will in certain governments and civil societies to 
establish constructive dialogue and thus a genuinely participatory form of development. Donors 
should take pains to support this process (and to dynamise it if they can and are invited to). 
4.2.1. Sense, content and limits of consultation 
First and foremost, the objectives must be  defined (general and  specific) for the consultation 
between agents, and the themes of the discussion marked out in order to increase the chances 
of quickly arriving at concrete results. It is also important to specify the limits of consultation and 
clearly indicate the functions that must be assumed by a consultative body. These functions will 
be most notably those of dialogue, consultation, coordination, etc. 
On the practical front,  it is wise to dissociate 'simple• consultation (consultation, dialogue, 
coordination)  from  other basic technical  and  decision-making functions  (identification, 
instruction,  selection,  execution,  and  monitoring)  which  belong  to  the  consequences  of 
consultation. These are  specific consultative functions on  the one hand  and executive 
ones on the other, and  each  requires different fora and  ways of working. However, it is the 
needs of the context that will ultimately determine the kind of structures needed. 
It is  important - obviously - to  rationalise proceedings and only develop further fora when the 
functions that they are to fulfil are clear and essential to the operation.  If precise functions are 
not allocated to them in  a larger organisational perspective, they can be costly in  both human 
and financial resources and largely irrelevant to decentralized cooperation. 
4.2.2. An integrated approach to the different levels of 
consultation 
According to a recent CIDA study, the sustainability of development actions requires articulation 
between three different levels: macro, meso, and micro. 
•  The macro level corresponds to the political level for which three basic components have 
been identified, that is,  democracy, respect of  human  rights  and  good governance, which 
includes bringing various agents from civil  society into the  management of development. 
These three components are prerequisites for the establishment of sustainable participatory 
development at other levels. Actions at macro level thus have as their objective the creation 
of a favourable environment for actions at meso and micro levels. •  The second level is the meso level, that of institutions (decentralized administrations and 
service organisations) and of capacity development. 
•  The third is the micro level where the objective is the empowerment of the population 
and its organisations, and of participatory projects implemented with them. 
The CIDA projects which have proved most sustainable have been those which have developed 
the participatory approach at micro  lev~l while maintaining their connections with other levels. 
For example, in  Ghana, a water-supply project worked simultaneously at the level of i) general 
water supply policy and norms,  ii)  capacity enhancement and strengthening  the  various 
institutions  involved (in  particular the  national distribution  company and its  decentralized 
branches) and iii) communities and individual users.  The project made it possible to  create a 
forum  for exchanges of opinion and consultation so  that good contacts  were  established 
between the different levels. 
It  is  important to  avoid  partitioning consultation  between  levels.  Consultation  must become 
established between the different levels in  integrated fashion,  and,  according to the different 
modalities proper to each phase of the project cycle, constitute a sort of compromise between 
top-down approaches (which DC is intended to counter) and bottom-up approaches, which are 
better suited to participatory development. 
On  the other hand, at  meso and  micro  levels,  a form of horizontal consultation  between the 
similar levels of region or of administrative sub-divisions can fulfil more specific functions, such 
as the coordination of sectoral or regional elements. 
The type  of  structure to  establish/activate and  the  level  at  which  a consultative forum  can 
effectively function will  depend on  the form  and  effective  level of the  decentralization of the 
State.  Depending  on  the country and  the  degree of progress  made in  decentralization, the 
decentralized administrative entities will be  at different levels:  meso for the district (normal  in 
Anglophone countries), micro for the municipality (normal in  Latin American countries). Zambia 
presents an  interesting example of the organisation of consultation between different levels of 
decision-making and  power; there,  BL 7/6430 funded information workshops for decentralized 
agents about the organisation of the decentralization of the State and the possible interactions 
with DC within the EDF framework. 
District Development Coordination Committee in Zambia 
Since  1991,  decentralization  has  been a  major objective  of the  strategy of the  Zambian 
government.  The  district is  the  operational level of the  implementation  of this  policy.  The 
elaboration and the  implementation of a  local development programme is coordinated by a 
Council (composed of elected officials and senior administrative personnel), basing itself on the 
recommendations of a District Development Coordinating Council (DDCC). 
The  DDCC is  formally a technical consultancy committee. under the auspices of the  Council, 
but,  among other functions,  it constitutes a forum for dialogue and coordination between local 
authorities,  ministerial functionaries at district level,  donors,  NGOs and communities.  DDCCs 
are currently being established and will gradually become operational. Some suggest a stronger 
DDCC with  wider prerogatives, in particular that of examining and approving funding requests 
and undertaking the monitoring and evaluation of projects.  In  that case,  it would be best if the 
DDCC's actions were supported by locally managed financial input. A  Central Direction  Committee  will  include  donors,  representatives  of NGOs  and other 
organisations,  including Local Councils through the Zambian Local Government Association, 
and the Government through the National Authorizing Officer.  Its principal functions will be to 
define a framework for decentralized cooperation, develop clear policies and guidelines for DC, 
ensure the  monitoring and evaluation of policies, and supply capacity development support to 
persons and institutions involved.  This  Central Direction Committee should also have overall 
responsibility for disbursements. 
In Zambia,  consultation at district level seems to  underpin decentralized development.  Some 
anxieties have been expressed as to the balance of effective representation within the DDCCs 
(insufficient representation,  it seems,  of NGOs and civil society).  The structures proposed are 
interesting consultation fora  at two  levels (macro and meso taken  together).  The  role of the 
DDCC goes beyond that of simple consultation; it is  a mixed body ensuring consultation and 
possessing  certain  executive  prerogatives.  It  will  be  of interest  to  base  decentralized 
cooperation actions on such structures as soon as they become operational. In the interim,  this 
decentralization process requires effective support and resources. 
4.2.3. Consultation guidelines 
Overall versus sectoral or thematic approaches 
Consultation can be sectoral/thematic or inclusive in  scope. At the national level, it is tempting 
to aim for an  overall approach, which is  better suited to integrating and coordinating the main 
principles  and  different  sectors  that  must  be  taken  into  account  while  planning.  In  ACP 
countries,  a broad  consultation of decentralized agents as  to  the priorities for an  indicative 
programme should anyway take concrete form as a result of the Joint Declaration that appears 
as an annex to Lome IV.2. 
However, an overall/national consultation runs the risk of getting bogged down in debates about 
ideas and  political conflicts, and  not producing concrete results.  The most pragmatic way of 
working might be to organise sectoral/thematic groups divided along traditional EU cooperation 
thematics,  relative  to  which  the  EU  possesses  a  certain  experience  and  'comparative 
advantages'. This would not rule out temporarily expanding the remit of the sectoral/thematic 
groups to other questions, so as to  avoid being confined to excessively limited visions and to 
maintain an integrated approach to the problems. 
Considering the complexity of implementation of decentralized cooperation and the inherent 
constraints of the process (among which should be numbered the limited capacity of the non-
state agents to  prove themselves effective interlocutors, even  in  consultation),  it  is  no  doubt 
wise from a methodological point of view to experiment first with intermediate or regional levels 
(meso-micro). This makes it  possible to test the capacities of the interlocutors from different 
interest groups (e.g.  unions, NGOs, LPAs, etc.) to work together and arrange coordination (in 
the form of seminars, for example). 
Nevertheless,  a more general and  inclusive form  of consultation  (or one at national  level)  -
which should confine itself to questions about precisely how to  work together within  EU  DC 
actions - is likely to prove necessary. Consultation on the basis of themes rather sectore:il priorities 
The strict sectoral approach runs the risk of partitioning off other concerns and makes it more 
difficult to  solve a given  problem through an  overall intervention.  Efforts should therefore be 
concentrated  on  more  general  themes  (e.g.  rural  development,  the  role  of  women,  the 
management  of  natural  resources,  etc.)  on  which  the  necessary  consultations  and 
coordinations  should  centre.  This  reduces  the  risk  of  forcing  all  such  concerns  into  the 
restrictive sectoral sausage-mould. 
The DRU (Rural Development) Group in Bolivia 
The  DRU Group is a non-official consultation forum  for rural development.  It was created in 
1990 at the initiative of the MACA (Ministerio de Asuntos Campesin~s  y de Agricultura [Ministry 
of Rural Affairs and Agriculture]) to  remedy difficulties in  organising and rationalising rural 
development proposals.  Initially made  up  of representatives  of governmental bodies,  of 
cooperation agencies (including the  FAO,  Dutch Cooperation,  Swiss Cooperation,  etc.),  the 
Group was expanded in  1991 at the request of the latter,  to include the national coordinations of 
the different NGO networks. 
The objective pursued via the DRU is to promote and facilitate at central and regional/eve/ the 
formation of inter-institutional bodies of technical character to support public sector agriculture 
in  general and the  MACA  in  particular in  the  management and orientation  of problems 
connected with rural development.  It is intended to explore new proposals which might lead to 
new and more suitable strategic conceptions, which would better serve the interests of the small 
producer: the Bolivian peasant.  DRU is also responsible for setting up relations between the 
different areas of rural interest and the State entities responsible for these sectors.  The  Group 
works,  for example,  on the  theme of credit with  the  Fonda de  Desarrollo Campesino [Rural 
Development Fund],  criticising government policies that deny the peasants access to  credit. 
One of the  weaknesses of the Group is  the  lack of direct representation of the social sector 
involved, whose interests are currently defended by NGO networks. 
4.2.4. Establishing consultation structures 
Building on existing structures 
In each country there are formal and informal consultation fora,  working at different levels and 
enabling  people  and  institutions to  enter into  dialogue.  Recourse  to  existing  structures  is 
generally recommended,  unless historical factors make participation in them impossible for a 
particular kind of agent.  Identifying initiatives and potential in  the matter of consultative fora or 
structures  is  a  natural  first  step  in  the  overall  identification  of  decentralized  cooperation 
operations.  It  is  therefore advisable to  examine how the  existing fora and  structures function 
and to evaluate the extent to which they can  play a role within the framework of decentralized 
cooperation. In some case a broadening of the participation base, a greater openness towards 
the decentralized agents may suffice to impart the needed dynamic to the existing structures. 
Participatory planning in Mexico 
PRONASOL,  the programme of war against poverty set up  by the preceding administration, 
was  based on  a process of decentralizing social policy and on  participatory planning and consultation structures at four levels: 
a)  population 
b)  population/municipalities 
c)  population/State authorities 
d)  civil society/Federal Government 
Committees 
Coplademun 
Cop  lade 
Consultative Council 
The consultation and planning function is performed by the general assemblies of the Solidarity 
Committees at popular level,  by the  Coplademun  (authorities  and representatives  of the 
committees) at municipal level,  and by the  Coplade at State level.  The  latter brings together 
various public institutions (State and Federal) and the  representatives of municipalities and 
society (associations  and private sector).  These  consultations have  the  power to  analyse 
proposals and to  classify them  in  order of the  priorities applicable at the  relevant  level 
(committee,  municipality or State).  The  State effectively has the power to decide which actions 
shall be realised,  as the federal administrations only review the technical side of the proposal 
and add their seal of  approval. 
The  fourth  level of consultation,  the  Consultative  Council (CC)  is  composed of persons 
nominated by the President of the Republic.  The  CC can summon those responsible for the 
Programme and issue recommendations to them,  to the relevant Ministry, and to the President. 
It also chooses the themes and the points that it will deal with.  It has no decision-making power, 
only a .consultative role. 
The problem with a system of this kind is that neither funding nor policy are planned in this way, 
only a small part of expenditure. Moreover, this set-up does not put the programme out of reach 
of  arbitrariness and clientelism; the President exerts strong control over the CC. 
Nature of consultative fora (in/formal1  permanent/occasional} 
A consultative forum can  be official or not; it can have a permanent structure or be occasional 
(seminars, workshops, conferences). The type of structure required varies with the objectives 
and functions it must carry out. An informal structure has certain advantages in terms of running 
costs  and  a  certain  institutional  flexibility,  but  its  major  disadvantage  is  that  it  is  often 
occasional, and  is therefore unfavourable to the continuity of inter-institutional dialogue. It can 
however be  expected that the  organisation  of  occasional consultative fora will  lead  to the 
establishment of  a  more  permanent consultative  structure,  thus  facilitating  the  necessary 
dialogue between decentralized agents. 
Launching decentralized cooperation in Zimbabwe 
Four workshops of information and awareness-raising about decentralized cooperation were 
organised during  1994 in  4 regions of the  country,  with  the  financial support of the  EU (BL 
7/6430  for  the  promotion  of  DC).  Their  objective  was  to  promote  dialogue  between 
decentralized agents and establish methodologies and tools for working in common.  Whereas 
the  first  three  seminars  were  consultative and informative,  and designed to  cover the  10 
administrative provinces of the country,  the fourth  was intended to  attract participants on  the 
basis of their national profile and their capacity to  take  decisions and make commitments. 
During these seminars,  the National Authorizing Officer,  the Commission's Delegate and the 
representatives of the decentralized agents examined in detail the ways in  which DC could be 
implemented in Zimbabwe.  The  representatives of the international donor NGOs based in  the 
country were also invited to consider this. 
A provisional outline was proposed (it was not official).  The system was organised at different 
levels horizontally and vertically.  At grassroots level,  organisations are grouped according to their sectors of activity.  Within each region,  representatives of each of the sectors (NGOs,  local 
authorities, private sector, informal sector, confessional organisations) were brought together in 
4 Regional Committees.  The  Regional Committees are coordinated by a National Secretariat. 
Dialogue between the National Authorizing Officer,  the Delegate and the decentralized agents 
takes place within a Steering Committee which should include two National Liaison Members 
elected by each Regional Committee.  It is expected that a working group, created in  the wake 
of the fourth seminar, will produce a definitive outline. 
This type of process provides a (probably decisive) push towards the creation of a permanent 
consultative forum. It allows discussion to be begun and the process to be started. However, it 
did not directly attain the desired result.  It seems that the difficulties involved in  entrusting such 
a task to unprepared non-state agents, who did not have a good knowledge of the more arcane 
pieces of state procedure or of its official jargon (see 2.3.2. and 2.3.3.) were under-estimated. 
This  experience  highlights  the  importance  of  specialised  support  groups  when 
establishing a consultation process- and, indeed, if the agents express the desire, for European 
technical assistance. 
We further note that many similar such workshops on  decentralized cooperation have been 
organised (especially on the basis of BL 7/6430 funding) in  a number of non-ACP and ACP 
countries  {ACP: Barbados, Burkina Faso, Haiti, Senegal, Gambia, Zambia, etc.). 
Organising an institutional framework 
To commit oneself to decentralized cooperation requires the administration of the country and 
the  Delegate  of  the  European  Union  to  be  able  to  deal  with  broad  representation  of 
decentralized agents and not work on the basis of individual contacts. It is therefore essential, in 
countries where this is  not the case, that the decentralized agents should be able to  set up 
frameworks of institutional representation and acquire legal  recognition. This is  all  the more 
important in countries where there is a multitude of small organisations, which have little or no 
structure of their own, and which it is all but impossible to assemble around a table. 
One condition governing the establishment of consultation with the State and the creation of a 
system of decentralized cooperation would thus seem to be the existence of one or several 
structures within which the full  range of decentralized agents could be represented. In 
many countries and  regions,  NGO platforms ensuring the coordination and  representation of 
their members already exist and could form the basis of such a consultation structure. 
Local or regional public authorities and other institutional agents could also play a role in 
such bodies, but will probably find that they need their own structures of representation. 
At meso or micro level, consultations by this kind of agent should eventually lead to the creation 
of local or regional structures integrating the representations of the various agents: structures 
able to  propose a  programme of action  and  to which  management/ coordination  could  be 
entrusted. 
At the  central level,  the  establishment of Directing Committees of the  kind that are being 
prepared in Zambia, including the EU,  the country's authorities and the representatives of the 
decentralized agents, could constitute a forum for dialogue about decentralized cooperation. In terms of possible configurations, then, the following set-up is conceivable: 
- intermediate  level  consultation  fora  (meso  or  micro)  bringing  together all  the 
decentralized agents and the representatives of the grassroots, which would be occasional 
to begin with (conferences, as  in Zimbabwe), but would lead to the establishm_ent of 
permanent structures (as with the DDCC, Zambia); 
- intermediate fora would be articulated with a permanent consultative forum at the 
macro  or central  level  (Steering  Committee,  or  Consultative  Assembly  style) 
dissociated from decision-making or executive structures; this would be a forum where 
the Government (the National Authorizing Officer and other representatives), the local 
powers, the Commission (Delegate, experts), the representatives of other hi- and multi-
lateral cooperation bodies and the representatives of the associative sector could consult 
each other and ensure the coordination required. 
One situation favourable to the implementation of DC  operations might be to  bestow specific 
resources on specialised consultative structures or bodies, whose function would be to ensure 
participatory  planning  at  local  level.  This  would  provide  a  first  and  essential  level  of 
participation.  In  this  system,  the  consultative  body would  find  its  natural  completion  in  a 
decision-making  body on  the  one  hand  and  executive  structures  working  on  participatory 
modalities on  the other.  The  DC  operation would then consist in  support for an  existing and 
legitimate decentralized  initiative which  conformed  to  national  priorities  and  possessed  a 
recognised legal status, but which, should it lack means, would have its capacities reinforced. 
T_he  EDF Programme of provincial development in  Puerto Plata  in  the  Dominican Republic 
offers a good example of a consultative body that has converted itself into a structure for the 
execution of projects.  This consultative body,  the  Foro Social (which brought together public 
and private sector institutions,  commune organisations and provincial development bodies), 
created a Provincial Technical Office (PTO) initially intended to counsel the public and private 
sector in the definition, programming, execution and monitoring of  plans and projects for socio-
economic development in the province.  To this PTO the execution of the EDF programme was 
naturally entrusted, under the supervision of a Board of Directors within which were represented 
local and regional bodies and institutions,  local administrations and associations,  the private 
sector, the National Planning Office (NPO  ),  the EU Delegation and those directly responsible for 
the execution of the programme. The President of Foro Social presides over this Board. 
The NPO decided to take the experience of Foro Social and of the PTO of Puerto Plata as a 
reference for the establishing of decentralized planning bodies in other provinces of the country. 
Agents' capacities 
One of the problems that generally arises when consultation procedures are being initiated is 
the limited capacity of the local government agents but more particularly of non-governmental 
agents to take effective part in  this process. This returns us  to the question (which we have 
already mentioned) of the reinforcement of the capacity of the agents to handle the content of a 
consultation, of the need for initial guidance and perhaps technical assistance. 
After needs have been identified (see 3.1.)  it will  thus be  necessary to offer information and 
support to officials of local authorities, professional organisations, NGOs and other associations 
(specific proposals are made to this end at 5.4.). Mistrust among agents 
This is a difficulty that the World Bank (WB), for example, found itself facing in  many countries 
during the design and implementation of Social Funds, for which it considered NGOs the most 
suitable partners. To get over the reciprocal mistrust felt by the NGOs towards the government, 
but also  towards the  WB  itself,  the  Bank suggests  various  actions.  These  actions  should 
become part of future EU  DC programmes involving decentralized agents: 
•  .Co.n~-~l.t~.ti.o.o: associate the NGOs as early as possible with the design of the programme. 
•  No.n-:int~t1~r~nc~ in  internal  affairs  and  financial  management:  the  only thing  that  the 
management structure of the programme should concern itself with is that each organisation 
meets its commitments and displays the necessary technical competence. 
•  T.~~.IJ.$p~r.t;!O~Y: the programme must operate in effective and transparent fashion. 
•  .l?.en;_Q.IJ.IJ.e.l:  it  is  important that some of  the  employees  of  the  programme  have  already 
worked for or with NGOs. 
•  .~.r:o.mo.ti.o.n: a campaign of active promotion may be an  important element for informing the 
NGOs about the programme and convincing them of its independence and integrity. 
Deadlines 
It  is  important that,  in  ACP  countries,  practical  mechanisms are  approved  by  government, 
Commission,  and  decentralized agents in  time to  be operational for the negotiations for the 
second National Indicative Programme of each country under Lome IV, when it is expected that 
a significant part of the available budgets will be allocated to decentralized cooperation. 
It  is,  however,  dangerous to  base a strategy of  DC  implementation on  the success of this 
process of structuring the decentralized agents and of dialogue with the public authorities and 
the  Commission.  These  processes  may  indeed take  a  lot of  time  and  quite  simply  prove 
unsuccessful thanks to disagreements between different types of agent. It is clear that mistrust 
exists between different types of agent and that there is a form of competition between agents 
of the same kind.  To this extent, positioning strategies will develop and  are developing which 
will  have an  effect exactly contrary to those that we seek.  For this  reason,  in  Chapter 5 we 
suggest alternative forms  for DC  operations. On  the other hand,  it  is  important to  pay close 
attention to the structuring and dialogue process taking place in various countries. 
4.2.5. Consultation among Northern donors 
In the context of the relations between donors active in the same region,  in the same countries, 
or vis-a-vis  the  same  partners,  dialogue  and  consultation  with  a  view  to  fine  tuning  the 
coordination of common or similar actions is  no less essential than consultation between local 
development agents. The Maastricht Treaty on  European  Union insists on  this  aspect in  its 
Article 130 X dealing with development cooperation: 
The  Community and the  Member States shall contribute  their policies on development 
cooperation and shall consult each other on their aid programmes  ..... They may undertake 
joint actions.  The  Member States shall contribute if necessary,  to  the implementation of 
community aid programmes. 
The Commission may take any useful initiative to promote [this] coordination. This provision was integrated into Article 9 of the regulation concerning technical cooperation 
with the ALA countries, which stipulates that cofinancing of projects/programmes by Member 
States or other donors must be  sought through  greater coordination,  while  maintaining the 
community aspect of the aid. 
This consultation and  coordination  between  donors  is  still further justified  in  the context of 
decentralized cooperation: 
•  the criteria and demands which must be  defined in  advance relative to the local context in 
planning DC operations will be easier to impose on the decentralized agents when they form 
part of a principled position adopted by several donors; 
•  obtaining EU funding should not be perceived as an opportunity to escape the tighter controls 
that might be imposed by other agencies, nor should the reverse be true; 
•  finally, coordination between donors seems necessary if a critical mass of interventions is to 
be reached, without which there is no significant impact at macro level. 
It should however be recognised that,  in the field, coordination between donors is often difficult 
to practise effectivelys. 
Among positive experiences, we note an interesting attempt to coordinate cooperation, initiated 
by the European Union between its Delegations and the Member State cooperation units.  This 
initiative currently works with 6 countries with which the EU has developed closer cooperation 
links.  Meetings are organised monthly, presided over by the country whose turn it is to occupy 
the EU presidency. In Peru,  for example, 4 working groups have been constituted dealing with 4 
cooperation  areas  which  are  considered priority ones  and in  which  there  is  European 
involvement. In effect, only countries that have a project connected with the relevant sector take 
part in the working groups. Some countries find them of  greater interest than others, as they are 
more directly involved relative to the sectoral definition. Others seem quite uninterested by this 
initiative, but in certain cases this can probably be put down to a communication problem (lack 
of information). 
After years of informal relations,  the  donors of Proshika  (Northern NGOs and Government 
Agencies) have decided to  organise themselves into  a consortium during the 4th  five-year 
programme of this Bangladesh-based NGO.  The donors and Proshika are members on equal 
terms.  Since  1993,  this  consortium  has had a permanent office.  It functions  are those  of 
coordination and interface (see 5.3).  Monitoring of activities, planning of evaluation missions 
(and other technical missions when necessary) and financial control are conducted by the office 
in coordinated fashion for all the PROSH/KA programmes. The consortium office also assumes 
responsibility for communication between PROSHIKA and its donors. 
This  aspect of coordination  is  essential.  A  single  report  is  produced for all the  donors, 
evaluation missions are organised jointly, etc.  This type of agreement between donors has the 
merit of eliminating duplication (along with the inevitable Joss of time and money implied) and 
the contradictory demands (or recommendations) of the  experts mandated by the  different 
donors. 
5  Examples of such dysfunctions: in  the ALA programme 'Drinking Water in the Lima Shanty towns' 
(which was studied for this work) the European expert, for whom  French cooperation had responsibility, 
was sent before the funding agreement of the programme had been signed. This is a good example of 
lack of consultation  between  Member States and  Commission.  Another example is  the failure  of  the 
EC/French Cooperation Steering Committee, a forum for consultation and coordination whose creation 
was agreed by both parties within the framework of the same ALA programme. 4.3. EDF INDICATIVE PROGRAMMING 
With the EDF framework, besides the two preconditions dealt with in this chapter, the first stage 
in the process of funding DC actions is the Indicative Programme for each ACP country. 
At present, a new Lome Convention has been agreed by the different partners, the financial 
envelope has been determined, and indicative programming operations are just beginning: the 
8th EDF should thus begin soon. 
Two questions arise at this stage of operations: 
1.  How can the priorities of society and  its  representative institutions be taken into account 
during indicative programming? This is a fundamental point, and one which will  influence 
the  perception  that  decentralized  agents  have  of  their  future  roles  in  DC 
(instrumentalisation) 
2.  How should the functionaries and  Delegations involved set about writing their desires for 
decentralized cooperation into the indicative programming? 
4.3.1. Consultation on national priorities 
Within the framework of EDF  programming  in  the  ACP  countries,  when  the  National 
Authorizing Officer outlines the National Indicative Programme, consultations are organised with 
the  different  ministries  and  departments  involved  before  submitting  the  project  to  the 
Commission. However, it seems that, for the most part,  little scope is offered to the organised 
agents of civil society to  intervene in  this process. The involvement of these agents in the 
programming phase would nevertheless be essential in the perspective of their taking part 
in  a DC  programme  (defining clear procedural  rules for future collaboration),  and  still  more 
important  as a way of ensuring that the aspirations of the population are placed at the 
centre of the policies being worked out. The lack of consultation in both the preparation and 
execution phase can  be  considered an  important factor in  the dysfunctioning of cooperation 
programmes. 
Senegal is  a country in  which,  after the first Harare meeting between African NGOs,  National 
Authorizing Officers and Commission  Delegates,  meetings  were  organised with  a  view to 
discussing  the  priorities of the  8th  EDF,  the  transformation  of MPPs  into  DCPs  and the 
conditions for NGO participation in these programmes. Similar consultations also took place in 
Zimbabwe.  For the  moment,  these consultations shows that this  type of dialogue,  which  is 
highly politicised, cannot be improvised, and must be constructed little by little over time. 
Decentralized  agents  will  often  have  to  exert pressure to  make themselves  heard  by the 
authorities, and should be supported in this by the Commission representatives in the country 
and by donors. They should combine their efforts in order to make their expectations known to 
the government, more particularly during the programming phases. The National Authorizing 
Officer is  the key person in  this process,  but it may also be  useful to  solicit the support of 
other government departments working in  the relevant sectors (e.g.  ministries working with 
NGOs  in  the  health  and  education  sectors).  At  the  same  time,  local  or  regional 
representatives (parliamentarians, community representatives) who are in  regular contact with 
the authorities should also be requested to support the initiatives in  favour of decentralized 
programmes. All this obviously supposes a set of circumstances in  which the legitimacy, will, 
and real capacities of the decentralized agents have a central role. In this respect,  it is important to emphasise that the Joint ACP/EC Declaration which appears 
as an annex to the new Lome Convention IV (2)  (see 2.1.1.) states that the ACP countries will 
make every effort to: 
•  organise exchanges of view between the authorities and the decentralized agents in  order 
that the agents should be able to express their opinion on national priorities and on initiatives 
of their own for which they wish to obtain support; 
•  supply, jointly with the Commission, information on the results of the programming and on the 
implementation modes of the National Indicative Programme. 
It should be noted that the Joint Assembly of ACP/EU parliamentary representatives has just 
declared its support for the implementation of the ACP/EU Joint Declaration in its Resolution of 
28 September 1995 requesting association of the non-governmental sector in the planning of 
the use of programmable aid within the framework of the Lome Convention. 
4.3.2. Writing DC into National Indicative Programmes (NIPs) 
We have already mentioned the fact that the basic principles of decentralized cooperation can 
be applied without distinction to: 
•  urban or rural areas 
•  all sectors of conventional aid intervention in the economic or social fields; 
•  the more or less standardised aid instruments (MPPs, RDPs, etc.). 
We also pointed out in Chapter 2 that there are various forms allowing the introduction of a DC 
approach in EDF-funded interventions. In particular, decentralized cooperation can: 
•  come under specific programmes (identified as such); 
•  be used as a method in existing or future programmes, by drawing the decentralized agents 
into participation in the realisation of objectives written into the indicative programmes (e.g. in 
the context of conventional sectoral or integrated rural or urban projects); 
•  be allocated a financial envelope within the indicative programme reserved for the funding of 
decentralized initiatives. 
From the 7th  EDF on,  it  seems that all  NIPs  referred  to the need to  support initiatives from 
persons or groups in the framework of DC. A third of these programmes repeated this guideline 
in the framework of an outside focal sector or priority sectoral approach. In terms of indicative 
programming for the 8th EDF, it will therefore be necessary for this procedure to be  reiterated, 
so that the DC preoccupation be clearly present in future NIPs. 
Again, given that it is  a different approach to development cooperation, this presumption in 
favour of decentralized cooperation should refer to  all the policies and programmes 
making up the NIP priorities, and not just one or more individual sectors. 
Writing DC into NIPs has strong implications for the content of the actions that will be funded. 
Although the basic choice is,  via the  DC  approach, to  support local  initiatives, these help to 
realise the overall objectives defined in the NIPs. These initiatives can be complementary to the 
NIP priorities,  or even  slightly outside them,  as  long  as  they are  coherent with  the  national 
policies  in  this  area.  In  this  respect,  Article 281.2.f is  particularly important,  as  it  explicitly 
requires ACP States to specify in the NIPs:  "resources reserved for projects and programmes outside the focal sector or sectors,  the broad outlines of the multi-annual programmes referred 
to  in Article 290,  as well as an indication of the  resources to  be deployed for each of these 
elements". 
In practice, this should take the form in the NIP of an indicative financial envelope reserved 
for decentralized cooperation. The use of this envelope will thus result in  ad  hoc programmes 
within more conventional programmes or stages thereof. 
However, the existence of such envelopes sometimes runs counter to Member States' requests 
that the NIP be rapidly initiated; the more specific a package (relative to a theme or sector), the 
more  difficult  it  is  to  give  it  concrete  form.  Besides,  if  problems  appear  and  the 
project/programme cannot  be  executed,  the  sums  reserved  for it  cannot  be  used.  These 
envelopes therefore have a 'political' usefulness, in that they allow dialogue with the National 
Authorizing Officer to be initiated, but they should not be a main focus. It would be better to use 
objectives and percentages as the basis of discussion with political officials. 
We should point out that an internal instruction note prepared by Unit VIII/B/2 offers 'Guidelines 
for the introduction of decentralized cooperation into NIPs'. The question of how this approach 
involving DC specified in the NIP should be implemented in  programmes/projects will be dealt 
with  in  Chapter 5,  in  the  form  of  either  specific  programmes  or  as  a  method  in  more 
conventional projects/programmes. Here we  consider a series of transversal aspects which  should constitute the scaffolding of 
future DC operations, whether in ACP countries or in  Developing/ALA countries. We shall talk 
about the priority themes for intervention, the forms of projects/ programmes, the institutional 
and operational set-ups, programme follow-up measures and programme financing proposals. 
Aspects particular to  Developing/ALA countries will separately considered (funding proposals 
for example). 
Various areas of intervention, various kinds of approach, institutional set-up and  intervention 
coordination were observed during the study missions in the field and surveys realised for this 
work.  In  Annex  3,  brief  descriptions  of  the  projects/programmes  that  we  visited,  which 
characterise  them  in  terms  of  certain  basic  aspects  of  the  decentralized  approach  to 
development (origin and development of the idea of the project, support measures, intensity of 
participation, instruments, etc.) are presented in the form of case studies. 
5.1.  INTERVENTION AREAS AND GUIDELINES 
The  European  Commission  has  decreed  three  major  themes  for  which  decentralized 
cooperation actions can be undertaken: 
•  democratisation of society; 
•  political and administra~ive decentralization; 
•  grassroots development. 
These three themes are sufficiently broad for the majority of the initiatives emanating from the 
States  (on  condition that they favour democratisation  and  decentralization)  or societies  of 
Southern countries to be accommodated in future DC operations. The themes suggest that DC 
operations might involve the following areas: 
•  .S.v.ppqr.f..fPr. ..  ~o  .. ~nvirQ.nm~nt  .. f.@.V.Q.I!.t:abl~  ...  tQ. ..  th~  .. reliJtQrc;.~m.~n.t  .. Qf  .. ~i.vi!  .. !?.Q.c;i~.ty 
lc!.em.Q_c;r.@Ji$~tiqn).  ~nd.  admini$.tt:atiJ(~  .cJ.~c;-~n.tr.;,~li.~atiQn; 
Political dialogue with the institutions of civil society; support for the improvement or creation 
of a legal and administrative framework; support for municipalisation; support for consultative 
planning at local level, etc. 
•  ln!?.ti.tl!.tiQ.tJ.@./. !?~PPQrt  .ft)t:.key ~g!!:nt!? 
Selection of the agents with determinant role  relative to a priority theme, and programmatic 
and  overall  support  in  the  medium  and  long  term,  with  the  goal  of  reinforcing  their 
management and political participation capacities, and improvement of their effectiveness. •  P.rggrC~mm~$.  _  Pf.$_Q.qi.CI!. itnd!Pr ~~PnPmi~  _t;l_~v.E!IPPm~nt 
Programmes implemented in  some degree of collaboration with the local public authorities, 
depending on the context,  and  ideally,  strongly oriented toward beneficiary demand.  It  is 
important that this kind of programme should not be limited to investment (macro or micro), 
but should also comprise a element of guidance, training and institutional support in the 
longer term. 
These programmes could be centred around rural or urban areas, geographical zones or 
specific technical sectors (water, education infrastructures, preventative health, etc.)  by 
adopting a participatory approach, that is by involving the various agents at micro, meso, 
and macro levels (see example at 4.2.2) and  in  relying on  institutions or organ.isations of 
civil society. 
More  generally,  they  will  combine  several  of  these  characteristics.  Thus  an  urban 
development educational and support programme will, for example, comprise: 
- actions of public utility  of the  'support for local development' kind,  intended for the 
advantage of the population as a whole, or at least accessible to everyone (public works), 
not necessarily profitable  in  the  short term  but justified by their social  utility and  their 
capacity to facilitate activity creation; 
- actions generating revenue and  employment of the 'support for entrepreneurs' kind 
which pursue more marked objectives of  economic profitability. 
It should be noted that these areas of intervention can also constitute chronological stages 
of the implementation of  a coherent policy of decentralized cooperation:  in  this framework,  it 
seems  sensible  to  begin  actions  at  overall  level,  while  favouring  democratisation  and 
decentralization, and  subsequently to  reinforce a certain number of key institutions on  which 
one  can  later rely  for the  implementation  of  actions  of  social  and  economic  development 
favouring the population.  However,  in  practice,  it  will  probably be  inevitable,  if  one  is  not to 
disappoint the  expectations of the population and  in  order to  ensure the  visibility of the  DC 
approach, to begin directly with tangible development actions. 
However, as we  have seen, decentralized cooperation thus runs the risk of being limited in  its 
objectives and being confined to the status of a new form of funding for small, isolated actions; 
of  becoming  a  sort  of  funding-counter  for  small  initiatives.  In  short,  there  would  be  the 
temptation of confining DC to the Micro-projects pattern (non-coordinated initiatives, assistance-
oriented approach to aid and contributive approach to beneficiaries). Whereas it is clear that, as 
defined in its basic principles (see 1.3), DC possesses the potential to aim for a much more 
ambitious  and  coherent approach  to  development,  on  the  basis  of  a  participatory 
procedure that imparts responsibility. 
In  this perspective, if opportunities arise (as  in the  Dominican Republic, see 4.2.4.), it seems 
worth  attempting  to  give  priority  to  the  notion  of  local  development,  by concentrating 
interventions in  a single territory, the populations of that zone,  and the key institutions of that 
population. Local development: some guidelines and definitions 
The many dimensions of a normative model of local development might be 1 : 
l)  To seek greater autonomy for a territory relative to external centres of decision and external 
constraints: 
=> valorisation of local physical and human resources; 
=>reference to an endogenous development model; 
=>delimitation of the relevant territory (economic zone); 
2)  Improved connection of the economic, social and cultural: 
=> overall or integrated development project; 
=>better distribution of the fruits of growth (human development); 
=> principle of equity and human justice; 
3)  Improved integration of the economy into the ecosystem: 
=> sustainable development model. 
4)  Improved participation of the populace in the local development project and its realisation: 
=>democratic model; 
=> decentralization principle; 
=> relevant territory of everyday democracy. 
5)  A cooperative strategy emphasising solidarity, thus differing from a strictly individualist and 
competitive model. 
Another approach could be envisaged relative to the practices of agents: 
1)  Provisional definitions of the empirical model. 
0  All local agent mobilisation processes on a territorial basis. 
0  Implementation of an  overall project,  normally  in  the  framework  of inter-commune 
cooperation, bringing together the economic, social and cultural aspect of development. 
2)  Elements constitutive of a dynamic of local development. 
0  A territory or'  spirit of place'. 
0  Agents and agents of development 
=>  Mobilisation of agents in the framework of a policy of local development. 
=>  The role of the local authority. 
0  Creation of synergies betwee.n functional and relational networks. 
0  Intersection of territorial (horizontal) and sectoral (vertical) logics. 
The concept of local development should not be taken to  refer exclusively to  micro level: this 
approach may concern a homogeneous region or a large administrative subdivision (province, 
departement, states within a federal State, etc.). Moreover, as we saw at 4.2.2, the intervention 
1  Following writings of Professor M.  Parodi, in CCFD & TOUIZA, "Mediterrannee deux rives solidaires", 
CCFD- TOUIZA, Paris, 1996, pp.  121-135 (see author bibliography). envisaged must be articulated with actions at other levels (meso and  macro).  Several points 
suggest that this latter approach should be favoured, for example: 
•  joint efforts by various agents; 
•  coherent interventions on the basis of plans made by consulting  agents; 
•  critical mass of interventions allowing a significant impact; 
•  improved monitoring and control of interventions; 
•  diminished logistical costs of follow-up. 
5.2. SPECIFIC DECENTRALIZED COOPERATION OPERATIONS 
5.2.1. Fundamental characteristics 
In  practice, DC programmes must be able to  respond to  local initiatives of various degrees of 
scale and coherence (according to the level of development and structuring of civil society and 
the results of consultation at local level) and involve maximum participation by the decentralized 
agents in the different stages of the actions. 
Decentralized initiatives 
These· are  projects/programmes whose  initiative comes  as  far  as  possible from  the 
population and decentralized agents. It is therefore important for the main donor to adopt a 
reactive rather than proactive attitude. In community cooperation, three types of intervention 
can  be  distinguished  from  this  point  of  view,  according  to  the  level  at  which  bottom-up 
development initiatives encounter aid supply. 
•  .C.P.nv~n.tiQnal.pr.Q_g(amm~s. (Rural  or  Urban  Development  Programmes,  Micro-project 
Programmes),  with  central  initiative,  a conventional  project cycle and  contracted  project 
managers,  but  applying  certain  basic  DC  principles.  In  this  case,  the  aid  programme 
undertakes a procedure intended to discover initiatives emanating from the grassroots (micro 
level); 
In Guinea-Conaky, the RurE;J.I Development Programmes of Upper West Guinea and Maritime 
Guinea  were  designed  as  fairly  conventional  EDF programmes.  Nevertheless,  the 
implementation was entrusted to European and local NGOs,  who are supposed to respond to 
demands from  the  target-groups in  the intervention areas considered by the programme. 
Moreover,  non-allocated budgetary envelopes  have  been  reserved  for Micro-projects 
peripheral to the programme but nonetheless necessary. 
It should be noted that the transformation of conventional programmes often proves difficult, 
because the combination of the  need to  guarantee results  and  the centralised traditions 
generally defeat the  will  to  innovate.  These  interventions  work more  on  the  logic  of  a 
'contribution' by the beneficiaries to the actions in which they take part; they are in danger of 
becoming  confined  to  an  'aid-counter'  at  which  non-coordinated  grassroots  initiative 
applications are made. 
The  Smallholders Development Project at Mpongwe in  North Zambia,  was  a conventional 
rural development programme in 26 villages (small communications infrastructure - bridges 
and tracks- and improvement of agricultural productivity). From 1991, participatory research undertaken with  the  peasants was  introduced,  and in  late  1993,  the  entire project was 
reoriented towards community development.  The project's efforts are now centred on  the 
training of village organisers emphasising the non-directive approach that the latter should 
apply in  their discussions  with  the  villagers.  The  village  assembly is  in  the  process of 
becoming the community's forum of reflection in  which decisions concerning the village's 
future are made.  With  the  aid of educators,  the  villagers are encouraged to  explore the 
totality of their resources and take initiatives aimed at turning them to use.  If necessary, they 
can receive support from the project itself,  or from the Micro-project Programme,  which is 
very active in Zambia. At the same time,  savings and credit clubs (based on the Grameen 
Bank system) have been created in most villages in the project. Many women have used this 
to  begin small businesses and activities  of transformation  of agricultural produce  (for 
example, buying sorghum seed, grinding it and selling it as flour). 
•  _CQnYe.rg~nt.  Q.C.P.r.Qgramme.$,  with a central initiative and conventional project cycle, the 
programme taking into consideration at some point an organised initiative of society (meso 
level); 
In the Dominican Republic, the EDF had intended to carry out a development project in the 
Puerto Plata. At the same time there occurred in  the province a broad-based consultation 
between local agents. This consultation was equipped with a technical advice bureau for the 
various agents public and private.  In  this case,  the EDF initiative encountered a structured 
initiative of that society (this example was described in greater depth at 4.2.4). 
•  _f;J;QttPm~-'!P  ..  OC.prpgr_~_m_m_t:fi, with the promoter/interface proposing its programme to the 
donor (macro level).  In  this case,  the aid  programme would  not have existed without the 
external proposition. 
In Cameroon, a French NGO undertook the task of dynamising local support NGOs active in 
urban areas,  so that they were  in  a position to  provide services to  the population.  It then 
designed, in collaboration with the NGOs, a support programme for small economic initiatives 
in 5 towns and presented it to  the  EDF.  Favourable circumstances (money remaining over 
from Lome IV,  agreements with  the ministries involved,  the agreement of the NAO and the 
Delegation) meant that the EDF agreed to  finance the programme with the French NGO as 
operator. 
In  the first two cases  (convergent and conventional programmes),  the  programme initiative 
came from the Commission or the State; in the third, the initiative for the programme came from 
one or more of the decentralized agents. 
Participation of decentralized agents 
These are programmes which, whatever their origin (State or decentralized agents) highlight 
the participation of  the populace concerned and the local agents at all  stages of the 
process. This  intensity of  participation  will  constitute  a fundamental  characteristic  of the 
practice of the decentralized cooperation process. 
It is  important to note that even in the two cases that we have just cited,  in which the initiative 
for  the  programme  comes  top-down  (convergent  and  conventional),  and  in  spite  of  the 
constraints described, it was possible to adopt and apply (with varying degrees of intensity), the 
basic principles of DC at the level of operators and beneficiaries (as regards the actions to be 
undertaken,  for example).  This  would  mean  a  strategy  of  responding  to  local  initiatives, reinforcing  the  capacities  of  a  range  of  agents,  reinforcing  civil  society,  support  for 
democratisation, a participatory approach, autonomy for the operator, flexible procedures, etc. 
The origin of the  initiative of the programme should  not therefore be  considered as  a factor 
predetermining  the  intensity of  participation in  the action.  The participatory aspect of  an 
operation  will  depend  as  much  on  the  working  methods  of  the  structures  responsible  for 
identifying  actions  and  implementing  them  than  on  the  origin  of  the  initiative.  This  again 
highlights the importance of the phase of identification or inventory of potential partners, mainly 
according to c;;riteria of capacity, competence, democratic working etc. 
5.2.2. Typical cases 
The census carried out by Unit VIII/B/2 and the study missions performed for this work show 
that there is no single form of operation with decentralized cooperation. We have already 
highlighted on  various occasions the fact that decentralized cooperation is  a different way of 
practising development cooperation rather than a specific instrument of cooperation with a well-
defined matching project/programme of intervention.  DC  is  a concept that can  be applied 
within most forms of intervention practised by European cooperation. 
DC  operations  can  take  very  various  forms,  depending  on  the  nature  and  degree  of 
decentralization of the State, the institutional attitude of the local public authorities, the will to 
impart  a  participatory  aspect  to  these  programmes  and  the  donor/EDF  or  Commission 
instruments being used. 
We saw at  4.3.2  that  the  decentralized cooperation  approach  can  either be  the  object  of 
specific  programmes, or be  used as a  method in  existing or forthcoming programmes, or 
again  make  use  of an  envelope/allocation  reserved,  within  the  indicative programme,  for 
decentralized agents. 
In practice, two typical cases of specific CD programmes are likely to be: 
•  a  programme of (co-)funding of  various  local  initiatives, which can  benefit from the 
simplified decision-making mechanism on global authorisation (Lome Article 290); 
•  a conventional development programme (of support for decentralized partners, or in which 
the execution of actions is entrusted to these partners) following the normal decision-making 
mechanism  on  the  basis  of  a  financial  proposal  (Articles  288  and  289  of  the  Lome 
Convention), with objectives and means defined in advance. 
Programme of (co-}funding of various local initiatives 
This  would  be  a  'development counter'  programme for  local  initiatives,  defined  in  outline 
(objectives,  intervention  sector,  eligibility criteria for projects  and  partners,  methodological 
requirements,  conditions  of  funding,  etc.)  without (definitive)  previous  identification  of 
projects and partners. The structuring of the budget would  be  done by broad  headings of 
activity or objective. In the case of ACP countries, a programme of this type would approved as 
such by the Commission on the basis of Article 290 of the Convention. The programme would 
then finance,  in  accordance with predefined criteria, structured initiatives arising from society, 
or, if so specified, from the local administration. These programmes will be either classified as Micro-project Programmes (MPPs, Articles 252 
and  253  of  Lome)  or as  'Ad hocl  decentralized  cooperation  programmes.  The  initiatives 
proposed are in  general of small scale, but could reach a certain size, the financial ceiling for 
any one action being placed at 300,000 ECU (Article 251 D). 
The MPPs are well  known to  most of the ACP  States and  Commission managers,  and  can 
constitute an  adequate 'way in
1
,  especially in  ACP countries that have never been able to  or 
never wished to benefit from them. They will however have to be adapted as  a result, as the 
projects should, for example, no longer be limited to one year. 
In both cases (adapted MPP or ad hoc DCP), the decentralized cooperation approach will mean 
imparting the maximum sense of responsibility to the decentralized agents, contractual relations 
with the donor, a participatory approach, coherence in the interventions, local consultation and 
planning,  autonomy  in  project  management,  etc.  They  should  also  comprise  a  major 
component of beneficiary capacity development (empowerment, reinforcing organisational 
capacity, reinforcing the organisations that they create) so that the beneficiaries are well able to 
claim from the public authorities (national or local) the services to which they have a right in the 
framework of the action (e.g. construction of a school/ demanding a teacher). 
The interface is  akin to technical assistance, but with a different profile and different roles.  It 
would, for example, have determining responsibilities for the appraisal of intervention requests. 
Unless  the  programme  is  thematic~lly or  sectorally  structured  (see  5.2.3.),  the  interface 
responsible for the management/coordination of the programme should be general in  kind,  so 
that the intervention requests are not confined to a limited range of'  possible~ technical choices 
(for example,  hydro-agricultural  choices  because  the  technical  assistance  or operator  is 
competent only in this field). There can be one or more interfaces. 
Conventional development programme 
Relative  to  the  preceding  case,  this  is  a  more  carefully  constructed  programme,  set  up 
according to standard Commission format, whose aim is a larger scale of action, which should, 
if possible be designed and prepared by decentralized agents of the required scale (peasant 
federations, unions,  local authorities, professional organisations, etc.).  It may be  made up of 
subprojects, with pre-identification of the subprojects that constitute the overall programme. It 
will  follow  a  normal  decision-making  mechanism:  subprojects,  partners  and  the  budgets 
allocated to each will have been determined by the time of the funding convention. The overall 
budget will  be  structured  into  subprojects,  with  a  predefined  budget for each  of  the  sub-
projects/operators.  On  the  other  hand,  the  precise  identification  of  the  actions  to  be 
implemented  in  participatory  fashion  vis-a-vis  the  beneficiaries  can  be  done  while  the 
programme is being executed. 
Agreements (in the form of protocols) must be signed between the Delegations, interfaces and 
the National Authorizing Officer in the A  CPs. These can be 'cascade  I  agreements: agreement 
between the EC/government, followed by more or less formalised agreement(s) between the 
government and one or more of the decentralized partners. The EC thus enters into agreement 
with a government, not with the decentralized partners. The agreements  can also be  'tripartite~, 
bringing together EC, government and the decentralized partner or partners. 
Such direct  'tripartite~ formulae  have  been  attempted,  in  a  limited  number of cases,  in  the 
Developing/ALA country context,  in  which  funding  agreements  were  agreed  between  the 
..  ,,_._  ,;.~ ......  :;::;:_.  ----~;- <·>· c c.  :·:;·':  ,.,; :':.  .:-.:::·::·'.;:}iJ/-~.  '~:.,·...  _::]·  .... :.-+-:.-::'  _,,  ,, \' . :.:.,:;  :-.:.  :-:~,:.:, . .  .  ·_._-_·_:_:-_:._::_:  __ v:'_.  ·_._:-.'_:~_;::e_  ...  _,_·  __  -~_-,· .......  _'.-._:_·:_."'·_:.·_c.;.._-_.-._.il'!!  ...  ~---i~~~.:_:_.  __  ,_.-,~_:  .. ·.·DC.  · .. · ·_'  ·-'o,_:·_ ..__  .·;RA,  :  -..._:  _,,',~_;.._  :_· .....  ,:._·  : .-_:::·:ar.: 
;::·~ .. :.  :;:  :.?~:~-:~r:·:.::·:·:.~:;  .·.  :·:.:.-._::·.-.·:  .. :--.->.:-=.:·:-:  ..  ·-··-· .. :: :::::  ..  ·:: ..  ::·.:.;:~.:·,i:;,=.::~  .:_:.  ,.;··:-/:·:~:·:·.;:?~:  ·,.,,.-·:.:.;;·::=.-:·:·.  :·:.::.:  ·:- ·  ... ·.·  ..  ·-:::'.~-~=::.:"·:  =·:~  : .. -.. .. :  ...  /::_:  ~  v  SJ:'.I' ~  v.r; a  r.:c  ,;t· VR Commission on  the one hand and a ministry and private organisations on the other (this was 
done in  Nicaragua with  a governmental land  legalisation programme, implemented via three 
private  operators).  They  remain  exceptional,  despite the  fact  that they  can  confer on  the 
decentralized  partners  a  direct  and  integral  participation  in  the  programme.  In  the  ACP 
countries, the Commission is an  integral part of the agreement with the EDF. There can be one 
or more interfaces corresponding to one or more programmes. 
The case may arise of a top-down programme initiative (see 5.2.1 ): this is a governmental or 
donor initiative which  would  present the characteristics  and  respect the  objectives and  the 
principles of decentralized cooperation 2. The initiative would bring together various key agents 
in  the execution of components of activity vis-a-vis various target groups;  it  is  vital that the 
decentralized agents should be associated as  closely as  possible with the preparation of the 
programme. The non-governmental partners who implement the actions (a)  should themselves 
have a DC  approach and  (b)  should be  given the opportunity to work in a way consistent with 
their own objectives and methodologies. Such a programme might, for example, be intended to 
develop the capacities of decentralized administrative entities in the framework of an operation 
working on small grassroots infrastructural implementations for the population. 
During the missions accomplished for this  work,  a programme of this kind,  PRONASOL,  in 
Mexico,  was studied.  The  World Bank decided to support this national programme by choosing 
its zones and sectors of intervention; for example, it decided to intervene financially in support 
of the  programme  in  6  Mexican  states,  exclusively in  rural  areas,  vis-a-vis  the  poorest 
inhabitants and only within  the  ·social Funds' sub-programme (which  includes support for 
municipalities  and the  setting  up  of socio-economic  infrastructures).  The  components 
supported by the  World Bank are subject to an extremely close and rigorous monitoring by its 
technical services concerning respect for criteria of eligibility and principles defined in common 
with the government. 
The conventional  EDF/ALA programmes (of the  rural  or integrated development type)  might 
enter this category insofar as their implementation is entrusted to decentralized agents. These 
would be chosen according to their competence, capacities and motivation, with consideration 
also given to the sectors chosen and the interventions envisaged ..  Moreover, open  budgets 
that the decentralized operators could  use according to  requests and opportunities, might be 
reserved within the overall budget of the project/programme. 
It is this type of programme which involves the greatest danger of the instrumentalisation of 
the decentralized agents, as they may find themselves entrusted with tasks that distance them 
from their own objectives. By contrast, if, within the confines of the kinds of actions envisaged in 
the  programme,  these  agents  are  allowed  to  realise  the  kind  of  intervention  that  they 
traditionally practise, and with their own methods, the danger of instrumentalisation is  reduced. 
It would then be essential for the authorities (Delegations, NAO in the ACP countries) to check 
that these kinds of intervention do indeed constitute relevant responses to the needs identified 
at grassroots level3,  and that the working methods of these agents do indeed meet a certain 
number of predefined criteria (approach, methods, capacities, etc.). 
2  Examples of  how  not to  proceed  are  provided by certain  of  the  ·Social Funds'  set  up  in  many 
countries to offset the negative effects of structural adjustment. While they brought in private actors, some 
of these programmes have shown characteristics ill-suited to local needs (works being done that did not 
match  real  priorities)  and  were  largely  lacking  in  participatory  methods  (imposing  certain  kinds  of 
implementation whose norms were defined in authoritarian and centralised fashion). 
3  This precaution is of course equally applicable to the other forms of programmes. There may also be bottom-up programme initiatives (see 5.1.2.); this would be an  initiative 
proposed by one or more of the decentralized partners identified as key institutions. They would 
then  play  the  role  of  interface  between  the  grassroots  groups  (beneficiaries)  and  the 
Commission  and  the  State  (ACP countries). The  decentralized  partners can  be  supported 
overall or relative to a specific component of their activities (see 5.2.4.). 
5.2.3. Frequent applications 
To ensure coherence, and depending on the importance accorded to local development, the 
overall  programme (including  support programmes for local  initiatives)  should  ideally be 
geographically,  sectorally or thematically structured  (geographical  specialisation  is 
obviously  impossible  where  a  programme  is  nationwide).  The  chosen  sectors  need  not 
necessarily match the NIP focal sectors, as article 281.2.f indicates (see 4.3.2.). 
Regional programme 
This would be a programme in  which a choice would be made in favour of geographical 
concentration. The intermediaries would be of various kinds (local administrations, Chambers 
of Commerce, associations, NGOs, unions, etc.).  Interventions would tend to be  integrated in 
character. The overall configuration of the programme would be  defined during identification. 
The specific content of the programme (projects to be  implemented) would be  defined on the 
basis of the results of consultative planning and the establishment of priorities at local/regional 
level; the various operators chosen would be involved in the construction of the programme. 
Sectoral/thematic programme 
Here a specific technical sector (e.g. water supply, health, specific production area, etc.)  or 
theme (women, natural resources, etc.) would be chosen. In this case, coherence would be not 
with the problems of a geographical zone but with a specific priority. The choice of a sectoral or 
thematic  option  would  thus  depend  on  the  context  of  the  country,  the  development 
opportunities, the national priorities or the EU  cooperation programme in that country (NIP or 
ALA/MED protocol), and local dynamics, etc. 
5.2.4. Support modalities for decentralized partners 
Two formulas of support for one or more decentralized partners can be envisaged, according to 
the objective pursued: 
a.  .O.v.c.t~U  .b.l!.rJ9.f#.tCJ!.Y .$.L!PP.Q.d 
The funding includes both the internal working of the organisation and its activities 
vis-a-vis its target-groups. The EC can only be one donor within a consortium of donors. 
The partner is broadly autonomous in the overall implementation of activities, but is strongly 
dependent for its existence on funding.  It is therefore important, in this framework, to allow 
the organisation supported to 'capitalise' itself. 
Through its funding,  the  Commission  (and  State,  if  ACP)  would agree not to  impose its 
views  as  to  activities  undertaken,  services  performed,  choice  of  beneficiary,  internal 
structural organisation, and development options. Consultations would normally take place nevertheless on this subject with the Commission (and ACP State), perhaps at consortium 
level.  The  structure  would  agree to  respect  a  certain  number of  priorities  defined  in 
consultation, as well as the administrative and financial procedures inherent in the funding 
arrangement. 
The example of Proshika in Bangladesh, often cited in this document, illustrates this kind of 
support.  The  most recent 5-year programme of Proshika  was  financed according to  a 
particular form of  pooling of the resources of different kinds of donors: the sources meet as 
a consortium and pool their funds  to  support the  overall activities of this NGO and the 
institution itself.  This type of support has the considerable merit of avoiding the division of 
the programme (which  would imply extra costs for the beneficiary association) but is not 
always welcomed by the donors,  who are used to providing individualised funding or funds 
matching a certain parl of the programme (which was what the EU did for Proshika at first). 
Another similar case is that of the local NGO BRAG, also in Bangladesh. 
b.  .S.VPP.9.rt. f.Qr. .EJ. ,;pmppn~nt.  Pf fh~.  if~fiv.itie.$_ Pt. nn. PrgtJni~iftiPn 
The funding  is  provided for a  particular  project,  geographically  or  thematically 
circumscribed, which is only a part of the activities of the decentralized partner. This formula 
requires that the structure supported has its own or alternative resources for funding its own 
running costs. The funding is intended to allow the organisation to develop certain specific 
activities (and not just to 'exist'), for example, to extend projects already under way to new 
sectors, new target groups or new geographical zones. 
The definition of the project to be financed should be in large measure the work of 
the partner, with  more or less active participation on  the part of the donor. This type of 
programme can, then,  run the risk of instrumentalising the partner; everything depends on 
the form  in  which the partner was chosen, the partner's working methods, and the way in 
which the programme was defined. There is also a danger of the overall programme of the 
supported  organisation  being  divided  up  and  of  this  imposing  extra costs  in  terms  of 
resources and time.  Finally, it is very difficult for an  organisation to attain capitalisation in 
this funding framework4. 
The  demands  and  guarantees  of  the  first  formula  are  also  applicable  here,  with  this 
difference: that closer control and targeted technical support are less likely to be  seen as 
interference with the working of the organisation. 
Individualised financing of a single decentralized partner is justifiable only if the partner offers 
minimal guarantees and  has the appropriate characteristics: the necessary management and 
execution capacities (or the possibility of rapid  improvement), a participatory approach in  the 
spirit of decentralized cooperation, and an  intervention capacity covering a given geographic 
zone,  thus  allowing the channelling  of the  minimal  financial  volume justifying  an  individual 
agreement. Such private organisations (NGOs or grassroots organisations) only exist in certain 
countries (rarely in Africa, for example). 
Where the situation or the organisation's qualities do not justify individualised funding, it would 
be  better to  include  support  for  this  body  in  a  broader  programme  comprising  several 
decentralized operators rather than to sign a separate agreement. In most cases it is possible to 
4  For more detail on these aspects, see Evaluation des cofinancements CEE-ONG en matiere d'appui 
institutionnel aux organisations de bases dans les PVD,  [Assessment of EEC-NGO cofinancing in the area 
of institutional support for grassroots organisations in developing countries], summary report, COTA, 1993. bring together in a single operation  several agents or key-institutions. The programme will 
consist of a series of subprojects executed by different agents/ organisations vis-a-vis different 
target  groups;  this  would  also  be  a  demand-driven  programme  in  which  the  support 
organisations would have a role as  intermediaries between grassroots initiatives and  donors. 
This formula can produce various configurations and can include, for each partner, both of the 
kinds  of  support considered  (overall  support,  or support for a  particular component  of  its 
activity). It would be chosen where a series of low-volume individual funding agreements create 
an excessive administrative burden or the cost of technical support (if any) would be too great. 
The justification for such a formula cannot, however, be limited to administrative considerations. 
There  may  be  more  fundamental  objectives  and  motivations.  It  may,  for example,  make 
possible a critical mass or geographical distribution effect, the diversification of the agents and a 
consequently increased democratic pluralism, or the establishment of relations of exchange and 
collaboration between partners. The partners included in one and the same programme can be 
very diverse.  They can  be  partners  of  the  same  kind  (a  number of  NGOs,  municipalities, 
cooperatives, etc.). Or different partners (public and private, e.g.) can be brought together in a 
single programme and complementarities and collaborations can be organised between them. 
5.3. INSTITUTIONAL AND OPERATIONAL SET·UPS: 
THE NEED FOR AN INTERFACE 
The choice of institutional and operational set-up is fundamental if decentralized cooperation 
operations  are  to  respect  the  expectations  and  prerogatives  of  the  parties  involved.  This 
question can be approached by examining the main preoccupations and expectations regarding 
the ethics of DC as expressed by the NGOs brought together at the Harare seminars: 
•  mutual recognition of the different roles,  identities and the operational independence of the 
agents; 
•  reinforcing the sense of responsibility of all the agents involved and  of the participation of 
these agents at the different levels of negotiation in a framework of constructive dialogue; 
•  respect for the autonomy of the  NGOs regarding their capacity for initiative and execution 
within the framework of contractually defined missions; 
•  the search for role complementarity in the agents and activities involved. 
Clearly, questions arise about the conditions under which DC can be practised.  For example, 
respect for the autonomy of agents in  respect of their capacity for initiation and execution will 
depend &trongly  on  the choice of  institutional and  operational  set-up.  Has  the  appraisal  of 
projects been performed by an interface/ decentralized agent or a professional cell contractually 
committed and autonomous relative to the administration? Has the selection of actions to be 
submitted for decision  been  made  impartially  in  an  ad  hoc,  pluralistic  committee?  Do  the 
contracts allow for execution to take place under the supervision of the operator itself, without 
the usual protagonists of cooperation programmes (consultants, enterprises or departments of 
the administration) being imposed? 
5  The seminar on  DC  held at Harare in January 1994 in the presence of several National Authorizing 
Officers, EU  delegates and Commission functionaries, allowed the NGOs from both South atid North to 
express their reservations and desires concerning their insertion in and collaboration with ACP/EU DCPs. 
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the proper implementation of the DC operation: one of its basic functions is to move the process 
,  along  by  installing  suitable  persons  and  structures  and  keeping  the  process  on  the  rails 
thereafter. It must find a balance between the activities that it can take on  personally and the 
activities  which  must  be  entrusted  to  others.  Given  the  workload  attached  to  remote 
management, we  cannot too strongly recommend that the process be supervised by the 
Delegation, while allowing the appropriate structures to act as intermediaries between 
the EDF authorities and the beneficiaries of the intervention or the operators responsible 
for implementing it. 
5.3.1. Criteria for choosing the management/coordination 
interface of the programme 
The choice of set-up will depend primarily on  the institutional, legislative and political 
context of the  country:  only what is  possible within the current state of the  laws,  juridical 
status and democratic progress in the country can be done. 
The criteria will also depend on  the form of programme selected. However the classification 
adopted at 5.2.2. (local initiative funding programme, conventional development programme) is 
not the most relevant in  relation to the different possible institutional set-ups. It is the number of 
operators or small  initiatives,  and thus the complexity of  the  operation,  which  must be  the 
determining choice in the management and coordination of the intervention. 
A.  Where the  programme has to  deal  with  many operators  or small  initiatives, there 
would seem to be a need for a programme management/coordination interface structure6 
between operators/initiatives and the donor (and the authorities in  ACP countries). This is 
the  case  with  programmes  funding  local  initiatives,  but  also  with  some  conventional 
programmes. 
B.  Where the programme deals with a single operator only (decentralized or governmental 
agent), there is probably no need for a specific structure, insofar as the sole operator will 
itself constitute the interface with the donor for the management and  coordination of the 
programme. 
Finally, the criteria of choice might be different according to whether the programme is  in an 
ACP  or  ALA  country,  given the  different  regulations  and  role  of  the  State in  community 
cooperation. 
In ACP countries, the need for a programme coordinating structure will no doubt make itself felt 
more urgently for two main reasons: 
•  the lack of capacity, scale, structuring and coordination of the decentralized agents in these 
countries; 
•  the complexity and onerousness of the administrative and financial procedures of the EDF. 
6  This conclusion is drawn from,  on the one hand, the set-ups adopted by many EDF MPPs and other 
EDF programmes,  and from studies of the programmes of several other funding sources,  with visits to 
their agencies, during the preparation of this work. However,  even  in  ALA  countries  and  even  where  a  single  operator  is  the  programme 
beneficiary, an interface structure with the donors may be chosen. 
This  is  the  case  with  the  Commission's  support programme  for  the  NGO  Proshika  in 
Bangladesh.  The  consortium bureau acts as an interface,  having a monitoring,  control and 
communication role with and between the donors.  The head of the bureau is a TA funded by the 
EU and whose nomination is subject to  the approval of the members of the consortium as a 
whole (this set up seems an excellent one from  the point of view of donor coordination,  see 
4.2.5.) 
5.3.2. Type of programme management/coordination interface 
In general, such a structure must: 
•  enjoy wide-ranging political and administrative autonomy in order to resist pressures up 
and  downstream (in  particular pressures operating  against the  selection  of operators or 
projects on the basis of democratic and transparent mechanisms and criteria) 7; 
•  manage the funds  for  the programme  (payment  by  instalment)  and  decide  on  their 
allocation (e.g. on the advice of a project committee); 
•  if it has to be created,  employ local contractual staff  (and perhaps T  A staff) rather than 
functionaries on secondment from the administration. 
These characteristics of the management/coordination structure mean that it should  have a 
status appropriate to the functions to be delegated to it. 
In  the case of a programme dealing with many operators or small initiatives (case A at 
5.3.1 ),  a specific programme management/cooperation structure will be needed, but two 
different cases may arise. 
•  Programme of (co-)funding of local initiatives; in that case, the best option is a structure 
specifically created  to  manage  and  coordinate the  programme,  whose  staff are  under 
contract. This structure would normally take the form  of an  ad  hoc cell or a programme 
coordination bureau  (this is what happens, e.g., with most MPPs). 
•  Conventional development programme (of support for several decentralized agents): 
because of the numerous different initiatives coming from different sectors of society that DC 
is likely to elicit,  the neutrality of the management and coordination structure will be a 
most important parameter.  For this reason,  it is  not a good idea to entrust this  role to  an 
organisation  likely to become  an  operator in  the  programme,  since  its  choices  might be 
biased and  its  neutrality questioned by other partners of the programme or by other agents 
representing  civil  society  (see  4.1.4.).  It  is  therefore best to  opt for an  ad  hoc  structure, 
similar to that in the preceding case. 
7  However, one person whom we met during study missions noted that,  for reasons relating to the 
culture and social system of many Southern countries, and more especially of Africa, it is often difficult for 
the  local personnel to  resist certain  pressures.  In  practice,  a formal  role  for expatriate personnel  (or 
representatives of the funding source) in  decision-making, or a motivating salary level for local staff, are 
often sufficient to enable them to offer greater resistance to such pressures. However, exceptions might be considered: 
(a)  a  programme  intervening  in  one  or more  specific  sectors,  implemented  by  a  local 
grassroots  organisation  covering  the  zone  in  question  (see  4.1 .4  on  grassroots 
organisations); 
(b)  if the programme is intended to support the activities of a network (of bodies working in a 
particular theme or sector), the coordination bureau of the network could then  act as 
interface between its members and the donor; 
(c)  a programme whose management and coordination was  entrusted to a structure born 
out of consultation between local agents. 
In these situations, the problem of legitimacy does not arise, and the situation as regards set-up 
is not the same as for a programme with a single operator. 
To sum up case A,  the interface should generally be an ad  hoc contractual structure, but could 
in  certain cases be an  umbrella grassroots organisation, a professional structure, or again be 
formed by a coalition of agents. 
If the  programme deals with a single operator or very few operators (case B at 5.3.1 ), the 
operators could be  placed in  direct contact with the funding structure and themselves play the 
role of interface and programme management/coordination. Where a governmental programme 
is  being supported, a management/coordination structure with  maximum independence of the 
administration  seems  necessary;  an  expatriate  TA  is  often  seconded  to  the 
management/coordination structure or the administration and fulfils several interface functions 
with the donor. This is also justifiable where the support is for the programme of a decentralized 
agent (for example,  Proshika,  in  Bangladesh, presented at 3.1.,  4.2.5., 5.2.2.,  and 5.3.1.,  or 
Foro Social  in  the  Dominican  Republic,  presented at 4.2.4.  - organisation of an  institutional 
framework- at the beginning of 5.2.). 
5.3.3. Functions of the programme management/coordination 
interface 
In general, the structure of the programme management/coordination plays the role of a 
filter both upstream  (in order to avoid the administration and the Delegation having the difficult 
task of dealing with many different agents) and downstream (to avoid the operators having to 
deal with administrative and financial constraints). However, the specific roles of this structure 
will vary according to whether it is in  an  'open' or'  closed' programme, in particular as  regards 
the identification of the operators and the actions to be supported. 
•  In  an  'open' programme, that is,  defined only in  broad outline (simplified decision-making 
mechanism,  case  A  at  5.2.2.,  funding  local  initiatives),  it  will  have  fundamental 
responsibilities in  the selection and appraisal of intervention demands. It can  play a 
more or less active role in generating and supporting the formulation of projects, in particular 
for partners who are inexperienced at this kind  of thing; to that extent,  it can  undertake a 
general structuring of local initiatives.  It would perform the task of ensuring the  greater or 
lesser overall coherence of the programme, in order to avoid 'aid-sprinkling'. 
•  In a 'closed' programme, that is, defined in detail before the funding agreement is drawn up 
(normal  decision-making  mechanism,  case  B  at  5.2.2.,  conventional  development 
programme), this component of the structure's role will normally be lacking, unless the 
structure is set up (or existed) before the decision on the programme, in order to identify its content and take part in the choice of operators. This might in  itself be recommendable,  in 
that  it  is  best  if  the  management/coordination  structure  takes  part  in  the  whole  of  the 
identification process (content of the programme, intervention areas, choice of operators): 
where this is  not the case,  it  has to commit itself to  coordinating and control operators in 
whose selection it has not taken part. 
In  more general terms, the functions of the programme management and coordination 
structure may  be  various  (some  of  them  will  be  lacking  where  the  operator  is  itself the 
programme management/coordination structure: 
•  communication in general and circulation of information upstream (NAO, administration and 
Delegation) and downstream (target groups or institutions); 
•  continuous  institution  mapping  and  identification  of  potential  partners  (in  the  evolving 
context); 
•  coordination between operators (in particular, definition of roles and functions); 
•  examining operators• action plans; 
•  checking the project identifications carried out by operators; 
•  formal financing decision on the basis of proposals made by a project selection committee; 
•  fund management and channelling of funds to operators; 
•  supplying consultancy and support services to grassroots operators and agents; 
•  design and monitoring of the guidance measures carried out (see 5.4.); 
•  monitoring of operators and their activities; 
•  checking that the broad outlines and specific criteria of  DC  are  applied  by  operators and 
donors; 
•  financial and administrative control of operators; 
•  ensuring that procedures are respected up and downstream; 
•  accounts consolidation; 
•  capitalisation of experience. 
Another criterion  for the  desirability of  an  independent and  autonomous  management and 
coordination structure  is  the degree of formal  responsibility for decision-making that will  be 
delegated to  it.  In  this configuration, the question of the legitimacy/representativeness of the 
interface  structure  is  less  immediately urgent;  it  will  be  required  above  all  to  demonstrate 
professional competence  and  must earn  the  recognition  and  trust of  the operators  by  its 
neutrality and the quality of its work. 
The  function  of  financial  control and  consolidation  of the accounts of the various 
operators  requires the structure to possess the necessary human resources. 
On a practical/eve/, the experiment made in Guinea for the RDP possesses several merits: a 
central accounting cell is made responsible for the financial supervision of the operators and 
consolidates their accounts in order to present them to the NAO and Delegation in a form that 
satisfies the EDF financial audit.  To  this end,  the cell developed an appropriate accounting 
programme, which it distributed to all the operators. This procedure allowed uniform monitoring 
and budgetary control procedures.  The  cell can  in  addition  offer expertise  in  t~e use  of 
accounting and management software in general (publishing working documents). It is also able 
to produce statistics useful to the optimal overall management of the programmes. The structure will  also be  able to  set up  consultation between the agents,  such that the 
individual projects fit  in  with an  overall  regional  or sectoral plan  created  in  consultative and 
participatory fashion. 
One remark about the structurels role  of capitalising on  experience:  DC  will often be justified 
only by the  potential  it  offers of self-multiplying effects  in  relation to  the actions and 
organisations supported;  the  danger is  otherwise that it  will  result  in  nothing  more than 
sprinkling~. This requires that measures be taken to ensure that such effects actually occur; 
capitalisation and systematisation of experience, encouraging the diffusion of such information, 
support for connecting similar local initiatives into networks so that learning experiences can be 
mutual, awareness-raising exercises, etc. What must be designed is thus a veritable strategy 
of capitalisation and  diffusion of experience, and  resources must be  provided so that the 
management/coordination structure can be implemented. 
5.3.4. The bodies that choose which actions to fund 
In  an  'open  I  programme  using  the  simplified decision-making  mechanism,  decisions about 
funding  projects within  the  programme  must be  taken  during  its  execution  (as  with  Micro-
projects). This may also be the case in a programme which is 'closed  I  as regards the operators 
but 'open  I  as  regards the actions to  be  implemented.  It  would  be  inadvisable in  this case to 
entrust the  entire responsibility for decision-making concerning operators,  beneficiaries and 
projects to the contractual programme management structure if  any. This body must not be 
allowed to  concentrate too many powers and thus to centralise the selection of  projects.  It is 
therefore important to  design an  appropriate decision-making procedure. A formula often 
found in MPPs is that of the Steering Committee (SC) 8. 
In DC operations, a pluralistic composition of these SCs could be as follows (the inclusion of 
the NAO is specific to ACPs): 
•  a representative of the NAO; 
•  a representative of the EC Delegation; 
•  a representative of the programme management/coordination interface; 
•  a representative of the local administration of the  region considered, or a representative of 
the elected officials of the region; 
•  one or more representatives of the operators, or one representative per type of operator; 
•  possibly local notables, representatives of different sectors of civil society, but without formal 
institutional  attachments.  These  could  be  invited  in  ad  hoc  fashion,  according  to  their 
particular technical competences. 
The composition of this committee must be  susceptible of variation according to context, the 
form  of  programme  chosen,  and  the  results  of  the  process  of  consultation  between  the 
decentralized agents and the State. Its main function must be to propose the allocation of the 
funds managed by the management and coordination interface  according to criteria and 
priorities  established  in  advance  (the  formal  decision-making  - signature of  contracts  with 
8  This kind of structure is similar in composition and functions to the regional planning authorities of the 
Mexican Pronasol (see 4.2.4). operators/beneficiaries- would be taken by the management/coordination interface). Other SC 
functions might be9: 
•  formulate basic outlines of the programme; 
•  plan budgetary allocations  and ensure coherence between its stages/sub-programmes/ 
operators; 
•  approve proposed budgetary reallocations; 
•  supervise  the  management,  administration  and  personnel  of  the  management/ 
coordination structure  1  o; 
•  supervise the evaluation process, internal and external. 
5.3.5. Towards permanent interface structures 
The  major defect of the  management/coordination structure as  proposed for programmes 
dealing with several operators/ initiatives is that it generally has a  provisional status, as it  is 
structured around a particular programme or project.  Its useful life is thus inherently limited, 
whereas a longer term structure would be preferable for a strategy of development generally 
based on decentralized cooperation, the participation of society and on capacity development. 
This temporary character is a disadvantage and should be changed in the light of:  (a)  a long 
term policy by the Commission which would involve continuous recourse to DC over the years 
to come; (b) the efficiency and effectiveness of services performed. 
It would therefore be advisable to  envisage a more permanent kind of set-up, which could 
build balanced and stable relations between the population and the State, and make it possible 
for a donor to ir:nplement a long term policy and a matching strategy. To this end, it is obviously 
desirable that the structure set up should in the medium term acquire real autonomy relative to 
the State and that the services proposed to the operators should have no local equivalent. 
Two examples of  institutional  set-ups  are  worthy of mention  in  this  perspective,  as  they 
constitute a response to these concerns: the first is the proposal to create an Agency for the 
Management and Promotion of Grassroots Initiatives in  Benin by the GTZ, and the second is 
the Palestinian Centre for Micro-project Development now being set up with the support of the 
EU. 
AGePIB: Agencv for the Management and Promotion of Grassroots Initiatives. GTZ. Benin 
In  the  framework of a support programme for grassroots initiatives  in  Benin,  the  GTZ has 
proposed creating a permanent structure for the management and promotion of such actions. 
The GTZ sees two reasons to support the creation of such a structure: 
- the agency would fulfil functions which normally fall to local authorities in  the area of social 
infrastructures and to the private sector where productive projects are concerned. Neither the 
local authorities nor the private sector can be expected to perform these tasks in  the near 
future; 
9  Where  certain  of  these functions  are  entrusted to  it,  this committee would  be  like  the  Steering 
Committee of the programme, such as exists in Guinea for the RDPs (see Annex 3, case 6). Note that this 
steering function seems necessary in  any case,  but that it can be accomplished by a smaller committee 
(composed of at least representatives of the NAO and of the delegation). 
10  The  SC's  having  this  responsibility  can  enhance  the  independence  of  the  management  and 
coordination structure relative to the NAO. - the  agency would implement a  strategy of war on poverty which  would go beyond the 
circumstantial dimension of groups which have been badly hit by structural adjustment; it 
would comprehend more general causes. 
The purpose of the agency would be to support economic and social projects. It would make 
use of intermediary structures for contacts with target-groups (national NGOs, projects, foreign 
development services, local credit banks, private operators). Regional antennae could be set up 
in zones where local development agents are weak or lacking. 
The agency would have the legal status of  an association. It will have wide-ranging autonomy. 
Its decision-making bodies would be: 
- the General Management and the technical staff; 
- the General Assembly. 
The Members of the Association would be: 
- the State; 
- two donors; 
- two federations of NGOs. 
The  General Assembly would fulfil  the  conditions  required  to  take  on,  in  addition  to  its 
conventional statutory powers,  the  functions of an orientation and supervision body, and of a 
Micro-project approval committee.  The  administration department with  responsibility for the 
agency would have the job of deciding eligibility criteria for projects and selection criteria for 
intermediaries, and would fix funding priorities. An association,  which currently serves as an 
embryonic forum for dialogue between State and civil society, could be included as a member 
of the General Assembly. 
The running costs of a structure of this kind are estimated at 135,000 ECU of initial investment 
and 140,000 ECU/year in  recurrent expenses.  The  agency would undergo an independent 
annual audit.  The  personnel would be recruited in  the  private  sector,  on  the  basis of a 
competitive exam. After the setting-up phase, it is suggested that the agency fund its costs by a 
commission calculated on the value of the projects supported.  This option does, however, open 
the organisation up to  an undesired side-effect,  as it might be tempted to  fund  'expensive' 
projects, or multiply the number of projects supported without regard to quality.  It also openly 
poses the question of the privatisation of the management of cooperation. 
Palestinian Centre for Micro-project Development (PCMDJ 
Till now the EC has financed small projects in the Occupied Territories via many NGOs,  which 
caused problems in the evaluation of requests,  appraisal,  monitoring and control.  The  PCMD 
was  therefore created to  be the  steering structure of the  Micro-project Programme,  while 
maintaining full NGO status. 
The legal set-up is as follows: 
a  Board of Administration (BA),  the  legal representative of the  PCMD,  responsible  (in 
particular) for the formal approval of individual projects; 
a Projects Committee, responsible (in particular) for selecting projects and proposing them 
to  the BA; this body is  composed of the BA,  the director of the  PCMD and his technical 
staff, and independent specialists coopted by the BA; 
a contractual technical team. 
The BA nomination process, and the composition of the BA,  were obvious extremely specific to 
the Palestinian situation and should not therefore serve as an example. In  fact,  the two  set-ups  are  very similar:  each  is  autonomous and  has  a legal  status.  The 
supplementary organ  of the  PCMD,  the  Projects Committee  (PC)  could  be  included  in  the 
AGePIB set-up, so as to free the General Assembly (GA)  of the task of examining proposals. 
This function would then fall to the PC which would propose projects for the decision of the GA. 
In both set-ups, it is the structure itself that would manage funding for projects, on the basis of 
advances from the donors. 
Depending on the variety of proposed actions, it might be useful to  divide the interface along 
the  lines of the intervention themes  that were  most often  proposed;  this  could  also  be 
organised via ad  hoc commissions within the project committee.  Similarly, depending on  the 
configuration chosen for the programmes (see 5.2),  it may sometimes be necessary to move 
the management/coordination structure out of  the locality (as  is  planned for AGePIB in 
Benin), particularly in  the case of programmes of national scale and/or those in which a large 
number of operators dispersed throughout the country intervene. This decentralization could 
take the form of regional antennae, or rely on ad  hoc operators (this is already done in several 
MPPs, as in Mali, Senegal and Zambia). 
A well-designed interface appropriate to the context should be able to perform its functions for 
several programmes of similar approach, for example MPPs,  urban and  rural  DCPs, etc.) or 
even for several donors, and thus make scale economies and reduce running costs. 
5.3.6. Optimal framework for a decentralized cooperation 
programme 
An optimal framework, which we  recommend,  in  a perhaps idealised vision of decentralized 
cooperation would be as follows: 
•  a geographically coordinated programme for a given region or administrative division; 
•  a programme in  the execution of which  a wide range of decentralized operators would 
intervene:  public  (local  administrations)  and  private  (associations,  NGOs,  unions, 
organisations  of  urban  or  rural  producers,  chambers  of  commerce,  professional 
organisations, etc.); 
•  a programme managed by an  interface between the operators and the EDF/Commission, 
comprising  local  staff  (perhaps TA staff)  or entrusted to  an  existing organisation  (union, 
peasant  federation,  etc.)  with  various  roles  and  responsibilities  (management  and 
coordination of the programme, proposals as to strategy, identification of the agents, analysis 
and appraisal of proposals, coordination and monitoring of operators, support for grassroots 
agents, financial decision-making, accounting consolidation); 
•  a programme which would be based on the mapping and selection of key agents; 
•  a  programme  proposed  by  one  of  the  decentralized  operators  or for which  the  overall 
planning of interventions would be the object of consultative planning among the different 
structured operators and agents in that society, at the level of the region considered; 
•  a programme in which  decisions on  individual actions to be funded would be taken by 
the management/coordination interface (in the EDF framework, as delegate NAO), on the 
basis of proposals from a Project Committee. Of course, other configurations or frameworks are possible, according to local context, the 
level of coherence desired for the programme relative to local development, the form adopted 
by the  programme,  etc.  For example,  a  national  programme of  support for administrative 
decentralization, by its nature and geographical scale, could not include all the elements of this 
optimal  configuration.  One  could,  moreover,  envisage  one  or more  management  cells, 
organised by sectors, regions or themes. 
We do however believe that this framework offers many advantages, as it has the following 
characteristics: 
•  coherent interventions  as  a  result  of  consultative  planning  between  the  local 
development agents; 
•  geographic coordination, and thus the possibility of significant impact at this level, as well 
as greater visibility; 
•  effective decentralization and an  overall grasp of the problems of local development; 
•  delegation of responsibilities and  responsibility imparted to the local agents; 
•  respect for the autonomy of the local agents, avoiding instrumentalisation and the danger 
of becoming bogged down in a similar process of consultation at national level; 
•  a structure of management/coordination playing a. the role of interface, given that for the 
EDF (or Commission) officials, it is impossible to deal with a multiplicity of different operators, 
and  b.  the role  of guarantor of the rules  of the  system  relative to the constraints and 
demands of administrative and financial procedures. 
However, several of these positive characteristics are also found  in  other configurations and 
forms of programmes. 
5.4. PROJECT/PROGRAMME GUIDANCE MEASURES 
We emphasised  (see  3.1)  the  importance  of  implementing  a  strategy  of  agent  capacity 
development  (CD)  in  a  DC  operation,  with  the  goal  of  sustained  improvement  in  their 
performance.  The general  object pursued  would  be  that  of  creating  an  environment more 
favourable to development. The implementation of a strategy of this kind  implies a redefinition 
of the relations between donors and beneficiary countries,  with the objective of giving local 
capacity a central place in cooperation programmes. 
This  strategy  of  capacity  development should,  in  our view,  take  the  form  of  a  series of 
guidance  measures  specific to  DC  operations.  The  objective  would  to  reinforce  the 
management and intervention capacities of the decentralized agents  (this  is  vital  if the 
constraints mentioned at 2.3.1 0.  are to be  avoided). These activities can  also be considered 
preparatory to a DC programme (funding of a meeting of decentralized agents, for example). In 
practice, they could be funded in different ways: 
•  within the framework of the project/programme considered; 
•  by constituting the  object of an  entire programme/ project,  aiming to  satisfy the needs of 
operators of different projects/programmes of intervention; 
•  via a Commission budget line; •  by becoming the object at country level of an institutional reinforcement and support fund for 
decentralized local agents. 
Such measures are distinct from the other support modalities planned in that the activities and 
projects of the decentralized bodies would not in themselves be financed, but services for which 
they had identified potential suppliers. Given the need for this DC  strategy to adapt to each 
situation  and  context,  this  strategy would  involve  sets  of  various  actions.  These would  in 
general  be:  programmes of  training,  technical  assistance and  methodological  support,  or 
seminars, meetings, exchanges of experience, etc.  oriented toward particular organisations. 
These activities  could  be  organised  and  managed  by  the  coordination  and  management 
structure of a DC programme, or by the operator himself. 
We can cite by way of example different forms of intervention through which this strategy could 
be implemented. These forms of intervention may sometimes concern only one target-group out 
of several  potential  agents  worthy of support  (grassroots  groups,  intermediary grassroots 
organisations, NGOs, local public authorities, local administration, etc.). Certain of these forms 
of intervention, intended to produce greater comprehension of the way in  which potential DC 
partners work,  should also be  directed towards the officials  responsible for the operation of 
programmes (management/coordination interfaces) and even towards the Delegation staff. 
1)  _Qv~r~U  lun.flin.g _  ~f.~9.e.tJ.t$/k~Y..iO.$.fifutif.?IJ.$. 
This is  institutional support for a partner organisation/ operator of a DC operation, which 
would allow it  to take appropriate and freely chosen measures to  reinforce its technical 
capacities  and  management,  organisational  and  mobilising  capacities  (this  case  was 
presented at 5.2.2. case B,  Bottom-up initiative programme). The basis of such funding 
must be  a contract between the  EDF/Commission, with  the objective of  improving the 
performance of the organisation in  terms of services performed and administrative and 
financial management. 
In ALA countries, direct support projects for a decentralized partner would normally require 
the  signature of a  funding  agreement or direct contract with  it,  with  or without  prior 
consultation with the authorities. 
2)  Pt:f.?9rJ1mmfU~  ff.?r. P~¥~'Qp{l)9.  _tl)_~  _QI:9~1J.l$.~_t(Q_I)_~l  !;~p~~}({e_$_  Qf  _(I)_~_ f;ifi~~IJ.$ 
Support for the  development of  organisational  capacities  must  be  not be  considered 
exclusively in  the light of the effective functioning of decentralized agents or projects. A 
project/programme should  be  a framework for learning  as  regards the awakening and 
development of the organisational capacities of the beneficiaries. 
In  Mexico,  for example,  the  officials responsible for PRONASOL are astonished and at 
times  frightened  by the  snowball effect produced in  some  cases11  by the  effective 
participation of the beneficiaries in practical development actions; this takes the form of 
increased and dynamic socio-political commitment which goes well beyond the project's 
limits. 
11  Essentially when the public actors at all levels of this gigantic government programme have 'played 
according to the rules', respecting the participatory methodology theoretically imposed at federal/eve/, and 
have thus permitted the free and democratic expression of the population.  The  example concerning the 
Local Public Authorities presented at 4.1.4. shows that this has not always been the case  . 
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different levels of civil society, and in the promotion of democracy, it is worth supporting or 
reinforcing processes intended to enhance organisational development. The notion is  of 
the organisation teaching others to develop capacities in  the wide sense (organisational 
and  other).  Such  actions can  produce behaviour and  initiatives on  the social, economic 
and political levels which go well beyond the effect expected or indeed predictable (see the 
examples of  Proshika at 3.1.,  of  PRONASOL cited above,  but also of 'solidarity groups' 
offering credit in urban areas, recreating links in socially destructured contexts. 
3)  .Manag~me.n.t  .train.io_g p_rpgrCJmm~$. 
These  should  be  designed to  include financial  planning,  accountancy,  administration, 
human  resources and  strategic planning.  They can  take the form  of  formal  or informal 
courses, exchange visits between organisations, information exchanges, and programmes 
of correspondence courses.  It is  important that these training courses are a response to 
real needs and that they be based on the solution of practical problems. 
4)  .P.rpgramm~$..  t:J.f. e.x.~hangf!!$.  Pf. ~JJp_e.r:ie.n.c.~. and. $tf.!dY. trip~ 
These could take into consideration visits to  the country,  other developing or European 
countries by similar organisations, or meetings bringing together similar organisations or 
different types of organisations within the country. 
South-South partnerships could be envisaged in the form of intercontinental exchanges of 
experience.  Indeed,  our  missions  showed  that  the  strengths  and  weaknesses  of 
organisations  varied  according  to  their  geographical  position.  For  example,  the 
participatory methodology and  organisation of  the big  NGOs of Bangladesh  (Proshika, 
Brak, Grameen Bank) and  India {Aware, Assefa) could inspire agents in  other continents 
and join a global programme of capacity development. 
5)  .S.t«aY. P.t:P9rCJmm~$ 
Such a programme could for example envisage a study intended to develop a common 
strategy of institutional development adapted to the associative private sector of a country, 
a study on  the advantages and  constraints of a local development dynamic, or again  a 
study intended to  identify,  in  a given country, the supply of organisational reinforcement 
services. 
6)  _Qrgan/$afiqn.at .CJ.l!.c!.f( pr.t;J_gramme_$ 
To supply the means to perform organisational and/or financial audits on a certain number 
of key partners in future operations. The choice of consultants should be left to the audited 
institutions, whether these were European or local. 
7)  .I~.c;hni~a(  _f;l.$_$/#?tan~e_  prpgrCJmm~$ 
On the basis of demand from partner organisations, support personnel with very specific 
competences could be placed at their disposition. Again, the personnel could be European 
(voluntary organisations: VSO  (UK),  SNV (the Netherlands), AFVP (France),  specialised 
associations or 'senior consultants', for example) or local. 
B)  .f:l.~tWQ_r:l.c.  _c;l_~_vf!!IPPm~nt.PrPgrCJ.m.m.~~ 
To support the placing in contact with one another of organisations of the same kind or of 
different kinds of agents through workshops or seminars, consultation and coordination structures, telematic means, or again to support development networks, in particular those 
whose institutional approach went beyond the local or national context. 
9)  PrP.grl!lmm~$.  _Q(_$..VPPQI1. fpr _IQ_~a/.$.e.rv.iqc_  ~trv.c;_tv.re.s 
These institutions could be training, consultancy, research or technical support centres in 
the wider sense. They could be supported by funding and/or providing for the partners in a 
DC operation to request the services that they provide. 
1  O)  .M~diatl$.atit;J.o.  P.rP.gramm~ 
To  mediatise  the  work of  decentralized  agents  involved  in  a  DC  operation  by  mass 
communication media (TV,  radio, etc.) with the goal of valorising their work in the eyes of 
the public,  making their work more transparent,  and  thus raising  public awareness and 
strengthening the position of these agents relative to other local institutional systems. 
11)  .C.P.mm«ni~t!tlQ.o.  .traio.iog P.rP.gramm~ 
The use of means of communication (word, image, sound, artistic expression, theatre, etc.) 
in the participatory approach and particularly in the reinforcement of capacities would attain 
several  objectives.  Mastery of these tools  might  reinforce  agents  in  their capacity to 
negotiate,  understand  what  was  at  stake,  express  their  will  and  insist  on  it,  raise 
awareness or inform other social groups, exchange experiences, etc. 
For example,  in  Jakarta,  the scavengers who go through rubbish constituted one of the 
most excluded social groups and were looked down on by the rest of the population; they 
lacked  social  recognition  and had not  mastered  the  rubbish  industry.  A  German 
cooperation project essentially based on structuring the scavengers' self-expression and 
on  teaching  different communication  techniques  notably improved their situation.  By 
performing theatre plays in public plae,es  which  recounted their lives,  they were able to 
change their image in the eyes of the local population and thus obtain: legal recognition of 
their status in the town and of their economic usefulness, a greater involvement in  rubbish 
channels up and downstream,  which helped to increase their income and to integrate them 
within  the  economic  fabric  as  a  whole  as  they  became  complementary  to  other 
professions. 
5.5. DECISION·MAKING  MECHANISMS  AND  SOURCES  OF 
PROGRAMME FINANCING 
5.5.1. Choosing a decision-making mechanism 
In  ACP  countries,  the  choice of  a decision-making  mechanism will  depend  on  the  type  of 
programme to  be  supported, that is,  on  the choice between  local  initiative and conventional 
programme  funding  presented  at  5.2.2.  Two  decision-making  mechanisms  are  possible, 
depending on the type of programme. One can: 
•  work out a funding proposal on the basis of a DCP identified in its broad outlines (intervention 
sectors,  programme  operation  mode),  and  thus  benefit from  the  use  of  the  simplified 
decision-making mechanism (on  global authorisation  Article 290); this is the 'open' 
programme option; •  or work out the funding proposal on the base of an  in-depth identification of the DCP in all its 
aspects (means, objectives, operators, stages of activities), and choose a normal decision-
making mechanism (Articles 288 and 289); this is the 'closed' programme option. 
To facilitate  this  choice,  we  set out the  advantages and  disadvantages of  each  of the two 
procedures: 
The normal decision-making mechanism  for financing  a programme involves submitting a 
detailed funding proposal (FP) to the Commission, translated into the various EU languages, its 
approval by the EDF Committee, and finally drawing up a funding agreement whose signature 
gives access to a primary financial commitment. To the length  of this procedure must be added 
the delays caused by the examination, selection and negotiation of individual DC  operations, 
the formulation of the programme and its transmission. 
With  a view to  avoiding discouragement in  operators and  beneficiaries,  it  may be  better to 
choose  an  'open'  programme  whose  primary  commitment  is  obtained  by  following  the 
simplified decision-making mechanism  of appraisal  and  decision on  global  authorisation 
(Article 290). This procedure allows the submission of a funding proposal which indicates only 
(a)  broad outlines, the types of action planned, and the primary commitment proposed, and (b) 
the  rules  of  the  game:  project  selection  procedures,  sectors  involved,  institutional  set-up 
planned, and perhaps the size and ceiling of financial commitment per project. 
As one Head of Delegation said, when consulted during preparation of this work, ' ... once the 
primary commitment has been made, dialogue with the agents can go ahead on a realistic 
basis. The usefulness of this dialogue is now much more credible for both sides, because a 
funding possibility can arise quickly from its resolution, and because immediate action may 
follow, on the decision of the NAO and the Head of Delegation'. 
In the framework of this mechanism, the  Commission's decision is made by ttle EDF Chief 
Authorizing Officer,  that is, the Commissioner or Director General, depending on whether the 
amount set aside for the programme is  below or above 2  MECU. Given this financial ceiling, 
other options should  be  borne  in  mind:  (a)  successive recourses to  Article  290 for several 
programmes or programme components; (b) incorporation of the DC into sectoral or geographic 
programmes, approved under normal procedure (DC budgetary package within the programme, 
DC  operators  designated  as  project  managers).  With  (b),  it  is  possible  to  concentrate 
identification more on the operators and their traditional activities than on the activities that they 
will perform within the framework of the programme. This would reduce the risk of rigidity during 
execution as regards places of intervention, objectives quantified or results expected. 
A  risk effectively common  to  both  procedures  is  that it  is  inherent  in  the  programmes that 
selection will be made on the basis of what it is possible to finance and what funding has been 
authorised. It is therefore vital that, in either case, an indicative envelope for DC actions 
should be systematically written into the NIP.  This should subsequently make possible a 
certain flexibility relative to the restrictions imposed by the priority zones or sectors written into 
the NIP. Summary of advantages and disadvantages of 
the two decision-making mechanisms 
•  .Gurarantee of a programme that is  well 
integrated in the indicative programme. 
•  Facilitates  monitoring  and  evaluation 
tasks. 
Ease  and  minimal  cost in 
·cation  and  appraisal  stages  of  the 
programme. 
•  Relative rapidity of the decision-making 
mechanism. 
Flexibility  in  the  management  of 
implementation with possibilities for the 
programme to be adapted. 
•  Better adapted  to  the  support for  small 
grassroots initiatives. 
•  Decentralized  delegation  of decision-
making on individual actions. 
•  A slow and costly preparatory process. 
•  Inflexibility in the implementation process 
as a result of predefined options. 
•  Internal division of the programme into 
sectors  and  a  reduced  range of eligible 
interventions. 
•  Supposes  the  existence  of  a  dialogue 
between State authorities  and  decentra-
lized agents. 
•  Danger  that  the  programme  may  be 
reduced to  a  'pay  counter' for financing 
local initiatives  thus losing coherence and 
opportunities for collective planning. 
•  Risks  supporting  fringe  activities  as 
opposed  to  focal  sectors  defined  m 
indicative programmes. 
•  Risks clientelism. 
•  Requires  monitoring, control and  evalu-
ation  means  that  are  more  difficult  to 
implement. 
As regards ALA/Developing Countries, the decision level within the Commission varies with the 
amount requested in the funding proposal (see 2.1.2): if the budget exceeds 1 MECU and for certain 
budget lines only (in particular, PTA), the project is subject to the approval of the Member States; 
this causes severe delays (the documents must be translated into the various Union languages, 
submission to the Developing Countries/ALA Committee, etc.). If the amount is _below  1 MECU, 
the procedure is internal to the Commission. Depending on the budget line, the decision will be 
made at different levels of the hierarchy (College of Commissioners, Commissioner in Charge, 
Director General),  involve  more  or  less  complex  approval  chains,  the  consultation  of the 
Interservices Committee, etc. For Developing/ALA countries, it is thus the cost factor that will 
determine the procedure to be adopted and consequently the length of the procedure. 5.5.2. Characteristics of the funding agreement 
Whatever the form of the DC operation, the Funding Agreement (FA) of a DC programme will 
comprise certain specific characteristics: 
•  First of all,  as it is  a participatory cooperation operation,  it will  generally be  desirable to 
specify  that  t.he  budget  presented  will  be  essentially  indicative (at  the  level  of 
description of budgetary items). 
It  will  be  important to  introduce into the funding  agreement  sufficient flexibility  for the 
project to  be adapted to demand. Without this, there would be a danger of giving priority to 
certain quantified objectives at the expense of participatory character and suitability to needs. 
An activity written into the FA must be modified or even eliminated at the operator•s request, 
if  this  is  justified  by  the  population•s  response.  In  addition  to  the  open  programmes, 
concerning which  it  is  self-evident, this observation should  also be  applied within closed 
programmes  as  regards actions vis-a-vis beneficiaries.  It will on the other hand be  more 
difficult to  obtain  budgetary flexibility  at  the  level  of  overall  allocation  per operator (in 
conventional  programmes,  however,  a  rider to  the  funding  agreement can  normally be 
requested from the NAO for up to  15% of the initial budget, without going through the EDF 
Committee). Flexibility of this kind also requires an  attitude on the part of the Commission 
services  which  encourages  operators  themselves  to  take  account  of  'people·,  of  their 
opinions and reactions, and of the evolution of the situation. 
For such flexibility to be put into practise, its modalities must be explicitly planned, and 
duly specified in the contractual funding agreements with the operators. It is important to plan 
flexible modalities, which are quick and easy to implement (for example, exchange of fax and 
even e-mail where possible). 
In  the case of Developing/  ALA Countries, a certain degree of decentralization of decisions 
should be planned in:  for example, bestowing on Delegations the right to  authorize budgetary 
adjustments above certain amounts or percentage variations in initial budget. 
•  If the project or programme is  to continue over several years, it may be  useful to plan  its 
unfolding in several phases, with evaluation of the previous phase before the next one is 
begun. 
•  Moreover,  it  will  be  necessary to  include  a  remark  about the formulation  of quantified 
objectives and measurement indicators: of course, elements such as participation or capacity 
development will be evaluated on the basis of qualitative criteria, which can also be treated in 
very rigorous fashion. On the other hand, there are social indicators which can be measured 
quantitatively like financial or economic indicators. With a view to reassuring technocratic 
tendencies,  if any,  within the Commission, it may be necessary to specify that flexibility 
does not mean lack of rigour. 
5.5.3. Programme donors 
We saw in  Chapter 2 that, for the funding of DC  actions, the EDF or FTA (Developing/ALA 
countries) and various budget lines depending on  the Commission budget could be asked for 
resources.  The  budget  lines  belong  to  different services,  or even  to  different Directorate 
Generals. In  some cases, the same project might be eligible for funding from various budget 
lines. This situation creates a problem, and goes hand in  hand with a twofold  risk:  i.  that the 
promoter may knock at the wrong door and find its project rejected merely for that reason; ii. that the promoter may knock at several doors at once - a procedure that,  useful as  it  is,  will 
generally  be  an  object  of  reproach  - and  be  accorded  different  treatment  at  different 
'counters' 12 . 
This point makes clear the problems resulting from making the distribution of responsibilities 
relative to a particular country depend on the budget lines that can be used. It is particularly true 
where these lines are managed by different Units, Directorates or General Directorates whose 
fields of action overlap, albeit only partially. A first reorganisation of services, some years ago, 
took the form of a greater concentration of responsibilities within geographical departments. But 
this  concentration  was  only  partial,  and  many  budget  lines  continued  to  be  managed  in 
autonomous  fashion,  with  little,  late  or  no  participation  (or  even  information)  from  the 
Geographic Unit and Desk. 
It  seems that greater coordination can  only be  attained at  Desk and  Delegation  level.  The 
development  of  decentralized  cooperation,  and  its  implementation  through  the  potential 
mobilisation  of  different  budget  lines,  makes  clear  the  need  for  a  reinforcing  of  the 
coordination and supervision of the Geographical Units, with a view to greater coherence 
of intervention at local level. 
Counterpart  Funds (CFs)  generated by the  EU  programmes constitute a  complementary 
source of funding for decentralized cooperation programmes. 
The advantage of the use of CFs  is that the funds are already in  situ  in  the country and the 
procedures for mobilising and allocating them are therefore more flexible. Their disadvantage is 
inherent in their nature and in the will of governments to allocate them to the projects for which 
they were intended. Not only do governments assimilate them generally to their own funds, but 
a Central Bank lacking liquidity may tend to freeze them.  However, with certain precautions, 
their use is not incompatible with DC funding. 
Among  the  principles  to  be  respected,  it  is  essential  that  operators  and  the  programme 
management and coordination structure do not undergo any interruption of funding because of 
a defect in/failure on  the  part  of  their donor.  The safest way of  ensuring this  is  to  sign  no 
agreement with  the  operator or management/ coordination  structure  before the  donor can 
guarantee funding. In the case of CF,  generally deposited in an account in the Central Bank of 
the beneficiary country, this guarantee would take the form of the previous transfer of the CFs 
allocated  to  a  DCP  to  the  DCP  Bank Account  in  a  retail  bank;  thereafter  it  is  generally 
impossible for the Government to change the allocation or freeze the account. If this did occur, 
the DCP would probably have to have recourse to EU funds sent to replace the missing CFs at 
the end of the year. 
In theory, it is possible to envisage the CFs being used to fund the local running costs of 
a management/coordination interface 13, or even of an entire DCP. In this case, in addition 
12  In addition to the fact that a single project may be accepted or not depending on where the promoter 
submits it  - and  it  should  not be  the  promoter's business to  know the  mysterious ways  in  which  the 
Commission works  - it  is  observable that different services adopt  different positions,  for example as 
regards the costs that can  be  covered by EU  funding or unit costs,  particularly salaries.  It  is  of course 
strange that, depending on the service to which one applies,  promoters can  have different salary levels 
validated. This is just one of the aspects that clearly shows the need for coordination. 
13  This formula is used for example by the World Bank for certain of its Social Funds, and by Canadian 
cooperation for local bilateral funds (Peru) . 
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reserved exclusively for a DCP whose sector of activity is acknowledged to be a priority (health, 
etc.) by the Government or whose value for the population can be amply demonstrated. This is 
particularly important when several successive demands for CFs will have to be  made for a 
multi-year DCP.  It is important too to reduce the number of requests to a minimum, in order to 
avoid repeating the complex allocation procedures for CFs. This means choosing to introduce a 
demand for CFs corresponding to the annual work of the whole DCP,  rather than a series of 
individual demands for CFs to be allocated to each DCP operator. 
CFs  are  normally  managed  by  a  Joint  Committee  composed  of  Government  and  donor 
representatives. Their allocation depends on the priorities of both parties. Beside the monetary 
policy of a central bank,  the policy of the donor (WB,  IMF) also affects the availability of the 
CFs.  To convince the Committee that funds  should be  made  available sometimes  requires 
considerable persuasion. In certain cases, a government will be  more flexible at the end of the 
year because it will have to show its capacity to absorb the CFs. All these elements (and many 
others, especially when very large sums are involved) must be taken into consideration where 
CFs f.und  DC. 
To conclude, one fundamental point is the need for communication and transparency on the 
part of the Commission vis-a-vis Southern agents as to the different sources of funding for DC 
and  their conditions  of  use.  It  is  also  necessary for the  Commission  to  seek to  harmonize 
conditions of access and eligibility criteria for all donors, at least non-EDF sources, intended for 
NGOs and  other kinds of  decentralized agents.  Let  us  briefly recall  the fact that the current 
budgetary possibilities for funding DC are these: 
•  the European Development Fund for ACP countries; 
•  Financial and Technical Assistance for ALAIMED countries; 
•  Counterpart Funds (all countries). 
•  a  large  number  of  sectoral,  thematic,  or geographic  budget  lines,  accessible  to  non-
governmental agents. These lines are listed with comments in a document available from the 
General Directorate VIII  of the Commission,  Unit B/2  (most recent update, April  1995) and 
were also the subject of a recent publication by the Liaison Committee of European NGOs 
(NGO  Handbook 1996).  Among  these  lines,  the  line  for the  promotion  of  decentralized 
cooperation  (BL  7/6430,  all  countries)  and  the  line  for  rehabilitation  actions  should  be 
highlighted. In  this Chapter, we  assume that a project/programme proposal  has been  appraised  by the 
competent services of the Commission, and that the funding proposal has been approved by 
the appropriate authorities, in  the form of a project/programme funding agreement (see 5.5); 
either DC  will  be  used as  a method in the programme, or the programmes will be  specifically 
DC programmes. 
As regards specific DC programmes, in order to distinguish the two cases presented 
at 5.2.2.  operationally,  hereafter  in  this  chapter  we  shall  refer  to  'closed 
1 
programmes for conventional development programmes and 'open 
1 for programmes 
funding various local initiatives. It should be remembered that these adjectives refer 
only to  the  level of detail required for the appraisal,  depending on  the adopted 
decision-making mechanism: the simplified mechanism for open and  the normal 
one for closed programmes. 
Here we describe the different stages of programme implementation. These sequence begins 
with the preparation phase and the appraisal of funding requests for the individual operations (if 
they have not already been  approved during the framework mapping  process of  a 'closed' 
programme).  It  continues  through  decision-making  and  contractual  procedures,  both  for 
individual  operations  and  technical  support  for  the  programmes  (programme 
management/coordination  interface,  guidance  measures).  We  then  go  on  to  the  different 
funding  modalities of the operators and  the programme management/coordination interface 
(PMCI), and of the execution of the actions. We end with aspects of financial control, monitoring 
and evaluation. 
Over the course of the chapter we  give particular emphasis to  certain aspects.  If we  give the 
impression  that  we  are  repeating  certain  arguments,  it  is  because  these  are  particularly 
complex subjects and for the most part unknown to decentralized agents; they can thus appear 
abstract and hermetic at first sight. 
6.1. PREPARATION AND APPRAISAL  OF  PROJECT  FUNDING 
REQUESTS 
6.1.1. Information on the programme 
As  we  have already suggested elsewhere (see  3.2.2)  effective publicity for the  programme 
brings  in  a  high  level  of  requests.  It  would  be  a  mistake  not to  give  any  indication  of the 
restrictions as to the kind  of project eligible.  In  reality,  local  restrictions,  even  if they are only 
financial, always exist.  It  is  important not to build up false hopes in  the promoters of projects 
who  are  liable  to  invest time  and  money  in  the  constitution  of  a  request  document.  It  is important,  too,  to  avoid  overloading  the  NAO,  the  Delegation,  or  the  services  of  the 
Commission. 
Therefore a balance has to be maintained between random publicity and a complete absence of 
promotion.  This  balance  can  be  attained  by  making sufficiently clear and accessible 
information available to those who request it (prospectuses, explanatory leaflets, perhaps 
radio publicity as in certain countries for MPPs). The information to be supplied should concern 
the  Lome  Convention  itself  as  well  as  the  practice  of  decentralized  cooperation. 
Seminars/workshops at  national  or regional  level  (such  as  have already been  organised  in 
Zimbabwe,  Senegal  and  Zambia)  are  a  good  opportunity  to  combine  publicity  and  the 
participatory definition of priorities of the programme/s. 
Moreover,  to  the  extent that the  institution  mapping  discussed  at  4.1.1  has  already been 
completed, the donor, for its part, will already have a knowledge of the potential operators and 
beneficiaries and  on  the  way in  which their activities fit  into the  national,  regional  and  local 
context. 
6.1.2. Formulating projects 
In  practice,  we  may take  it  that the  promoters of  a  project will  be  either the  beneficiaries 
themselves (or organisations representing them)  or eligible operators 1.They will formulate a 
project request on the basis of a pattern either designed by the Commission services or in  ad 
hoc fashion by the Delegations or spontaneously. 
In the rest of  this chapter) we will use the term promoter/ operator to designate an 
organisation/institution etc.· making a .request for funding ·and proposing to 
execute the  project under its own responsibility. 
With the exception of certain major European NGOs, the majority of the potential operators of 
DC  in  both  North and South do not know the Commission's  Project Cycle Management and 
are not familiar with the documents that its services require.  It is a method that can prove very 
useful, particularly for organisations which do not yet plan their activities at short and  medium 
terms, as it forces promoters to produce a rational and logical presentation of their idea 
of the project. To facilitate later processing of requests, it is desirable that the PMCI should be 
able to offer them technical support for the constitution of the dossier, which  could  go from 
supplying  reference  documentation  to  the  realisation  of  a  project  preparation  mission  (for 
projects whose scale justifies this).  This support would  be  available to dossiers of manifest 
interest relative to  criteria and  guidelines established  in  advance.  At  all  events, experience 
shows that the formulation of a grassroots development project generally unfolds over several 
stages under the influence of critical discussion between the operator and the donor (or a local 
structure representing the latter). 
Article  285  of  Lome_  IV  (2)  provides  that  'The  identification  and  preparation  of  projects  and 
programmes shall  be the responsibility of  the  ACP  State concerned or any other eligible beneficiary'. 
Article 286 adds that ·project or programme dossiers prepared and submitted for financing must contain all 
information necessary for the appraisal  of  the projects or programmes,  or,  where such  projects and 
programmes have not been completely defined, provide the broad outlines necessary for their appraisal' . 
.  :··  _-.-. Project cycle management and participatory development 
For the donor, it is the process rather than a project that must be supported. To this extent, 
participatory development often finds  it hard to  accommodate 'draconian', rigid  project 
cycle  management.  Writing  flexibility  into  the  cycle  management  means  allowing 
readjustments during the different stages of the cycle; these will be required as a result of 
the modifications which prove necessary during the course of the project (see on this subject 
the CIDA pattern at 3.1.2, which shows how a later stage of the strategy can feed back into 
an  earlier one).  This approach means delegating a share of responsibility,  so  as  not to 
overload other levels with the decisions that must be taken during execution. 
Such flexibility  makes  it  possible for  the  people  involved  genuinely  to  influence  the 
decisions  that  affect  them;  it  allows  modifications  resulting  from  consultation  and 
information-sharing to be integrated. For this to happen, those responsible at different levels 
(who  are  in  charge  of the  long  term)  must  know,  understand  and  appropriate  cycle 
management procedures. The question is not therefore one of training these people in the 
use of the habitual instruments, but of finding a system that is suitable for all parties and for 
the circumstances. 
With this in mind, it is desirable that the relevant functionaries apply the EDF project cycle 
in flexible fashion. This method should be considered as a tool at the service of a policy or 
strategy of decentralized cooperation and of objectives to be attained above all in terms of 
participation and democratisation: it must not be turned into a dogma. 
At all events, the dossier to be submitted must comprise two parts: 
•  a description of the operator: history, target population or members, activities conqucted, 
methodological orientations, funding methods. It is important to include accurate information 
about the financial  support available to  the  partner,  both  to  demonstrate  its  absorption 
capacity and to avoid problems of excess or duplicated funding; 
•  a  description  of  the  project/programme:  general  and  specific  objectives,  activities 
envisaged,  target-population,  budget  needed,  form  of  intervention  planned,  intervention 
timetable. This presentation of the project must be made according to the basic elements of 
the logical framework. 
In  general, the project preparation phase, especially where it  is  participatory,  is often long 
drawn out and delicate. It involves considerable costs and requires flexible methodology if well 
structured  projects are to  emerge.  For example, the formulation  of  a project is  sometimes 
accompanied by the carrying out of a study on one aspect of it; there may also be participatory 
diagnoses in which the local agents are encouraged to express their desires and integrate them 
into a larger framework. The promoter will generally have conducted these activities at its own 
expense. Subsequently, the Commission may apply the non-retroactive condition in funding for 
the implementation of a project. The costs of a study conducted by a decentralized agent can 
however be included in accounts at a later stage in the form of a personal financial contribution 
to the action by the operator. Nevertheless, in the perspective of a large scale implementation 
of DC, a structural solution should be devised by the Commission for reimbursing promoters for 
expenses incurred in the preparation of an operation. 
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and selection of actions 
In some procedures for small scale projects (e.g. Micro-projects), populations are deemed to 
have 'participated' when they have contributed to the execution of an action (cost, work, 
etc.). However, their choices are very often limited to a narrow range of interventions. True 
participation means taking into account the demands of the persons concerned as the starting 
point of an action and fully involving them during the first stages of the process. 
The  involvement  of the  population  concerned  from  the  identification  stage  on  is 
fundamental on the one hand because incomprehension or rejection  of the premises of an 
action (analysis of a problem, conclusions of a study) can affect its  sustainability, on the 
other because the population must take responsibility for its choices and finally because this 
participation has an educational dimension which is essential. 
During this phase, the agents get to know each other on the basis of information exchange 
(identification methods and participatory planning). This knowledge is  on the one hand a 
prerequisite for the establishment of clear and balanced contractual relations, and on the 
other, it underpins a relation of real partnership, which is necessary if cooperation is to be 
sustainable. Consequently, it is vital that participation should be considered from the start as 
a form of collective learning. This consultation of the population continues throughout the 
process; it is the basis of execution, monitoring and evaluation. 
The process by  which  agents participate in  identification may be a  long one, but with 
sustainability as the aim, it is important not to think that it can be accelerated by bringing in 
a solution from outside; this could inhibit real participation.  · 
The information sought must not only be of technical kind, there should be a degree of 
flexibility and the milieu should be studied as a whole (see 3.1  and 4.1.1 ). 
To identify an action in participatory fashion, the quest for information and dialogue with 
the population can take the form of interviews (individual or group) in the field and/or in 
meetings, with the further aim of organising and setting up dynamics2. The information 
must be exchanged: relevant information must be collected and analysed, but also returned 
to the population. This return is  vital, since it  is  the basis of effective participation in the 
analysis and makes criticism and revision possible. It is  therefore necessary that it be 
conducted  in  the  best  possible  conditions,  in  a  language  and  a  conceptual  form 
comprehensible to everyone; the time and place too must be right. 
In terms of involving the agents, it is essential, at the local level, to consult those who will 
benefit from the project (directly or not), and those who will be excluded3. Obviously, they 
do not all need to be consulted at once; indeed, this might prevent exchange, since a more 
powerful agent might inhibit others. It is  also important to use adequate methodological 
support and an organiser experienced in this discipline (not authoritarian). 
...f  ... 
2  In  this  respect,  the  participatory enquiry  method  can  be  an  interesting consultation  tool  for the 
population, since it also aims to motivate people to  analyse their situation, to exchange information in 
order to make a decision, etc. and a learning process is made possible by it. 
3  See  Cheminements  d'une  action  de  developpement,  de  /'identification  a  /'evaluation, 
Harmattan/COTA, 1992, pp 40-41, author bibliography. Though it is important to consult the population to discover their preoccupations, it is also 
possible to  involve them much  more,  particularly  in  the  search for  solutions and the 
planning  of actions.  This  type  of participation  in  decision-making  requires  specific 
techniques4. It also requires that the representatives of the grassroots agents are capable of 
negotiation.  Because of their limited organisation  and  their weaknesses,  it  is  fairly 
exceptional to find  grassroots agents able to play a central role in negotiation. Support 
organisations are more often consulted (or certain representatives of grassroots agents). The 
participation of grassroots agents should however be a long term goal. 
Negotiations on the selection of actions should take place between the responsible officials 
at vanous levels (funding, support and population). It is therefore important that the criteria 
are clear and can be  mastered by  all  those taking part,  that the negotiation should be 
complete and should take place in suitable places at suitable times (perhaps by stages). It is 
important to consult the peripheral agents about the decisions. 
6.1.3. Submitting funding requests 
For ACP countries, the procedure for submitting funding requests is explicitly described in the 
Lome Convention. After the principles and the local framework for DC  have been made public, 
the eligible  operators  can  submit  their  requests  directly to  the  Delegation,  or  any 
structure set up for that purpose.  In  fact,  the  Commission's services in  the field  are  not 
normally equipped to receive  such  requests  (see  2.3.5),  which  justifies  recourse to,  or the 
establishment of, an interface. 
Hereafter w~  shall rtijer UJ the intet;{ace bi@een the operators and the .donor as 
.. the programme  managementlcoctrdinatioit  interface'  (PMCI).  The  role  of 
.  :mtlitagementlcoordinatilJn: interface can be assumed by an. ad hoc structure -
~reatedfor  the needs of  ohe or more programmes  ~ or by an existing specialised 
protnoterl operator·(  ~ef!  5~3.1  and 5.3.2 ); 
Moreover, the agreement of the State will have to be sought5. This means that decentralized 
agents not wishing to give an  account of themselves to the State (in  practice, to the National 
Authorizing Officer), or whose activities do not meet with the formal  assent of the State, will 
have to seek another source of funding. Exceptions will be limited to the mobilisation of ad  hoc 
budget lines, which come directly from the Commission budget and do not require the approval 
of the ACP State. 
4  The ZOPP is one such technique, but it should be subjected to rigorous analysis, more particularly in 
cases where its use is repetitive. 
5  Article 286 of Lome IV (2) specifies that project and programme dossiers must be officially transmitted 
to the Head of Delegation 'by the ACP States or the other beneficiaries  ... In the case of beneficiaries other 
than ACP States, the express agreement of the State concerned shall be required'. In Developing/  ALA countries, a funding demand from a decentralized partner can be submitted 
directly to the Commission, without intervention by governmental authorities. It can be addressed 
directly to the services at the Commission headquarters, or to the Delegation responsible for the 
country concerned. This facility  clearly makes  a very  autonomous decentralized cooperation 
policy possible, one which is  not subject to  state control, and this is  a particularly interesting 
modality where there is a democratic deficit6. 
The submission of a proposal should be acknowledged by a receipt indicating the details of the 
functionary responsible for the dossier. We recommend that requests that have been refused 
should be filed so that later requests for information .can  be  met (also for statistical use). The 
funding requests could be reoriented towards other budget lines or towards the programmes of 
other donors. 
On  reception of such  requests,  attention should be  paid to the  role of intermediaries if any 
(motivation, priorities, degree of intervention, reformulation of the project, etc.) and information 
gathered as  to the process which led  to the submission. The box that follows illustrates this 
concern by referring to the risks run in certain situations. A detailed knowledge of local contexts, 
such as might result from the studies presented at 4.1.1, is necessary for this. 
In certain countries, the local politician seems to be an interlocutor representative of a wide 
zone of intervention. Nevertheless, s/he may well give priority to his/her own constituency 
or attempt to pressurize people in order to obtain funding. It is important that this phase of 
formulation  of the .  project  should  be  accompanied  by  previous  interviews  with  the 
population and with other involved interlocutors so as to reach the source of the demand. 
When  the  requests  go  through  the  administrative  authorities  in  the  service  of the 
constituency,  local  functionaries  are  not  necessarily  familiar  with  EU  participatory 
development. They are sometimes 'better qualified to tell people what to do than to listen to 
them and seek a common solution'. 
Moreover,  the  local  authorities  are  sometimes  invested  by  the  government  with 
decentralized responsibilities, but do not have the budgetary resources to fulfil them ('if you 
haven't got the  money,  try  the EEC!'). Constituencies (districts,  prefectures, etc.)  may 
substitute projects matching their own priorities for the initial requests from the population. 
Or they may constitute a filter in  which priorities are reversed, by  receiving the wishes 
expressed at grassroots level but letting through those which respond to the central State's 
development imperatives. These may be useful projects. It is up to the DC officials in charge 
to evaluate the justification and representativeness of the demand. 
6.1.4. Appraisal of requests 
The  regulations  indicate that the appraisal of  projects/programmes must be  realised  by the 
services of the  Commission (non-ACP countries) or jointly by the Commission and the ACP 
State7. In practice, the PMCI should receive a mandate to appraise the project requests. 
6  In this way it has been possible in Central America to fund human rights defence bodies that accuse 
members of the armed forces, support popular organisations that act against dominant positions, etc. 
7  Article  287  of  the  Lome  Convention  IV  (2)  is  a  reminder  that  'the  appraisal  of  projects  and 
programmes shall  be  jointly undertaken by the  ACP  State or States and the Community.  In  order to 
expedite the  procedure, the Commission shall give its necessary powers to  its Head of Delegation to 
undertake this joint appraisal'. Supervision  by  the  Delegation  or  the  services  of  the  Commission  will  nonetheless  be 
necessary. Insufficient involvement on their part in the selection of projects can prove prejudicial 
at a later stage in the process. Another difficulty that should be avoided is the personalisation of 
the DC operation by the selection of small number of types of projects according to the personal 
sensibility of  one  official  or his/her primary area of  technical competence  (which  frequently 
happens with MPPs). 
The appraisal of the request will consider, as with any project, the overall validity of the proposal 
and the adequacy of the means to the goals proposed. The criteria and documents traditionally 
used by the Commission for an  appraisal can  serve as a basis for this exercise. However, as 
we are talking  about decentralized cooperation,  a further objective will  normally be  added 
regional,  sectoral and  thematic objectives,  that is  the promotion of  participation and the 
encouragement  of  democratic  processes.  It  will therefore be  necessary to  evaluate the 
means and the activities planned to meet this objective, and to ask questions such as: 
•  does the operator use participatory methodologies? Does it work in democratic ways? 
•  what is the relation between the operator and the interface and is the latter recognised and 
trusted ·by the operators as a whole? 
•  is the choice of operators in this programme the result of democratic selection? 
The selection criteria for an  operator and its project should be transparent. Among them, the 
relation between the operator and population is a factor essential to the success of the project. 
It  is  a  difficult criterion to  quantify and  rather subjective.  An  institutional  presentation  and 
previous experience of the operator are not equivalent to an evaluation of its behaviour vis-a-vis 
the target-groups. The appraisal should not therefore be limited to an analysis of dossiers, but 
should be  completed by  a field  visit, with the aim of evaluating the reality of the work 
performed. 
'Whatever the general framework fixed for the selection of projects, it is  vital... to demand 
to be able to judge on the spot and not just on the basis of documents or declarations of 
intention. A potential agent which has nothing to present as the beginning of the carrying 
out of its project, which has not 'managed' to begin any thing in the area in which it wishes 
to work, lacks credibility. There is a need to evaluate on the spot what it has managed to do, 
what contacts it has managed to make with the population and with the local authorities, the 
way in which it is perceived by either of these. It is also the only way to judge its technical 
and perhaps its management capacities. A preliminary sorting of candidates based on the 
examination of what has already been performed makes  it  possible to eliminate many 
circumstantial and 'quickly knocked together' projects. 
This approach attempts to  evaluate the operators by  seeking the best quality of services 
offered  (it is an investor's logic). The investor is prepared to invest in an operator (running costs 
if  any,  operations that it has  spontaneously initiated)  by procuring further resources for it.  It 
analyses the dossiers, or seeks,  on  its  own  initiative,  partners already active locally,  or who 
have demonstrated their motivation and know-how relative to  a specific field of intervention, in 
the context of self- or otherwise financed activities (MPPs,  EC-NGO cofinancing budget lines, 
aid from other donors, etc.). In  a  'closed' programme,  the  problem  of the time-lapse  between  the  beginning  of  the 
consultations for the establishing of the programme and the receipt of the first funding should 
not be eluded: this is generally at least two or three years. This poses a problem of credibility 
between  promoters and  beneficiaries  relative to  institutions  and  the  EU.  Such time-lapses 
create management problems for decentralized agents and increase the risk that Delegations, 
uncertain how to proceed, will  ultimately opt for solutions that are  simpler to  implement (an 
MPP, for example). Another possible consequence is that the agents who designed the project 
are no longer present when implementation occurs, either being involved in another action, or 
having disappeared. Finally, the context may have changed and the proposed intervention may 
no  longer be  relevant,  or may at least need profound modification. One solution might be to 
favour'  open' programmes (with the limitations that this implies, see 5.5.1) that benefit from the 
simplified decision-making mechanism and thus having the ability to react more quickly for the 
funding of individual projects. The Commission should however seek to shorten the appraisal 
deadlines relative to the  normal  decision-making  mechanism.  Decentralized  agents,  in  the 
North as in the South, should pressurize the Commission to this end, but should also improve 
their technical  and  managerial  capacities,  which  could  have  an  impact  on  the  will  of  the 
Commission and Delegation to shorten these deadlines. 
6.1.5. Taking account of the post-project during appraisal 
At grassroots level, development processes make their way slowly and  must be  sustainable; 
grassroots or support organisations must be  continuously supported. This implies that,  in the 
DC context, the post-project should be considered differently than in  conventional projects, for 
which a limited life is acceptable. 
The management/coordination structures of conventional interventions rarely survive the end of 
funding.  This  situation  is  to  be  avoided,  which  is  why it  is  important to  choose interface 
structures that are not connected  to  a  particular intervention,  but  have  a  permanent 
support function for local initiatives where these occur (for example, like AGePIB in Benin, see 
5.3.5}. 
This does not however stand in  the way of considering  questio~s relating to the financial 
closure of a particular project from appraisal onwards.  It  is therefore necessary to think 
about the services that the beneficiary will  receive and the activities that the operator will later 
undertake in its favour. This reflection should include: 
•  the viability of the activities undertaken; 
•  the future of the investments made in the framework of DC projects (in particular in relation to 
administrations); 
•  the  passage  from  project to  permanent  status  (institution,  company,  non-profit-making 
association); 
•  the implications relative to the clauses of the contracts: property in  movable and immovable 
assets (beneficiary, operator or State); accounting implications and procedures; 
•  the payment of  recurrent costs,  if  necessary by a formal  agreement (with the beneficiary 
group, operator or State). 6.2.  DECISION-MAKING PROCESSES AND CONTRACTUAL 
COMMITMENTS 
6.2.1. Decision-making procedures 
At this stage, we find  ourselves facing two different situations, depending whether we have 
chosen an 'open' or 'closed' programme (or framework): 
•  In a 'closed' programme, decisions concerning the operators have been taken before the 
funding proposal is drawn up; this has led to a programme funding agreement and an  initial 
commitment of funds.  We therefore move directly to the phase of concluding contractual 
agreements  with  the  programme  management/coordination  interface  (PCMI)  with  the 
operators (see 6.2.2 and 6.2.3). As regards the actions to be funded, either they have been 
decided in the framework of the funding proposal, or,  if they have not, the situation is that of 
the ·open' programme described next (with or without a Steering Committee, according to the 
configuration chose). 
•  In an 'open' programme, the programme has been approved, but the decisions about the 
operators and the actions to be funded have still to be taken. These decisions are subject to 
an appraisal and selection process undertaken by the PMCI. In the preceding chapter (5.3.4) 
we  suggested a suitable decision-making framework in  the form of a Project or Steering 
Committee,  one of whose functions would be  to propose the allocation of funding to the 
actions to be  undertaken by the operators. The selection process for actions to be funded 
could also take place without the intervention of a Project Committee; finally, the decisions to 
enter into formal commitments with operators could be taken by the PMCI; they would be 
approved by the NAO and the Delegation in ACP countries. 
6.2.2. Need for contracts between the parties 
It is essential that the dialogue between donor and operator established during the preparation 
of  a  project should  also  concern  future  contractual  arrangements.  It  is  important that the 
operator should  be  able  to  acquaint  itself  as  early  as  possible  with  the  modalities  and 
procedures of the Commission, even if the project has not yet been approved. At all events, it is 
essential to formalise the mutual obligations of the parties by the signing of contracts 
precisely specifying the rights and responsibilities of each. 
In ACP countries, the fact that· non-profit making associations' (Article 294 of Lome IV) are not, 
in  theory,  eligible for  invitations to tender or contract-award  constitutes  an  obstacle to  the 
contractualisation of relations between decentralized agents and the EDF. This constitutes a 
major difficulty for DC  in the context of EDF funding (as does the fact that an agent which has 
identified an action is  increasingly often excluded from the tender for its execution). This is  a 
problem that the Commission seems to  have treated rather ambivalently, on  a case by case 
basis, or according to the managing functionary's taste. Exceptions are clearly possible for the 
NGOs (at least as  regards deals made by mutual agreement), but it is difficult to obtain a clear 
and non-personalised answer from Commission officials on this point. For example, in order to 
get around this rule,  NGOs are in some cases made to compete with each other for a particular 
contract, so as  at least to respect the spirit of the Convention.  In  other situations, recourse is 
made to Article 300 of the Convention, which allows the execution of ·Emergency aid' actions to 
be entrusted to ·Specialised organisations' and thus to derogate from Article 294 cited above. It 
should however be noted that Article 278, §2,  Paragraph C,  contradicts Article 294, stating that recourse  to  decentralized  agents  should  be  envisaged  for  technical  assistance  in  EDF 
projects/programmes. 
As indicated above, cooperation with Developing/ALA countries is not subject to the agreement 
of the official authorities. Direct cooperation with the private sector (associations or others) are 
among the possible modes of cooperation. In the framework of decentralized cooperation, funding 
agreements can thus be signed: 
- between the Commission and a private organisation. There are no  restrictions as to the legal 
status of this organisation (NGO, association, foundation, group of producers, etc.). It would 
normally be a body already in existence. However, in a limited number of cases, a management 
body has been created for the purpose of administering the project (this has also been the case 
with the creation of TMNAs in the framework of Mediterranean regional programmes); 
- between the Commission and several organisations, which includes the possibility of mixed 
tripartite agreements, associating local partners private and public. 
6.2.3. Types of contractual agreements 
For the implementation of a DC  operation  in  ACP countries, we  recommend the impressed 
account method which,  in  theory,  makes  it  possible to  respond 'in real  time• to needs 
expressed or thrown up by the context. The new Article 251 estates more explicitly that the 
participation of decentralized agents in  EDF projects/programmes should be conducted on the 
basis of direct labour contracts, in accordance with Article 299 of the Convention. 
In  'decentralized'  projects  that  have  adopted  this  method,  operators  generally  sign  two 
contractual agreements directly with the EDF: 
a)  A.S~r.vi~~-PrQ_Vi~iPn.CQ.IJ.tr:a~t (SPC) in  an international currency for technical assistance 
and the remuneration of foreign personnel8; the SPC is managed by the Delegation. 
b)  A.PrQgramm.~---~$.fiiJI.l{l_f~  in  local currency to meet the project and local expenditure costs 
of the operators. 
For this  reason,  where there  is  a PMCI,  it  is  best if the contractual agreements with the 
operators are prepared by and concluded with the PMCI, on  the basis of a mandate from 
the EDF (or from the Commission in Developing/ALA countries). These contractual agreements 
should  be  drawn  up  on  an  ad  hoc basis  (protocol,  convention,  etc.)  according to the 
legislation of the country. 
By  becoming  direct  operators  for  the  Commission  (Developing/ALA  countries),  the 
promoters/decentralized agents would be subject to the obligations of a service provider in the 
context of a contract with the donor, which can be very constrictive from an administrative point 
of view and  is  therefore not desirable. Their situation is  greatly facilitated  if their contractual 
agreements are concluded with the PMCI, which would thus be able to play in full its role of 
'buffer• between the donor and the operators. It  would  then  be  formally  responsible  for 
ensuring  respect of EDF or Commission  rules.  Decentralized agents would  then  remain  the 
indirect operators of the  EDF or Commission. They would thus  retain their entire freedom of 
initiative and autonomy of execution. 
The memoranda of agreement with the operators signed by the PMCI (which would thus be 
the responsible for them)  would simply be approved by the National Authorizing Officer 
and the Delegation. The latter would,  let us  remember, form  part of the Project Committee 
8  This separate SPC is particularly useful when the local currency is not convertible. (PC)  via their representatives on  this body.  For this purpose, the  PMCI  would have to have 
received the necessary powers; this is provided for in the new formulation of Article 290. In this 
way, a formal control is exercised by the relevant authorities, but one which would not bear 
on the choice of actions; this would be the responsibility of the PC, the PMCI or the operator. 
The PMCI, in its turn,  would sign a service provision contract with the EDF (this would be 
directly managed  by  the  Delegation)  for its equipment and running costs and for the 
remuneration of its expatriate personnel (if any), and a Programme-Estimate for the 
activities of the operators. 
If  local conditions made this suggestion inappropriate,  it could  at least be  envisaged for the 
operators only to sign Programme-Estimates. If any part of the budget required international 
currency, this could be directly managed by the PMCI in the framework of its SPC. This would 
however imply that riders would be added to the SPC of the PMCI according to the necessities 
that arose in the course of execution. 
On the other hand,  where there is no PMCI, or for very large-scale operations, operators 
would normally be subject to direct Programme-Estimates (and perhaps SPCs)  with the 
EDF.  It is important to note that this choice requires that the management of the Programme-
Estimate should  be  of  a kind  suitable to  DC  (see 6.4.  and  6.5.}.  Given the burden  of work 
involved in  impressed account methods, the PMCI  should ensure the financial and technical 
monitoring of the DC Programme-Estimates.-
To sum up, there can be contractual documents at three different levels: 
•  between the EU and governments with interfaces for the management and implementation of 
the programmes; 
•  between the interfaces and the operators, who assume responsibility for certain tasks on 
behalf of the beneficiaries by acting as service providers or intermediaries, or take complete 
responsibility vis-a-vis the interface for the execution of the project; 
•  between the operators or interfaces and the beneficiaries, who sign simple agreements at 
individual level and thus,  in the latter case, take responsibility for financial control and the 
submission of reports for their projects. 
In the case of Developing/ALA countries, and in the absence of very precise or restrictive legal 
requirements, there are many different possibilities and it is possible to  generalise only in  the 
knowledge that there are many possible exceptions and half-way houses. 
In general, it can be said that various forms of agreement are provided for: 'Funding Agreements', 
'Contracts', 'Letters of Appointment', and there are no  strict rules concerning their fields  of 
application. The 'Funding Agreement' modality is  used above all  for agreements made with 
governments or with official multilateral bodies; the sums are generally larger, the projects are 
often funded via the FTA or cooperation budget lines, and the agreement is relatively detailed. 
The other contractual forms are generally reserved for agreements made with private partners; the 
sums are often smaller, they generally make use of 'minor' budget lines, and the agreements are 
less restrictive. 
Contractual agreements  vary  widely;  the degree of involvement of the  Commission  in  the 
execution of the projects and the funding mode are two main determinants. Several different cases 
can be identified: 
the Commission takes an active part in the execution of the projects. The project is managed by 
an execution structure directed by two co-directors, of whom one, the European co-director, is 
appointed and recruited by the Commmission and is co-manager of the funds made available to 
the project. The Commission approves the annual operation plans and manages the technical 
assistance staff, which undertakes management functions and releases the funds according to 
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projects; 
- The Commission supplies intermittent technical assistance (short-term missions) to a private or 
public  body  responsible  for  the  execution  of the  project.  It  takes  no  direct part  in  the 
management of activities except through its  technical assistants (the TA has  no  powers). It 
nevertheless ensures a close monitoring and releases funds by instalments. This formula is used 
for middle-sized projects and projects of long duration; 
- The Commission provides financial support to  an  existing body, private or public, without 
intervening at all  in  its  activities. It provides a third party with the means required for its 
activity,  and  these  means  are  managed  under that entity's  responsibility.  The funding  is 
sometimes released all at once, or almost (a last instalment, representing a limited percentage of 
the total, is released after checking the expenditures against the commitments contracted for), 
especially when it is being used for specific actions or to supply overall budgetary support. This 
modality has been applied in a certain number of cases of DC. 
6.3.  THE FINANCING OF PROJECTS AND TECHNICAL 
SUPPORT 
6.3.1. The contributions of the parties to the funding of projects 
The implementation of a project or programme requires funding by the Commission of a certain 
number of budgetary items: the preliminary studies, the technical assistance if any, the follow-
up measures or the execution as such. 
Within the EDF framework, the different sections of Title Ill of Lome IV concerning development 
funding suggest that with the exception of the specific cofinancing actions or certain instruments 
such as Micro-projects, the Commission generally finances a project entirely (though there 
is a restriction on what project expenses can be assumed, which we will look at in 6.3.2. below). 
Within the framework of Lome IV.2, it is nevertheless explicitly provided (see Articles 251 D) that 
certain types of  DCP (such as  those belonging to the first case presented at 5.2.2., funding 
various  local  initiatives)  should  be financed  in  the  same way as the  MPPs,  that is,  via  the 
simplified decision-making mechanism (Article 290),  but with a ceiling per action of 300,000 
ECU  and a limit on  Community funding  relative to the total cost of the action (75%) 9. At the 
same  time,  Article  251 E  stipulates  that  decentralized  agents  can  also  take  part  in  the 
implementation of other kinds of EDF projects/programmes, at the request or with the approval 
of ACP States. 
In Developing/ALA countries, even in conventional financial and technical cooperation, there are 
no precise rules concerning the contribution of the parties to the funding of projects which are 
supported by European Union funds. The Community contribution can thus cover headings such 
as  the running costs of the executing organisation, the fees of the local staff, the acquisition of 
equipment, etc.  Each case is thus examined on an  individual basis during the appraisal of the 
project,  without reference  to  either legal  restrictions  or recommended operational  norms.  A 
standardisation of rules  and norms is  however planned, in  the form  of a  manual  for  use  by 
managers (but not statutory regulation). 
9  It should be noted that there is an ambiguity in this article. It states that the EDF contribution shall not 
exceed 'three quarters of the total  cost of the  project,  or programme,  and shall  not be greater than 
300,000 ECU'. A literal reading of this article would suggest that the maximum contribution from the EDF 
to a DC programme cannot exceed this ceiling. It thus appears that the eligibility of a DC operation does not necessarily depend on a financial 
contribution from the local partners.  Nevertheless, this aspect should be borne in  mind from 
the design stage onward,  since it  is  likely to  influence the  relations  of  donor, operator and 
beneficiaries. 
A distinction must be made between support institutions  {promoters/operators) and the 
beneficiaries themselves.  For the former, 1  00°/o funding is most logical. For the latter, it must 
be  borne in  mind that cost sharing is,  after all,  the  basis of participation 10 ,  even though the 
notion of a  significant contribution' from the beneficiaries (as  proposed  in  the guidelines for 
Micro-projects in Lome IV) seems most relevant in this respect. 
In  order  to  maintain  their  independence,  the  operators  often  insist  on  their  personal 
contributions. Their own funding can be written into the operator's memorandum of agreement. 
It  might be  possible to orient the operators towards one or other source of DC  funding  (DC 
programme,  Micro-projects,  etc.)  according  to  the  type  of  relationship  envisaged  and  the 
existence or absence of  their own  funding.  In  the  framework  of  North/South  partnerships, 
financial contributions by the European partners are also recommended, as they constitute a 
tangible proof of commitment to the Southern operator. 
As to the beneficiaries, they should be  expected to contribute to  projects in  various ways:  in 
kind,  in  cash,  or by  providing  their own  labour.  One  can  also  envisage  the  post-project 
management, maintenance and upkeep being counted as part of their contribution. On the other 
hand,  the principle of  requiring  a 25°/o  contribution  often excludes working with the  poorest 
people, and thus runs the  risk of reinforcing their sense of exclusion. Finally, each operator is 
likely  to  work  with  the  beneficiaries  using  a  different  approach;  the  contribution  of  the 
beneficiaries is  thus likely to  depend on  the project,  its evolution and  context.  It  is  therefore 
essential to adopt flexible rules for contribution;  DC  programmes should not have too 
restrictive a policy concerning contribution, except in the matter of the participatory (and 
not just 'contributive') character of activities, while maintaining awareness of the contribution 
everyone brings to partnership. A coordinated policy on the part of the donors in the matter of 
contribution, a policy defined in terms of objectives and target-groups, would be a considerable 
step forward. 
In Zambia,  where the  local contribution requested by the  World Bank is lower than  ·the 25% 
requested by Lome and EDF Micro-projects, constituencies generally approach the World Bank 
first. 
6.3.2. Funding the operators 
It  is  advisable, when collaboration with  a decentralized agent is  beginning, to  limit the first 
contractual agreements in amount and duration, (a)  by limiting oneself to  equipment that 
can be written off within a year and (b) by providing contractual clauses concerning the recovery 
of capital  goods  (e.g  vehicles)  at  the  end  of  the  contract.  The  contracts can  be gradually 
increased in  amount  (75,000,  150,000 ECU,  etc.)  thus  allowing the  operator's absorption 
capacity and competence to  be verified.  Moreover, guarantees can be  given to the operators 
10  We  have  given  considerable  emphasis  throughout  this  document  to  arguments  showing  that 
participation should not be confined to a contribution to costs. that, 'if everything goes well', funds will be set aside for the action to be pursued and perhaps 
for the renewal of the action  11 . 
There is a restriction on assuming certain costs related to the implementation of a project in the 
EDF framework. It is defined by Article 299 of Lome IV,  and relates to direct  labot~r contracts 
made by agencies or the public services of an  ACP country.  In  such cases,  when the EDF 
contributes to the expenses of the administrative services in question, the financial contribution 
is  limited  to  the  complementary  means  and  temporary  execution  expenses  of  the  action 
considered. By extension, where the PMCI  is  under direct labour contracts (or the operators 
where there is no PMCI), the EDF could decide to support the operators of the DC programme 
or project only up to the amount required for the proper implementation of the activities of the 
programme/project.  In  other' words,  this  means  that  the  funding  cannot  be  used  for the 
remuneration  of the  local  personnel,  or,  for example,  for the capacity reinforcement of the 
operators. This  interpretation of  Lome  IV  would  introduce a disparity between  EDF  project 
operators and ALA/MED project operators. 
In its collaboration with Proshika in Bangladesh,  the European Commission support takes the 
form of overall, programmatic support via  a consortium of donors.  The  latter have agreed to 
help Proshika to  lay the foundations for its own financial autonomy.  Over the years,  Proshika 
has accumulated credits,  some  of which  are capable  of generating  income  or offsetting 
Proshika's expenses,  so  that its  own resources and its self-funding capacity have increased 
over time. 
For this  reason,  in  the  context  of  a  broader interpretation  of  the  Commission's  rules,  the 
running costs of operators should not be considered as such by the Commission. They form 
part of the expenditure that must be envisaged in the context of a capacity reinforcement 
policy relative to the agents, without their being necessarily connected to the agent's 
activities vis-a-vis the beneficiaries or even to the competent performance of these activities. 
Moreover, these local operator expenses should not be accounted for under a technical support 
heading, but rather as an investment in an organisation on which the Commission relies for the 
implementation of DC actions. 
When  support  for  the  operator  as  such  constitutes  one  of  the  objectives  of  the 
project/programmes,  we  remind  the  reader that this  should  be  formalised  by  contractual 
agreement setting out  the objectives of this support in terms of improvement in the 
performance of the organisation. Where institutional support is supplied, the responsibilities 
of the operator relative to  the target-groups should  also  precisely defined, along  with  an 
outline of the actions and sub-projects that the operator is expected to perform. 
6.3.3. Funding Management/Coordination Interfaces 
In funding the PMCI,  it will be necessary to show creativeness as the the conventional forms 
of technical assistance will often prove too costly, especially as  regards the programme 
partners' budgets.  Among the forms to  be explored on  a case-by-case basis,  we  might cite: 
forms of local technical assistance, South/South cooperation,  horizontal cooperation and  the 
11  We cannot avoid observing on this point that the discourse of donors conceals their preoccupations. 
Most look for Western NGOs which can act as intermediaries and guarantors for national NGOs (this can, 
incidentally,  mean  initiating  North/South  partnerships).  Co-management proposals  (signature  of  both 
partners for disbursal,  real  sharing of responsibility)  are  also motivated by the fear of loss of financial 
control (see also Note 6 at 5.3.2). promotion  of  exchange  networks,  joint  support  programmes  for  groupings  of  partner 
organisations, and recourse to voluntary or 'senior consultant' organisations. 
This  problem  does  not  arise  in  the  same  way,  obviously,  if  the  programme 
management/coordination  is  entrusted  to  a  local  promoter/operator,  that  is,  an  existing 
organisation. In this case, obviously, technical assistance is optional. 
Where a specific management/coordination interface is created,  its staff should be of local 
origin, or from another country of the region, and expatriate only as a last recourse. 
When PMCI staff is recruited locally in an ACP country, it is normally contracted directly to the 
EDF (NAO). With a view to ensuring maximum administrative autonomy, it would be best if the 
personnel could be chosen and employed directly by the PMCI  (with the obvious exception of 
responsible posts within the PCMI, appointed by the NAO and the Delegation); this requires the 
PCMI to have the appropriate legal status (such as that of AGePIB frequently cited in this study, 
see 5.3.5). 
If the personnel is expatriate and individually recruited, it can  be contracted directly or via EAC 
contracts, after selection on the basis of a restricted tender invitation or recruitment by mutual 
agreement.  Finally,  if  technical  assistance  is  to  be  entrusted  to  a  company  (research 
organisation, cooperative, enterprise, etc.), the company will sign a service provision contract 
after selection  on  the  basis  of  an  open  or restricted  tender invitation  or mutual  agreement 
contract. 
It is all but self-evident that the success of decentralized cooperation will greatly depend on the 
individuals who implement it. Particular attention should be devoted to the selection criteria for 
technical assistants. For this kind of project,  in  addition to the criteria habitually used  in  the 
EDF context (cost, years of experience, etc.) it is important to apply to the selection of technical 
assistance staff other, more qualitative criteria: type of post occupied, experience acquired, 
knowledge of the problems facing  NGOs or associations and  about grassroots development, 
etc. As regards the choice of experts and technical assistance, decentralized agents often find it 
hard to  put up  with  government prerogatives. On  the other hand, state employees often look 
askance at attempts to bypass government authority. The delegation of powers by the NAO to 
decentralized agents can sometimes provide a solution to this problem. 
It  should,  moreover,  be  clearly  understood  by  all  concerned  that the  role  of  DC  technical 
assistance should be guidance, supporting, reinforcing and putting oneself at the service of the 
operators and  beneficiaries, and  not pressurizing and  exhorting them to go  faster than they 
wish. The AT should also take care that the commitments of each agent (including those of the 
Commission) are respected (in particular as regards deadlines). 
As  regards  costs,  a permanent structure composed  of  local  contractual  staff (such  as  that 
proposed for AGePIB in  Benin) represents, for example, for the whole structure (including two 
regional antennae), a cost not exceeding that of  a single expatriate technical assistant on  a 
conventional  EDF programme.  As  regards the  RDP  in  Guinea,  it  seems that the cost of the 
coordination interface and accounting cell is not very different from that of a more conventional 
RDP. 
In Developing/ALA countries, as in other fields, there are no formal rules governing the ways in 
which  technical  assistance  is  made  available  and  in  particular aspects  such  as  eligibility, 
recruitment procedures, and contractual conditions. The norm for major Financial and Technical Assistance projects consists of requesting external 
technical  assistance  via  a  European  consultancy12.  In this  kind of project, the AT has co-
management functions in the framework of a project-structure normally possessing a high degree 
of autonomy. The consultancy will normally be selected after a restricted consultation procedure 
with technical and financial tenders. The consultation can however be extended to other types of 
bodies than consultancies (for example, NGOs, universities, associations, semi-public bodies, etc.) 
and there are other kinds of recruitment, in particular recruitment by mutual agreement, or open 
tendering. 
However,  where  small  projects  are  concerned,  involving  limited  technical  assistance,  no 
generalisation is possible (short missions, making available technical assistance for the duration of 
execution, etc.). Direct contracts with individuals are one possibility. These individuals can be 
non-Europeans from developing countries, though this is rare. 
6.4.  EXECUTION 
The  differences  that  we  have  highlighted  between  open  and  closed  programmes  arise 
essentially  at  the  level  of  programme  and  project  appraisal  (decision-making  mechanism 
leading to a funding agreement). In one case, the appraisal of projects is performed before the 
funding agreement is concluded (closed programmes),  in  the other,  it can  be  performed after 
the funding agreement. But, after the execution phase, the situation is identical in terms of 
procedures for both open and closed programmes. 
The success of the execution phase will depend essentially on three factors: 
1.  methodologies  following  which  the  operators  will  implement  participatory actions 
centring on capacity development; 
2.  continuity in support and funding from the donor; 
3.  the flexibility of the administrative and financial procedures of the donor. 
Participatory dimension in the execution of actions 
The remarks made concerning the need, if the action is to be viable, for the beneficiaries to 
participate  from  the  identification  stage  onward,  are  no  less  valid  in  relation  to 
implementation. 
It is, for example, important to make the participation of the beneficiaries tangible in the 
form of distribution of responsibilities and  tasks  (execution of actions,  management of 
activities at their level,  and in  particular sub-contracting where possible). This requires 
competence (technical and managerial), preferably imparted by peers (use of local persons 
and resources) and anyway as close as  possible to the field.  Supervision, the quality and 
level  of training  will  depend  on  the  degree  and  complexity  of tasks  and  functions 
undertaken. 
. .  ·I  ... 
12  Even if the consultancy is necessarily European, it can still propose non-European staff.  In  practice, 
only staff from  one  of the  EU  nationalities,  or,  more  rarely,  from  a non-member country,  generally a 
country from  the same region,  or a country benefiting from  European cooperation (Latin Americans for 
Latin America, Indians for Asian countries, for example) will be accepted. It is evidently important to envisage a collaboration with the beneficiaries in relation to the 
distribution of costs, in monetary or other form, direct or indirect. The sharing of costs is not 
enough to ensure participation ('obligatory' work),  but beneficiary  contribution to the 
funding of the actions is nevertheless fundamental. 
As  regards the  implementation phase,  it  is  important to  pay  attention  to  the  specific 
components of the executions, for example to the appropriateness of the technologies used. 
In  this  area too,  the  participatory  approach  is  increasingly  taken  into  account,  as  the 
appearance of the concept of 'participatory technological development' (PTD) implies. The 
starting point for this concept is the very limited dissemination of development technologies 
by appropriate technologies bodies over many years. 
Via this concept, T  A organisations have attempted to reevaluate their role in  relation to 
manufacturers  and  users  of technology  on  a  small  and  medium  scale.  A  change  of 
technology involves both those who pose the technical problem and those who will benefit 
from its solution, those who can offer concrete responses (manufacturers) and others, such 
as facilitators, communicators and information networks, teachers, researchers, etc. Each of 
these  groups  represents  different interests  and  is  internally  heterogeneous  (culturally, 
politically, socially, economically, interests, gender). The starting point for the PTD process 
is thus to favour interaction between different groups. The objective is to put the end-users 
in a position to identify the nature of the changes and help them to face new situations or 
crises. This implies  reinforcing their analytic,  diagnostic,  experimental and innovatory 
capacities and  their ability  to  define goals  and  orientations throughout the  process of 
learning particular techniques. 
A DTP process follows sequences of interactive stages which stimulate change. Further to 
identifying motivations (profit, growth, long or short term, market guarantees, production 
methods, etc.), it is  marked by a series of decisive moments in  which the key question is: 
who participates  and  who controls the  final  decision? The external agents  must  both 
understand  and  learn  from  the  system  of local  knowledge  and  share  the  technical 
information so that they are connected into existing know-how. In  short, it is a question of 
using what people know to explain what they don't know. 
6.4.1. Execution modalities: direct labour execution at PMCI 
level 
As  we  have stated, the  impressed account system seems the mode of execution best 
suited to decentralized agents and to the PMCI (see 6.2.3}. Micro-project and conventional 
EDF  rural  and  urban  development programmes  regularly  use  this  very  practical  mode  of 
execution. For its  use in  and adaptation to DC actions, it should be possible to learn from the 
experience of these programmes, and particularly from MPPs such as that implemented in Mali. 
In  the  Mali experiment,  the  MPP Cell acts as  a programming,  programme execution and 
evaluation body.  In  this role it can entrust all or part of the studies needed (for both appraisal 
and evaluation)  for  the  direction  and execution  of projects  to  administrative  services, 
international bodies, NGOs, private enterprises, jobbers, freelances,  etc.  It should be noted that 
for this purpose the MPP Cell establishes contractual working relations with its partners. It is not 
limited in  its field of intervention except in  its  ·capacity to  control the  executing body' - the 
operator in DC operations. The MPP Cell responsible for the technical and financial management of the whole programme 
receives a cash advance  in  the  framework of an estimate relating to  'the estimated partial 
programme of tmicro-proects'.  The estimate relates to  operations likely to be executed which 
seem already to have been identified. It is managed by the Cell's director. 
This  cell receives an estimate covering its  running costs whose  estimated detail has been 
established in  collaboration with the Ministry responsible for it and the European Delegation. 
The estimate authorises it to set up,  under its own responsibility, support cells in order to extend 
the  geographical range  of its  interventions,  as  well as of its  decentralized antennae.  The 
contracts signed between the support cells and the MPP Cell,  are of a local nature: they are 
memoranda of agreement and not service provision contracts of  the EDF.  It should be noted 
that the  support cells .are managed by a  European NGO,  and that the antennae are also 
NGOs. 
One of the first tasks of the PMCI will  be to  draw up a work schedule (overall,  periodic, 
annual,  etc.).  This  will  be  submitted  to  the  European  Delegation,  and  to  the  authorities 
mentioned in the funding agreement. 
In  the case of an  open support programme for various local initiatives, the work schedule will 
precisely describe the working  of the structure (PMCI)  but will  be  indicative concerning the 
actions to  be funded.  Where an  individual  DC  project is  being  funded  in  the absence of a 
programme, it  will  be  a work schedule drawn up  directly by the operator (with or without the 
collaboration of an interface). 
In  the case  of  a  closed  programme  (and  whatever the  system  adopted  by the  operators: 
estimate, advance management agreements, memoranda of agreement, agreements, etc.) the 
work schedule could be a consolidated version of the respective work plans of the various 
operators identified in  the programme funding agreement.  This would bring together in  a 
single contractual document the amounts allocated to the different operators in a single 
programme; the DCP's authorization to incur expenditure, managed by the PMCI, would form 
the object of a unique secondary engagement with the services of the Commission on the 
basis of the funding agreement of the DCP. The periodic advance-schedule would fix the total 
of the impressed accounts in  the national currency made available to the DCP to cover local 
expenses  (equipment purchase,  running  costs,  realisation  of  actions).  It  would  define  the 
actions to be undertaken by all the operators and the budget allocated for the period concerned. 
Concluded  between  the  NAO  and  the  PMCI  - which  would  ensure  the  monitoring  of  the 
operators under its technical and financial responsibility- it would be approved and stamped by 
the Chief of Delegation. 
The estimated nature of the work schedule and the budget connected to  it  are  often 
assimilated to a 'devis  previsionnel  du  programme'. Some Commission services prefer the 
terminology of 'devis-programme' (DG  VIII), others that of 'plan d'operation' (DG  I);  in  English 
the  expressions  are  'work plan',  ·plan  of  operation'  or ·provisional  budget'.  It  should  be 
remembered that work plans and budgets are contractual documents, signed by the contracting 
parties (PMCI or operator) in the same way as a letter of  i~tent or a service provision contract. 
Twice a year, that is,  during the preparation of the budget of the direct labour programme and 
midway through its execution, the Project Committee (or Steering Committee) on  which sit the 
authorities, the PMCI and the operators, should receive the operators' reports on their activities. 6.4.2. Specific modes of execution at operator level 
For operators,  as  we  saw at 6.2.3.,  more  flexible  modalities  can  be  envisaged.  It  is 
important to note the local character of the agreements that can  be  made with third  parties 
working for EDF programmes in the context of a direct labour system entrusted to  a PMCI  -
which is the case with  most MPP cells and even  most conventional programmes.  In the last 
analysis, everything depends on the autonomy left to the PMCI and to the operators, and 
more particularly on the way in which the latter can conduct their interventions according to their 
own methodologies, but within the limits laid down by the terms of reference (or specifications) 
and by the funds which have been entrusted to them for the execution of their projects. 
The situation will therefore differ in different countries and practices should and must evolve 
over time within any one programme as a result of experience acquired. 
Where decentralized operators are working  directly with the EDF, they will have to  respect a 
certain number of EDF execution modalities, whose content will form part of their programme 
budget. For example: 
a.  The choice of sub-contractors contracted by the operators is subject to the approval of the 
EDF authorities or the interface structure which ensures the agreement of the NAO and 
Head of Delegation before authorising the choice. 
b.  Works,  supply and  service provision contracts are  in  theory signed  only after an  open 
invitation to  tender.  Given the small  size and  other characteristics  of the actions to  be 
executed, the operator is  generally authorised, by previous agreement with the NAO and 
the  Head  of  Delegation,  to  conclude  agreements  after  restricted  tenders,  restricted 
consultations or by mutual agreement. As regards investments in equipment, the operator is 
invited to present a minimum of two or three pro-forma invoices per article of equipment to 
the interface before the purchase, with a technical note justifying its choice. 
c.  The supplies and equipment must come from either an  EU or ACP country, unless the NAO 
and the Head of Delegation have previously approved a derogation from this rule. 
d.  Some  Programme-budgets (effectively dealing with the operators' projects/programmes) 
provide a budgetary item for unexpected expenses, whose use is  subject to the previous 
agreement of the NAO and the Head of Delegation. 
e.  The operator must meet a certain number of procedural requirements relative to financial 
and accounting management of the impressed account, including the provision of receipts, 
etc.  It is  important to note that the support of an  accounting cell considerably lightens the 
managerial burden for the operator. 
If there is  a PMCI,  these  clauses  (or certain  of  them)  can  be  reproduced  in  the  ad  hoc 
contractual documents signed by the operators and the PMCI. 
The actions undertaken by the EDF operators (PMCI or decentralized agents) come under the 
exoneration arrangements of Section 6 of Lome  IV  relative to the fiscal and customs regime 
applicable in ACP States to contracts funded by the Community. The non-respect by customs of 
these arrangements is frequent,  and  administrative support for the operator by the  donor is 
welcome in this field. 6.5.  ADMINISTRATIVE AND FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT 
6.5.1. Management of impressed account systems 
In practice, the periodic programme-budget (corresponding to the work plan) goes hand in  hand 
with  the  management of  an  advance-fund  constituted  by  funds  from  the  financing 
agreement of the DC programme. 
A  bank  account  must  be  opened,  in  order  to  domicile  the  advance-fund  of  the 
programme. An  initial endowment in  national currency is  planned in  the programme-budget 
managed by the PMCI to  cover the start-up expenses of the programme (studies, etc.). Once 
the  preparation  and  appraisal  have  been  completed,  no  disbursement can  take  place  for 
operations unless they have been clearly defined in  advance in  the periodic budget submitted 
by the operator and  approved by the Head of  Delegation and the national authorities under 
whose responsibility the PMCI officially comes (see 6.2.3). 
It should be noted that the periodic budget of an open PMCI would receive further injections of 
capital  reflecting  not  only  previous  operations  which  have  been  documented  but  also  the 
identification and approbation of new actions. 
It is  important to n"ote that,  in countries where the EDF direct labour system is applied as such, 
not only to a PMCI  but to  decentralized operators too,  it  is  much criticized by operators, who 
find  it  unsuitable.  NGO/operators complain  in  particular about delays in  payments and  in  the 
restocking of advances after submission of documentary proof,  receipts, etc. This can lead to 
the NGO/operator having to raise substantial amounts over long periods to offset these delays. 
In  other cases,  the impressed account is  not passed on  to the  local operators by the PMCI, 
which causes similar liquidity problems. These problems have also been encountered in  the 
FTA framework  in  ALA countries.  In  that case,  the conventional  NGO cofunding  system  is 
reversed, and disbursement precedes expenditure and its justifications. The difference between 
the two systems also resides  in  the number of  signatures necessary for the authorization of 
expenses. One NGO involved in  an  EDF programme noted that it estimated the administrative 
work at 5-10% of  its time in  cofunding,  and  30-50% in  an  EDF framework.  In  the two cases 
cited,  it  is  often  funds  from  European  partners,  or  even  from  NGO  co-funding  by  the 
Commission itself, which allows the local operators to ensure continuity of funding and thus of 
action.  Finally,  PMCI  or accounting cells,  instead of playing a support and  follow-up  role  in 
relation to the operators in  their administrative tasks, sometimes see themselves as  a further 
level of control and justification of expenses. 
However,  a  system  of  impressed account that guaranteed a  rapid  reimbursement of 
advances  paid  out  and  that  covered  the  liquidity  needs  of  the  operator  without 
exhausting the operator•s kitty would be better adapted to the needs of the Commission 
representatives and DC operators. 
The  system was adapted in  Guinea,  where  the  impressed account is  locally managed by a 
coordination cell assisted by an accounting cell.  Vis-a-vis  the  operator,  the advances allow 
disbursement procedures to be accelerated. Monitoring by the coordination cell ensures that the 
operator's rea/liquidity needs are met and that its kitty is not emptied. One of the characteristics 
of the system is a posteriori verification of accounting documents.  This verification is combined 
with an offsetting of advances proportional to  the accounting documentation received,  while bearing in  mind the  liquidity available (kitty and bank)  to  each operator and its provisional 
expenses for the next two or three months.  The accounting documents are encoded,  verified, 
validated and filed by the accounting cell (see also 6.6.1., systems of accounting and financial 
supervision).  The annual system is closed only after the following year's system has come on 
tap. 
One kitty restocking system is to make available to the operator e.g. 40% of the funds initially, 
40°/o  on  presentation of receipts for Xo/o  of the initial advance,  and 20% thereafter.  Another 
would  be  to  hand  over e.g.  25% in  advance,  and  then  reimburse  only 75°/o  of  all  receipts 
presented. The idea is that the operator then possesses a working capital fund proportional (in 
this case, at 25°/o) to the sums remaining to be spent. There would then be no empty kitty, and 
the advance paid  out would  be  gradually recovered  by the donor.  Any remainder would  be 
returned at the end of the year. 
If the donor is  sure that the advances paid  out are being correctly used,  it  is  more  likely to 
accord  the  operators  their autonomy  in  implementing  actions.  It  receives  feed-back from 
management structures. The DG  VIII  headquarters can supervise the results at annual direct 
labour programme level (consolidated version of all the advances of a DC programme), while 
leaving to the Delegation the duty of making any administrative investment at the level of the 
individual  contractual  agreements  with  each  operator,  either directly or via  the  structures 
created  for  this  purpose  (PMCI).  The  effectiveness  of  the  mechanism  derives  from  the 
coordination between the activities delegated to the programme management/ coordination 
interface and to the accounting cell, and from a satisfactory methodology. 
6.5.2. Management of the accounts of the project/programme 
and EDF disbursement procedures 
For  the  PCMI  to  manage  the  accounts  associated  with  the  direct  labour  system,  the 
implementation  modalities of  the  system  must  be  borne in  mind  as  defined  in  the  DG  VIII 
appraisal manual. These modalities derive from the application of the financial  regulations to 
which the EDF is subject. 
The principle of direct labour rests  on  the  separation of responsibilities  between the 
manager-authorizer and the accountant: 
a  The Manager (in our case the Director of the PCMI) appointed by the NAO in agreement 
with the Commission, is responsible for drawing up the budget and for all the financial 
operations involving funds committed and for authorization vis-a-vis the operators. 
b.  A managerial accountant, who answers to the NAO, is responsible for making payments 
and recovering any debts. To this end, he ensures the accounting of operations (funds 
committed and paid out, keeping the books and cash and bank books). 
In this system, transfers from the bank account associated with the programme budget are 
performed under the double signature of the manager-authorizer and the accountant. The 
DG VIII  Appraisal  Manual  warns  against  the  tendency  to  confuse  the  two  functions 
(authorizer and accountant) by restating the fact that this constitutes an  irregularity in  the 
eyes of the EDF. But it is  willing to allow the system to  be adapted as  long as  financial 
security and the principles mentioned above are respected. In ACP countries, the accounts associated with the management of the direct labour system in 
the case of DC operations would be the following: 
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The advances agreed in the direct labour programme are domiciled in  a single bank account, 
the source-account13 . This is  managed under the responsibility of the PMCI, perhaps aided 
by an accounting cell able to cover various projects/programmes. 
Expenditure from the kitty is made under the joint signatures of the Director of the PMCI 
(authorizer) and its accountant. 
Its periodic restocking is  subject to repayment orders co-signed by the NAO and the Head of 
Delegation,  on  presentation of a budgetary statement,  documentary justification and  activity 
reports. Given the management role of the PMCI, this function of the NAO cannot be delegated 
to  the  PMCI;  it  can  only  be  delegated  to  a  Ministry  responsible,  which  is  not  always  a 
satisfactory solution. 
The account is  opened  in  a  retail  bank,  and  enjoys the  advantages generally accorded to 
Community  funded  project  accounts,  such  as  exoneration  from:  bank  charges,  account 
commission, and overdraft charges. 
b.  _Manag~m.~n.t  _I'-f. bank _tJ!;f:;QUnt!i _  rl!#lating _  tP_ PP~ratPr  PtP9.ram.m~s 
For each operator programme there should be a bank account. These are  stocked from the 
source-account under the personal responsibility of the PMCI officials,  in application of the 
programme budget  (or any other form  of  periodic  activity planning  by  the  operator) and 
according to the operator•s liquidity needs. 
The operators receive advances that can  be  renewed  on  presentation of  the corresponding 
documentary proof up to the amount set in the annual programme budget. 
A very unstable rate of exchange or non-convertibility of the local currency can cause situations 
unfavourable to operators.  In some countries, the solution is to avoid converting the budget of 
the programme into the local currency; this is combined  w~th management of the programme 
from Brussels. In this case,  DG  VIII  headquarters may directly make the payments connected 
with the purchase of majority of the equipment necessary for the projects on the European and 
ACP markets. However, this has negative repercussions on the autonomy of the operator and 
shortcircuits the PMCI.  It also reduces the volume of local purchases, and thus deprives local 
enterprises of custom. It is  recommended that the budget be converted into the local currency 
for all purchases that can be  locally invoiced, and  letters of appointment in  hard currency used 
only  for  the  purchase  of  major  equipment  items.  The  existence  of  two  contractual 
documents, one in hard currency managed by the Delegation, the other in local currency 
managed by the PMCI, here assumes its full significance. 
13  A DC programme could have a second source-account if it had another source of funding (co-funding 
from another donor for example). Bank guarantees in the context of 
service provision contracts with operators 
The EDF general conditions of contract which serve as  a reference for service provision 
contracts with operators was drawn up for consultants. For example, Article 34 concerning 
the  deposit  of a  bank  guarantee  for  advances  granted  is  reproduced  in  the  special 
prescriptions for all operators, even if these are non-profit-making. Though attempts have 
been made to adjust this requirement locally, no solution has been found that completely 
satisfies decentralized operators. Consideration should be given to this problem within the 
Commission's services, with three options available:  either adapt the  system, or waive 
certain contractual clauses where non-profit-making partners are involved, or maintain the 
status quo.  It is  indeed  logical  that an  operator bound  by  a  contractual commitment 
concerning  the  provision  of services  should  have  to  respect  the  same  rules  as  the 
conventional  EDF operators,  even  if the  operator in  question  is  a  non-profit-making 
association. The same does not, of course, apply in relation to investments of all kinds made 
vis-a-vis the beneficiaries. Where a bank guarantee is required, its cost could however be 
assumed by the EDF/Commission if the operator is non-profit-making. 
However, it should be pointed out that, in several countries, the exoneration of the bank 
guarantee was the subject of a complaint from Commission headquarters after the contract 
with the decentralized operator had been signed. Putting aside the administrative reasons 
which  motivated  this  attitude,  when  the  modalities  that  have  been  negotiated  are 
retrospectively invalidated, the value of a contract is undermined in  the perception of the 
donor as  is  its  consideration for  its  partner.  This  attitude  damages  the  image  of the 
institution.  This is  a pity as the terms of reference and the contractual documents of the 
operators have often been the subject of long negotiations with the Commission, with all 
parties  attempting to  identify  possible complications and  propose  compromises.  This 
convivial climate should be continued throughout the operations, without retrospective 
questioning of commitments. 
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There are no restrictive rules in the matter of cooperation with Developing/  ALA countries. 
It is  however generally required of the cooperation partner that it opens one or more accounts 
specifically to receive the Community contribution. Once again, no rules have been provided in 
this area. Project accounts can be in ECU, $US or the national currency. They can be opened 
locally and/or in Europe, or even in a third country. In general, EC financial control of the EC will 
be reluctant to sanction the opening o_f accounts elsewhere than Europe or the country where the 
partner organisations has its headquarters. If  justification is forthcoming, however, other formulas 
are acceptable and have been practised in a number of cases (accounts in Miami for Latin America 
and the Caribbean, for example). 
In the case of Developing/ALA countries, the stocking of the account can be done on the basis of 
the payment of an advance that either covers a certain number of months of activities (from 3 to 
12) or that meets a certain percentage of the project's overall budget (I 0 to 90%  ). 
Renewing this advance and the payment of two successive instalments (of the last instalment, 
when payment in two parts is specified) is subject to presentation of a statement of expenses paid 
and to the verification of their conformity with the operation/programme plans approved. 
As we saw above, there two kinds of management of projects in Developing/ALA countries: 
- in  the case of co-management (project managed by  a mixed Execution Unit created for the 
needs of the project and  composed of local  personnel  and expatriate technical  assistants, 
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double signature procedure, with the national and expatriate co-Directors both signing; 
- where management is by the cooperation partner, the partner applies its own procedures, the 
Commission confining itself to verifying the conformity of expenses made with the approved 
programmes. 
In both cases, disbursements are made at the initiative of the project, and Commission control 
(like that of other possible verification bodies: Court of Auditors, the external audit bureau) is 
essentially ex-post. 
6.6.  CONTROL, MONITORING AND EVALUATION 
6.6.1. Accounts and financial control system 
Rigour is the condition of flexibility. It is vital to ensure adequate control of the use of funds 
and set out in  detail the control plan  implemented for the examination of original accounting 
documents (periodicity, extent,  level  of errors that triggers  an  exhaustive audit)  and  for the 
certification of the monthly statements.  Decentralized use of funds (in  particular impressed 
accounts)  can  only be  ensured  if  the operators  and  authorizers  know that effective 
checks will take place and that they are very restrictive.  This is also protects the operator 
who can  refer to this system when dealing with  sub-contractors. This  rigour begins with the 
establishment of an adequate accounting system. 
Ideally, while remaining rigorous, a decentralized accounting system should free the services of 
the Delegation and the National Authorizing Officer of the burden of work connected with the 
supervision of the activities of a large number of operators. Moreover, the accounting system in 
itself should not be felt as a constraint vis-a-vis operators. 
With this in  mind, it is perhaps "recommendable, in some cases, for the accounting cell (or the 
ad  hoc  PMCI  service)  responsible for verifying the  authenticity of the  documentary proofs 
presented by the operator to undertake the keyboarding of the account entries in the operator's 
place, for example, for everything that concerns the funding of the operations. Local operators 
rarely possess the competences or the personnel required for genuine account management, 
still less for accounts adapted to the requirements of the EDF. 
Operators should be reminded that the rapidity of the financial movements in this system 
will depend heavily on their submission every two months  (or even every month) of their 
documentary proof.  In  order to  avoid  penalising  DC  operators  if  some of their documents 
should prove unacceptable, the refusal of a single document should not mean the rejection 
of the rest of the operator•s dossier. The modalities of acceptance of a documentary proof 
should also take account of the technical view of the PMCI on the subject of the justification of 
expenses relative to the activities and objectives of the operator. 
The general approach would be to accelerate the account restocking procedure and avoid 
operator liquidity crises. The accounting procedure would thus meet the concerns of the EDF 
and Member States, of  funds committed 'matching real expenditure•. The same principle 
could  be  applied to the  renewal  of funds  in  the programme source-account by the National 
Authorizing Officer and the Commission Delegation. On the methodological level, the accounting verification should be  implemented by applying 
uniform  procedures  locally for all  the  operators  of  one  or several  DCPs.  It  is  moreover 
recommendable to  have recourse to a computerized tool  appropriate  to the operations 
funded via direct labour or to any other modalities chosen. 
It is also  recommended that a regular  system  of  financial  audits should  be developed. 
Among the existing formulas,  it is  desirable to  have  recourse to  a two-level financial  audit 
system: 
a.  an audit of the operators and the PMCI; 
b.  a periodic audit of the working of the  services  responsible for the accounting,  not only 
relative  to  their handling  of  the  accounts,  but  also  of  their accounting  technique,  the 
procedures applied, and the mechanisms set up vis-a-vis the operators. 
Where an  external audit is  performed, care should be taken that the auditors understand the 
mechanisms in place and are able to advise on adaptations that would aid the operators. 
6.6.2. System of operational monitoring 
The monitoring procedures of  DG  I and VIII  of the European Commission are based  on  the 
methodology of the  Logical  Framework and  Project Management Cycle (PMC),  which 
makes use of principles recognised by many development agencies (though new guidelines are 
being  drawn  up  on  this  subject,  c.f.  the  new  project  cycle  of  the  World  Bank,  see  WB 
Bibliograp.hy). The broad outlines of this methodology are set out in a manual published by DG 
VIII  (Project  Cycle  Management,  integrated  approach  and  logical  framework,  see  EC 
bibliography); it allows the local officials some latitude in adapting the information to the specific 
needs of  a programme and  its  managers.  The  overall  procedure consists  in  supplying the 
officials with more or less detailed information according to the decision level (operators, PMCI, 
authorities involved- NAO, Ministry responsible-, Commission, etc.) while maintaining general 
coherence in the presentation of the information and its content vis-a-vis the donor. 
The data gathered by the operator constitutes an  indispensable contribution to the monitoring 
system. However, it is unlikely that all DC operators have the capacities (competence, logistical 
resources, and time) to apply the donor's system as such. There decentralized training will no 
doubt be welcomed (similar to that which has already been provided by DG VIII at Delegation 
level). It should be accessible not only to PMCI staff, but also to the operators' representatives. 
Given the contribution that training of this kind  makes to operator capacity development, it  is 
advisable to assume the cost of it by providing for the resources required while setting-up a 
DC programme. 
The possibility also exists of there being several donors each making different demands on the 
operator. The operator no doubt has it own internal reporting system, or one that takes account 
of  its  other donors.  In  the  best cases,  the  operator has  already  mastered  a  participatory 
monitoring  approach  vis-a-vis  the  beneficiary  population  and  brings  it  to  bear  on  critical 
examination of the action/project realised. 
For this reason,  it is advisable to accompany the setting-up of a DCP with some reflection on 
the kinds of reports required at each level, their frequency, the time required for their drafting, 
their logistical  costs,  the  participatory aspect of  the  exercise  and  the  possible constraints 
incurred by operators in the matter of data-collection. This should lead to the development of a suitable system. Decentralized agents are generally in favour of a single type of report on 
their activities, acceptable by all parties concerned  (Commission, other donors, etc.); this 
idea could be applied to their annual report too. 
One of the tasks of the PMCI would thus be to consult with the operators, in particular about the 
most satisfactory effectiveness,  efficiency,  impact and  viability  indicators,  and the practical 
modalities of collecting these.  It  is  essential that  there should  be  a balance between the 
monitoring demands and the pragmatism of the approach. It  should be remembered that 
monitoring is useful only if the information circulates and is analysed. It is effective only if 
all  involved, the beneficiaries and the operators, are clear about the purpose of the activities 
being asked of them, and can appropriate the results of the monitoring in order to improve the 
management of the project and reorient the actions for which they are responsible in the light of 
them.  In  this  perspective,  a  certain  flexibility  will  be  required  in  implementing  the 
monitoring/evaluation of participatory kind that is recommended in the box at 6.6.3. 
6.6.3. Evalution system 
As  in  conventional  programmes,  independent evaluations  will  be  planned  as  early  in  the 
process as  the  DCP funding  agreement, and the terms of  reference of such  studies will  be 
based on the PCM methodology of the Commission services. 
Without forgetting the criteria associated with this method, it is  desirable that the evaluation 
procedure  should  acquire  a  participatory aspect and  that technical  support should  be 
provided for the Evaluation Unit of  DG  VIII for the elaboration of a methodology and  specific 
terms  of  reference.  The experience of  other development agencies  (GTZ,  UNDP)  and  the 
literature published by think tanks, etc., in this field is fairly recent. 
Not  only  should  the  approach  and  effectiveness  of  current  participatory  evaluations  be 
scrutinised,  along with the possible kinds of participation  (operators,  beneficiaries) and their 
form  (workshops,  surveys,  etc.),  but the duration  and  the cost to  the donor should also be 
considered.  In the field,  mixed teams, bringing together experts who know the Commissionls 
PCM method well, with specialised evaluators of participatory methods are an obvious solution. 
Besides the modalities of this process, the Evaluation Unit will  have to specify the object of a 
DCP evaluation and the areas to be considered in depth. According to a UNDP analysis, there 
are very few monitoring and  evaluation  mechanisms that take  account of the participatory 
process itself. 
Participatory Dimension in Monitoring and Evaluation 
In  the  management of development  actions,  monitoring  and  evaluation  are  essential 
functions.  They  must  be  shared  among all  the  agents.  To this  end,  it is  necessary  to 
recognise that, independent of their level of education, people are capable of giving their 
opinion and evaluating the results of an activity in which they are involved. 
At local level, monitoring aims not merely to give an account of the action (as a verification 
method); it can also prompt reflection and make it possible to gain a better understanding of 
local constraints. It is again necessary to involve the beneficiaries as much as possible in the 
definition of the indicators and criteria, and in the monitoring methods and their application. 
This of course requires competence in organisation and group dynamics. 
. ..  f ... Evaluation has two functions, internal support and verification (with its guillotine aspect); 
the second should not be given greater priority than the first. It is particularly important not 
to be content with external evaluation, which may have neither the means nor the time to 
evaluate participation as such. External missions too often focus on results, and have little 
space for qualitative elements in estimating the impact, methods, and the evolution of the 
processes, for example. 
Participatory evaluation and self-evaluation comprise the same logical steps as conventional 
evaluation, but follow different rules insofar as they are designed as a learning process for 
everyone involved. The criteria and indicators are fixed in consultation with the persons 
concerned, in the course of an open process; it is not thus solely an instrument for checking 
on  and  improving a project,  but also for  promoting the capacity of the participants to 
critically examine their own practices. 
The advantages of participatory evaluation are fuller results (as they are based on different 
interpretations of the information collected) and  an  impact of the evaluation which goes 
beyond the project team and can thus set off swift and broad-based reactions to improve the 
actions in question. It also has disadvantages. It involves the criteria involved being defined 
by or with the beneficiaries; it is therefore longer; analysis is collective and debate frequent. 
When outside support is used, consultation should, logically, take place with the different 
agents on the choice of this  support or of the external evaluator. It nevertheless looks 
difficult to systematise this mechanism with the Commission, given that practices of this 
kind are generally not intensively - or not at all - planned. 
It is  therefore  recommended  that  the  decentralized  agents'  own  internal  evaluation 
procedures should be encouraged and  that the external evaluations of the Commission 
should little by little be inserted into them. Over the course of this document, it clearly appears that decentralized cooperation is  not so 
much an  instrument particular to development cooperation,  as  a new and different way  of 
practising cooperation. It should be based on  principles rather than regulations,  instructions or 
particular procedures.  This  implies that when  decentralized  cooperation  actions  are  being 
implemented, an  essential part should be  left to the creativeness of the agents as  a whole, 
whether institutional or decentralized. 
If creativeness of this kind is to be expressed by Southern societies, it is essential that fora for 
constructive dialogue between the agents should be created too.  It  is also essential that the 
donors,  both  official  and  non-governmental,  agree that they are,  as  agents,  external to  the 
processes taking place or to  be  established. Their role will  be one of support and follow-up 
rather than direct intervention. They must be willing to  take risks and recognise others' right 
to make mistakes. 
However, given the very forms that decentralized cooperation can take, it is clear that it might 
remain simply one instrument amongst others, isolated within the EU's cooperation actions. 
But decentralized cooperation  is  a concept that can  be  applied within  most of the forms  of 
intervention practised by European cooperation. It has within it the potential for an ambitious 
and coherent approach to development support, which  might make it possible to  reach a 
critical mass of intervention, a significant impact and greater visibility. 
It  is  therefore important that this approach should be  integrated into a true  European  Union 
policy of sustainable development, based on strategic principles such as the reinforcement of 
agent capacities,  agent participation and  responsibility,  and  support for the decentralization 
process.  This  of  course  requires  a  clear  political  will  on  the  part  of  both  political  and 
managerial officials, and their active participation in the promotion of this different conception of 
development cooperation. 
To do  this  will  require  that  habitual,  tested  and  reliable  practices  be  exchanged  for new 
methods  of  doing  things;  this  is  never easy.  The changes  in  outlook and  attitude  that 
decentralized cooperation implies for functionaries will have to be supported by an appropriate 
'institutional culture', which will encourage innovation and flexibility; this process of change 
will have to be structural and above all gradual. Such changes of attitude are required no less of 
decentralized  agents  themselves,  who  must  make  efforts  to  adapt  their  behaviour  and 
structures to this new approach. That means greater openness toward other agents, a spirit 
of dialogue and consultation, and a redefinition of their roles. 
It may all  seem a considerable gamble.  But faced with the challenges of democratisation, the 
growing aspirations of  populations to  participate in  the management of their future,  and the 
cruel reality of the exclusion of the absolute majority, this approach is simply essential. +  +  +  + 
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1996, 259 p. PROSH IKA, Bangladesh 
1.  Origin and background to the programme idea 
Proshika, one of the three biggest NGOs in  Bangladesh  1 (with the Grameen Bank and BRAC) 
was born of the initiative of an  individual who, after working as field developer with a Canadian 
NGO  (CUSO),  set  up  his  own  NGO  in  1976 with  the  financial  help of CUSO.  CIDA  soon 
replaced CUSO as a f~nding source, and was joined by other donors, at first mainly European 
NGOs, then official agencies: Sweden, the Netherlands, Great Britain: The EU recently decided 
to take part in the funding of Phase V (94-99) of Proshika's programme. For Proshika, 'take part 
in the funding of a programme' means something quite specific: it means funding the institution 
and  not a particular project.  Till  now,  the  main  objective of  Proshika's  donors  has  been  to 
provide the means for Proshika's action. They have not limited their support to the funding of 
activities but have agreed to fund the organisation itself, allowing it to lay the foundations of its 
own financial autonomy. Moreover, the funding sources have formed a consortium which has 
settled on a pooling of resources. 
The object of Phase V of the Proshika programme corresponds to the overall choices made by 
Proshika: combating  poverty by concentrating  directly on  the  poorest.  It  places  its  faith  in 
human  development,  and  its  objective  is  to  promote  real  empowerment of  the  population 
through  an  overall,  multi-sector approach.  Proshika  also  interacts  with  the  State,  either 
collaborating with certain ministries, or pressuring the authorities, for example, in  1987, to  allot 
deforested State land to landless peasants. Its methods of action are bottom-up, and accord a 
central role to participation, the promotion of organisation, training, a sense of responsibility in 
beneficiaries, promotion of beneficiary self-sufficiency and so on.  Proshika also programmes its 
activities in bottom-up fashion; its starts in the field and works toward the centre. Requests are 
made by  the population  (previously organised  into  groups),  projects are then  submitted to 
Village Committees and  discussed so that an overall plan for the village can be worked out. .. 
This process is followed at all levels. 
The relationship between the EU and Proshika is based on a Proshika initiative, which designed 
its programme and then contacted the  donor (via the  Delegation and  its  Executive  Director 
visiting Brussels), asking for the funding of the next five years to be completed. This is therefore 
a  typical  example  of  a  bottom-up  programme  for  the  donor,  as  the  idea  came  from  the 
decentralized partner. 
The Commission headquarters was,  at first,  reluctant to  agree to  non-individualised funding 
(individualised funding would have meant a specific EU  project or allocation of  EU  funds to 
certain  specific  elements  of the  Proshika  programme).  It  should  be  noted  that  Brussels's 
objections were based less on regulatory obstacles than on the practical difficulties of financial 
In 1994, Proshika had 1459 staff for 662,000 beneficiaries. control and of a 'culture' no doubt unwilling to accept innovations. Both Proshika and its other 
donors were against this chopping up of its activities. 
In  the  last analysis,  certain  elements were essential  in  the  decision to  fund  Proshika:  the 
personal contact made by its Executive Director, the lack of other proposals in Bangladesh, the 
previous  funding  of  a  project  by  another  major  Bangladeshi  NGO  (BRAC)  through  the 
budgetary resources of Technical and  Financial Assistance, the consortium organised by the 
donors (among which were members of the EU), the Delegation's support for the project, and 
the project's absorption capacity. 
2.  Support measures 
The management of Phase V is performed entirely by Proshika with its own staff (management 
and other). The coordination of the different aspects of the programme is done within Proshika, 
which  works  in  participatory and  decentralized  fashion.  The  actions  are  proposed  by  the 
beneficiaries  and  subject to  consultation  at  every  level.  The  personnel  is  local  and  close 
connections are sought between its staff and the field (15% at headquarters, 85% in the field). 
Moreover, a large share of management responsibility rests on  its members. A greater transfer 
of responsibilities to members is sought for the future. 
Internally,  Proshika's  guidance  po~icy (very close  to the  grassroots)  is  a clear result  of  its 
capacity development strategy, at both individual and organisational levels. 
No permanent technical assistance is planned for this phase, any more than for previous ones. 
Donors do not,  strictly speaking, participate in  the project, e.g. through Technical Assistance. 
The staff contribution of the donors has consisted in funding a local consortium representation 
office in  Dhaka and a permanent consultant (funded  by the  EU)  and  in  the funding  of short 
missions of support on  specific themes: evaluation, audit,  etc.  The external TA functions are 
thus essentially monitoring and support on request and the cost is proportionally low (2°/o of the 
donors' and 6% of the EU's contributions). 
3.  Intensity of  participation 
For Proshika,  participation  is  more than  a  means,  it  is  an  end  in  itself,  not  only within  its 
activities  (where  management  is  based  on  collective  decision-making)  but  at  local  level 
(promoting organisation and training as the keys to personal empowerment) and at a wider level 
of democratisation (organise in order to make oneself heard not only in the context of Proshika 
activities but in other social fora). 
For Proshika, the participation of the beneficiary population is  an  integral part of the process, 
from the programming of activities to their execution, monitoring and evaluation. Thus, in  the 
field,  activities  are  programmed  and  budget  management  autonomy  is  achieved  when 
programmes  are  approved;  groups'  projects  are  funded  from  a  credit  fund.  As  regards 
monitoring and  evaluation, there are,  on  the one hand,  internal procedures (including  regular 
self-evaluation workshops) and on the other procedures effected by external agents acting for 
the consortium. 4.  Instruments 
The set-up is  peculiar relative to the habitual funding  practices of the  EU  (agreement directly 
with an NGO; contribution mixed with that of other donors, without there being, as such, an  EU 
project or programme  ... see Point 1  ). 
Proshika and its various donors have formed a consortium of which each is an equal member; 
the  consortium  has  a  permanent  office,  funded  by  the  donors.  It  is  the  interface  and 
coordination body of the donors. The Office Chief is a consultant whose selection is subject to 
the approval of the consortium members as a whole and whose task is that of TA-consultant. 
He ensures monitoring of activities, formulates recommendations when necessary, coordinates 
evaluation missions (or any other technical missions), ensures financial control (making use of a 
local  auditor when  necessary),  ensures  communication  between  Proshika and  its  donors, 
prepares an annual report on Proshika, etc. I  Rakai District Development Programme, Uganda 
1.  Origin and background to the programme idea 
The Rakai District Development Programme (RDDP) is a pilot project, aimed at supporting the 
political process of decentralization, initiated by the Ugandan government, by providing financial 
and institutional support to  Rakai district. The main focus is  on  strengthening the capacity of 
district structures to plan and support the implementation of development initiatives. 
RDDP  was  born  out of  a  meeting  of  minds  of  the  Uganda government and  DANIDA.  The 
Government had embarked upon a national policy of decentralization. It acknowledged that in 
the  absence  of  devolution  of  decision-making  power  (including  financial  authority)  and 
institutional support to  district structures, the process of decentralization would not succeed. 
Rakai district was selected for pilot implementation of this policy.  DANIDA•s aid priorities had 
evolved along the same line.  It emphasized poverty alleviation, democratisation, participatory 
development, capacity-building  and  sustainability.  DANIDA  had  also  decentralized  its  own 
organisational  structure  and  procedures.  Its  commitment  to  RDDP  was  reflected  in  an 
agreement to support the programme over 15 to 20 years. 
One could  argue that a top-down  approach was  adopted  in  developing the  basic idea and 
underlying principles of RDDP,  including a relatively dominant role for external consultants (in 
drafting the programme document) and for centralised agencies, including Danish Embassy (in 
managing the programme). Initially, this was seen as a necessity, taking into account the lack of 
a clear national decentralization policy and poor starting conditions in Rakai district. 
However, the process approach adopted by  RDDP,  gradually created opportunities for local 
participation  and  bottom-up  approaches.  Outside  influences  on  the  management of  RDDP 
decreased as capacities of local institutions and actors increased. 
2.  Supportive measures 
The originality of RDDP resides primarily in  the linkage between supporting a wide variety of 
socio-economic development  initiatives  at  local  level  and  strengthening  local  political  and 
administrative district structures.  Capacity development of  district authorities is seen  as  both 
and  end  in  itself and  a  means to  achieve  RDDPs  broader socio-economic objectives.  The 
district is  given a prominent role as  a nexus between central government, donors and a wide 
variety of local actors. Dan ida has taken the option to fully support the political decentralization 
process of the Ugandan government. It provides financial and  institutional support to a district 
and  is  prepared to  subordinate RDDP  (including  its  own  accountability requirements) to  the 
logic of the decentralization process. This explicit choice for working through existing structures 
-however weak they may be- is based on the premisse that district structures are there to stay 
(contrary to  donor supported  Project Implementation Units or foreign  NGO ).  Supporting the 
emergence  of  a capable  local  framework for  participatory planning  and  implementation of 
development activities, is seen as a means to ensure greater accountability and sustainability of 
development initiatives. 
RDDP  gradually developed  a flexible  and  comprehensive  strategy for  institutional  support, 
including finance  (e.g.  recurrent budget support),  training  and  technical  cooperation  (albeit reduced to a single resident advisor and  adhoc consultancies).  RDDP also benefits from  a 
supportive national policy and  institutional backup. These supportive measures were largely 
conceived outside Rakai  district.  But as the programme developed and  the different actors 
became aware of their new roles and  responsibilities, the demand-driven nature of the whole 
process increased. 
3.  Intensity of  participation 
RDDP is a multi-faceted programme, with 25 components including socio-economic activities, 
infrastructure and rehabilitation projects and capacity-building efforts. Experience has shown 
that levels of participation vary according to the type of activity supported. The planning process 
-a core element of RDDP- is generally perceived to have been based on extensive consultation 
and democratic decision-making at different levels. Major efforts have been made to ensure that 
the necessary structures,  procedures,  isntruments and capacities of the different actors are 
developed to ensure this participation.  It is,  however, acknowledged that the focus has been 
primarily on  key actors at district level. Additional efforts in capacity building will be required to 
ensure bottom-up inputs from lower levels of 
administration and local people. 
4.  Instruments 
Formally existing district structures rather than project-related ad hoc institutional arrangements 
are the main instrument of RDDP. A wide set of actors at the local level (local authorities, NGO, 
CBOs,  private sector agents,  etc.)  are expected  to  implement the different components of 
RDDP and to ensure day-to-day management. There is no overall coordinating unit nor is it the 
intention to  have  a oversized  district administration.  Recruitment ·of  project staff,  financed 
outside  the  district  budget,  is  kept  to  a  minimum.  Management of  RDDP  is  increasingly 
decentralized, with central government and donor agency adopting a controlled 'letgo' attitude. 
An  indication of this, is  DANIDA  preparedness to  integrate the programme's budget into the 
district budget and to use the existing auditing system under the Local Government Statute to 
ensure accountability. Community Action Programme, Uganda 
1.  Origin and background to the programme idea 
The  overall  objective  of  the  Community  Action  Programme  (CAP)  is  the  promotion  of 
sustainable socio-economic development in three districts. Target groups are local communities 
and  groups.  CAP  aims at  strengthening their capacity to  identify and execute development 
initiatives (primarily microprojects). Existing CAP documents dwell at length on the inextricable 
link between the objectives of capacity development and the implementation of micro-projects. 
Three  contextual  elements  are  at  the  origin  of  the  programe:  a  government  initiated 
reconstruction  plan  for  the  region,  (including  a  social  fund),  the  national  policy  of 
decentralization and positive responses from major donors. 
The process of programme design was rather top-down, including a wide variety of actors such 
as the Office of the Prime Miister (OPM), the World Bank (as the driving conceptual force), the 
Dutch government and several short-term external consultants. All of these actors had different 
perceptions as to the desirable nature and  institutional set-up of CAP. The net result is a very 
general  Programme  Document  (with  vague  objectives,  criteria,  procedures  and  working 
methods)  and  a  rather  heavy  and  schizophrenic  institutional  set-up  (combining  several 
coordinating units at national level and a very decentralized management approach in the field). 
A  Dutch  NGO  (SNV)  was  charged  with  the  execution  of  CAP,  under a  'co-implementing' 
arrangement with OPM. This framework was 'implanted' from above in three districts. From this 
moment on, there was scope for involvement of local communities in design, decision-making, 
execution and financial management of micro-projects. 
2.  Supportive measures 
From  the  outset,  CAP  aimed  at  putting  in  place  a community-based,  people  centred  and 
demand driven approach. This had to be achieved through the 'facilitation' of community and 
group initiatives to assess their own  needs and  priorities and through financial and technical 
support, with CAP structures in a coordinating and advisory role.  CAP staff made major efforts 
to ensure effective capacity building of local groups (through participation all along the project 
cycle). To this end, it developed a comprehensive (albeit rather abstract) capacity development 
strategy (using local Community Facilitators, Participatory Rural Appraisals, providin·g training, 
etc.). It is difficult to say that local actors fully agree with all this attention being given to capacity 
building. It would appear that local groups often do no see the relevance of lengthy consultation 
processes in the context of a survival economy. They may prefer quick material improvements 
through  micro-projects.  They  also fear that too  much  programme funds  are  'eaten  up'  by 
overheads (which are indeed relatively high). It is also relevant to note that CAP  -as currently 
designed- has no special support measures to strengthen district structures. Their cooperation 
is sought if needed for the implementation of CAP projects. This, of course, does hardly provide 
an  incentive for district staff to participate.  If  anything,  they  resent the financial  and  logistic 
possibilities of CAP, which they tend to perceive as 'unfair competition'. 3.  Intensity of Participation 
CAP  has  made  it  possible to  adopt  a truly decentralized  approach  to  project design  and 
implementation. There  is  no  major political  interference from  the  top  or from  local  politics. 
Communities and groups are facilitated in a decentralized manner (through locally recruited and 
trained staff) to take the lead in managing development initiatives. The budget can be used in a 
very flexible and demand-driven way. The CAP units do not (directly) interfere in the approval 
process. Technical assistance, especially short-term consultancies, are carefully managed. The 
main tension on this system, is CAP's coordinating 'superstructures' at national level. They do 
not necessarily share the  'decentralized  mind'  of  SNV and  CAP  staff at district levels. The 
bureaucratic and accountability requirements emanating from the centre, may end up reducing 
the scope for a flexible and efficient approach in the field. 
4.  Instruments 
CAP's organisational structure has been tailored to the needs of both participatory management 
of micro-projects and the coimplementation principle between OPM and SNV. To meet the first 
objective, the institutional framework is  based on  a devolution of decision-making authority to 
local  communities  and  groups.  At  this  level,  representative  interface structures  (steering 
committees) have been created to assume these responsibilities. To meet the second objective, 
there  is  shared  responsibility between  OPM  and  SNV at  each  layer of  CAP's complicated 
structure. Coordination and accountability requirements are discharged at the level of the three 
CAP District Units (jointly by a local  Unit Head and  an  SNV Advisor). The National CAP  Unit 
(based  in  Kampala)  is  responsible for overall management coordination  (e.g.  elaboration of 
common procedures) and consolidation of accountability requirements. While decision-making 
on micro projects seems strongly embedded in local dynamcis, the overall management of CAP 
is  trapped  in  a much too complicated and  costly institutional set-up.  Another problem is the 
absence of a long term vision of CAP. The programme hangs in an 'institutional vacuum'. CAP is 
not likely to  become a  local  NGO,  nor is  it  planning to  integrate  its  activities within  locally 
existing structures. This may jeopardise the long-term sustainability ofits activities.  ! Micro-projects Programme, Zambia 
1.  Origin and background of the programme idea 
The Zambia Micro-project Programme (MPP) is a typical EDF Micro-project programme and is 
essentially  given  over to  small  social  infrastructures,  schools,  and  health  centres.  It  is  a 
response to a notable lack of  such facilities. The government has  no  budget devoted to the 
construction  of  such  infrastructure  and  thus  depends  on  external  aid  in  these  areas.  An 
important characteristic of this programme is that it is funded and managed jointly by the EDF 
and the World Bank. 
The Zambia MPP follows  the basic  rules  of  Micro-project programmes, that is,  a minimum 
contribution  of  25o/o  from  the  beneficiaries and  technologically simple  interventions whose 
execution should take no longer than a year. 
The MPP is mixed top-down and bottom-up. It offers support for a type of action determined by 
the MPP: beneficiary groups must organise and form a Project Committee, promise participation 
in the action envisaged, and, if possible, prove this participation if they are to have access to an 
MPP. However, the Zambia MPP.is one of very few that leaves the management of funds to the 
Project Committee.  In  other Micro-project programmes,  the funds  intended for projects are 
managed by the programme•s central cell. 
The  beneficiaries·  point  of  view  is  taken  into  account  little  if  at  all.  They  must  match  the 
conditions set by the MPP in order to have access to aid. 
2.  Support Measures 
The programme possesses a large support unit, the Micro-projects Unit (MPU), which employs 
some fifteen people in the capital and is represented in each of the nine provinces. 
The  support  measures  developed  have  been  essentially  oriented  towards  control  (of  the 
contribution),  and  support  and  monitoring  of  the  work  performed.  Currently,  support  is 
increasingly oriented towards the training  of  Project Committees for their role  in  the  entire 
process of the action envisaged (training seminars before the project begins). 
One of the aims of support is thus capacity development, but this is  limited to a very specific 
area of the carrying out of the project. 
3.  Intensity of  participation 
There is no real participation in the development process; it would be more accurate to speak of 
contributions to the carrying out of an action. However, the support system is currently intended 
to train the beneficiary community in  practices of delegation of powers within the village and 
control of the use made of these powers by the officials to whom such power is delegated. At 
this level, some degree of participation is beginning to be practised. 4.  Instruments 
The coordination cell (MPU) manages the programme and is  responsible to the EU  Delegation 
in Zambia, the World Bank official in charge of the programme in Washington, and the National 
Authorizing Officer. It comprises two expatriates (one EAC and one contractual WB official) and 
several high level Zambian executives. 
The MPU at Lusaka includes a financial control service which receives documentary proof and 
checks the expenses of the projects as a whole. 
lh each province, a Zambian regional official is in charge of the identification and monitoring of 
projects,  in  collaboration  with  a  certain  number  of  district  functionaries  (Building  Officer, 
Education Officer,  Health Officer, etc.).  The  regional  officials send  project proposals,  which 
have already been selected, to the central MPU office, which studies them and submits its own 
selection to the Project Committee,  on  which the three authorities sit (NAO,  EU,  WB). This 
Committee makes the final decision on funding. The Zambia MPP is a rare example of a Micro-
project financed by two donors: the EDF and WB. Mpongwe Smallholders Development Programme, 
,  Zambia  o 
1.  Origin and background of the project idea 
The object of the project is currently community development in 26 villages of the Ndola region. 
The origin of the project was at first the agricultural development of these villages, centring on 
increased productivity and communications infrastructure development (roads, bridges, etc.). 
The idea of  transforming  a conventional  agricultural  project into a community development 
project came from the project's Technical Assistance. To begin with, the Technical Assistance 
organised applied  research  with the peasants to  determine techniques for improved farming 
with their aid. 
After this first and successful experience of PB:rticipatory measures, the TA asked the help of 
British consultants in transforming the project as a whole into one of community development. 
In this, they relied on  a small number of administration officials of the Districts (in  which there 
were 26 villages), whom they trained in participatory methodology. Then each village chose two 
extension workers (a woman and a man) to receive the same techniques. 
The project initiative is typically top-down. The AT proposed the idea to the District functionaries 
and to the villagers, and the villagers quickly became interested in the approach proposed. The 
approach  is  typically bottom-up;  the  intention  of  training  extension workers  in  participatory 
methods was to enable the villagers to think constructively about the problems that they face 
and to seek solutions. 
2.  Support measures 
The  support  by  the  TA  was  concentrated  at  first  on  the  extension  workers'  capacity 
development, then on the villagers. These support measures have become the main function of 
the project. 
3.  Intensity of  participation 
The participation of the beneficiaries is the main objective of the project. It is the result expected 
from the development of the capacity of the educators and villagers. Thanks to the development 
of their capacities, the villagers can analyse their problems, identify their causes and propose 
solutions. 
When external support for an  action  envisaged  is  necessary, this can  come either from the 
project itself (for example from group savings schemes, whose capital is doubled by the project) 
or from  another project or donor (for example,  a  health centre constructed  by  EDF  Micro-
projects). 4.  Instruments 
The structure of the conventional agricultural development project has remained. It comprises 
three expatriate TAs and several local officials. The project is often criticised in terms of the high 
cost of its T  A. 
The interest of the project lies in the fact that the TAs had the idea and the energy to start the 
process  of  transforming  the  conventional  project  into  a  project  matching  the  norms  of 
Decentralized  Cooperation;  in  this they were  supported  by the  Delegation.  When the  new 
method is functioning smoothly, theTA will be replaced by local personnel at lower cost, and TA 
will be reserved for occasional support. 1.  Origin and background of the project idea 
The DC  in the RDPs of Upper Western Guinea and  Maritime Guinea concerns around 47% of 
the former and 37% of the funds  of the latter. The set-up does not exclude the possibility of 
other parallel forms of implementation of more conventional EDF RDP kind. The DC approach 
results from a series of observations about the working methods of Lome Ill: projects of human 
resource valorisation, in  which the 'evolution of the target population  in  the direction desired 
constitutes the main criterion of success'2, require a specific approach, taking account of the 
peasants and their reactions and evolution. 
There is  a clear will to  introduce some flexibility into the formulation of  RDPs  (sustainability, 
activities,  etc.)  and  to  seek  decentralized  operators  who  are  familiar  with  decentralized 
cooperation  (local  and  foreign  NGOs,  Guinean  associations,  consultancies,  individuals, 
research centres, etc.) willing to support the beneficiary group ·both before and after the EDF 
funding. The Guinean authorities have approved this initiative. However, the Post-Project and 
title in  productive investments (equipment, infrastructure, etc.) funded by the RDP are among 
the financial stakes to which DC gives rise, and this arouses some resistance. 
The project idea is the result of a mixed approach: (a) top-down in the formulation of the initial 
objectives3 of the RDP and in the choice of operators on the basis of investment in actions and 
agents recognised locally, (b)  bottom-up in  the proposal by operators to the RDP of activities 
and  structures  meriting  support.  This  takes  the  form  of  the  operators  cooperating  in  the 
formulation  of  an  RDP  and  their freedom  to  propose  adjustments  during  execution.  The 
operators  are the  kingpin  of  the  process:  the  testing  of the  opinion  of  villagers  and  other 
grassroots groups is  done through the operators, who are  responsible for the quality of their 
own participatory procedures. 
2.  Support measures 
Support  is  primarily through  the  operators,  from  the  operator to  the  villagers  and  other 
beneficiaries. 
The institutional set-up of the RDP  is  oriented towards support for the operators from (a)  the 
coordination cell  of each  RDP  and  (b)  a central  accounting  cell  attached to the NAO.  This 
support mainly relates to the administrative procedures of the EDF RDPs and the accountancy 
2  This is the case with the agricultural components of the Guinean RDPs,  which are conducted on  a 
participatory basis in which attempts are made to interest villagers in the improvement of their agricultural 
techniques,  to  organise their supply of inputs in  sustainable fashion,  to  favour the marketing of their 
production, or to organise track maintenance with the aid of the population. 
3  In  supporting the  rural  development policy of  the  Guinean government, these programmes have 
among their priorities the  training  and  consolidation  of  local  groups,  which  orients  activities  in  that 
direction. of the projects (account-data capture in  place of the operators who request this,  sometimes 
consultancy  in  social  management and  tax affairs).  The  technical  coordinations  and  the 
Delegation are also fora for reflection between operators: common reflection intended to make 
collaboration more effective. 
3.  Intensity of  Participation 
In  the specific objectives and  activities written  into the  RDP  Funding  Proposals,  beneficiary 
participation is considered as an operational objective in itself. 
This  participation  occurs  at  project  level,  between  operator  and  beneficiary;  the  type  of 
contribution and the responsibilities of the peasants are the result of internal dialogue. Among 
the tendencies encouraged by the RDPs are: 
•  leaving the operators to identify their initial activities (which constitute the operator's, and 
indirectly the EDF's, permission to enter the village). This allows collaboration to be initiated 
concerning needs very close to the concerns of a particular group. If everything goes well, 
the nature and scale of the activities can evolve. 
•  leaving the peasants to  organise themselves,  helping them  but not doing things  in  their 
stead. 'People always decide for themselves' whether they want to work with the operator. 
Activities are decided by common agreement; experience has taught officials that a project 
should never go 'faster' than the beneficiaries. 
The participatory methodologies are individual to each operator. After verif~ing the operator's 
participatory approach in the field, the Delegation and Structures never intervene directly in the 
operator/beneficiary relationship. The validity of each approach will,  however, be highlighted by 
the monitoring mechanisms4,  and  discussed and  commented on  during exchanges with  the 
programmes officials (T A/Delegation). 
4.  Instrumentation 
The Administration  is  present upstream in  the form  of the National Authorizing Officer and  a 
Ministry with  responsibility for RDPs.  The  Delegation  is  the  guarantor of  the  participatory 
approach.  One  of  its  main  functions  is  to  dynamise  the  DC  process,  by  arranging  the 
appropriate structures,  appointing the  right personnel,  and  ensuring that the process is  not 
derailed. The National Coordination Cells (NCCs)  responsible for the execution of each  RDP 
and the Central Accounting Cell  (CAC),  common to the six major EDF projects,  work as the 
authorities' technical  and  accounting  filters  and  as  the  operators'  official  interlocutors.  The 
operators  ensure the  execution  of the  projects and  on-hand  guidance for the  beneficiaries 
(support, training, monitoring, etc.). 
Each NCC is  directed by two persons: a senior executive from the Ministry with responsibility 
appointed by Ministerial decree, and a Technical Assistant {TA  under EDF service contract or 
ECA  expert)  who  co-manages  the  RDP,  recruited  after tripartite  agreement  between  the 
NAG/Ministry  responsible/Delegation.  To  this  model  can  be  added  a  European  technical 
consultant (Maritime Guinea)  or Delocalized Coordination  (European consultancy and  local 
4  The operators are requested to verify the interest of the villagers in the operation proposed, by testing 
with  them  simple  actions  and  methods;  by  checking,  for  example,  whether or not the  beneficiaries 
individually reproduce the activities which are proposed. functionaries,  in  Upper Guinea) and  local contractual staff.  In  its tasks of controlling operator 
budgets,  it  is  supported  by  the  CAC,  which  checks the accounting  validity of documentary 
proofs,  produces  statistics  and  updated  liquidity  statements,  budgetary  estimates  for  the 
operators,  budgetary consolidation  with  each  RDP,  etc.  The  NCC  performs the  secretarial 
functions of a RDP Steering Committee which meets twice a year as a forum for exchanges, 
decision-making and adjustments for the authorities, the RDP officials and the operators. The 
RDPs use a system of annual Programme Budgets for each operator and for the running costs 
of the Cells. Provision of drinking water 
in the Lima shanty towns, Peru 
1.  Origin and background of the programme idea 
The object of the programme is to contribute to the provision of drinking water to the outlying 
areas where this is most lacking and which were worst hit by the cholera epidemic which struck 
Peru and particularly Lima in 1991. 
The cholera epidemic led the Peruvian government to request international aid in order to deal 
with the problems considered to be the cause or contributory factors of the propagation of the 
illness. It was therefore a top-down initiative, identified as a priority action by the government in 
relation to the emergency but also constituting a response to the structural problem of the water 
supply of the impoverished inhabitants of the shanty towns. 
Funding was  not  a difficulty given that the  EU  wanted  to  act in  relation  to this  problem.  It 
adopted  the  methodology  of  the  technical  proposal  identified  by  the  CEPIS  cell  of  the 
Panamerican Health Organisation. The programme did not require adjusting to meet available 
funding, but the cooperation instrument used (technical and financial cooperation programme) 
should  probably have  been  adapted to  meet  the  urgency of the  situation  and  intervention 
(operations only began in mid-93 for an identification made in 1991 ). 
Although the  beneficiaries•  point of view was  not taken  into account,  the  objectives  of  the 
government and programme seem to meet their needs and expectations. 
2.  Support measures 
The originality of the Drinking Water Programme lies mainly in  its objective of organising and 
reinforcing the capacities of local institutions which are the  main  agents and  partners in  the 
actions.  On  the  one  hand,  the  work  of  promotion,  preparation  (training)  and  preliminary 
organisation of the beneficiary urban districts or groups was  performed by NGOs selected on 
the basis of their experience of working in the very specific context of the shanty towns and for 
their technical and pedagogic capacities. On the other, the technical option was designed with a 
view to its later integration into the SEDEPAL network (SEDEPAL is the company responsible 
for water supply and sewage disposal in Lima). The technical solution was thus inherent in the 
permanent institutional and technical structures of Lima. 
These  strategic  choices  were  not  requested  by  the  beneficiaries,  who  were  not  directly 
associated  with  the  identification  of  the  action.  A  deliberate  strategy  of  individual  and 
institutional capacity development nevertheless constituted the logic of the support operations. 
The  Programme  Management  Unit  exploits  the  complementarity  of  the  various  agents 
approached; by allocating specialised functions to them and endowing them with the required 
technical and financial resources, it enables them to assume their statutory technical and social 
functions  and  thus contributes to their reinforcement.  A training and  participation promotion 
component was immediately made part of the objectives of the programme and entrusted to 
specialist NGOs. The method used  (training of educators) produces a self-multiplying effect, which is,  in view of the task in hand, indispensable. The use of communicators who are from the 
shanty town world contributes to the effectiveness and impact of the training work. 
3.  Intensity of  participation 
The participation of the beneficiaries was initially identified as essential to the carrying out of the 
micro-projects, their viability and sustainability. It is considered as a means allowing a series of 
technical objectives to be attained and  as an  end  in  itself. Expressions of solidarity cannot be 
taken for granted; they must often be elicited, whence the major participation promotion work 
entrusted to the NGOs. 
Beneficiary participation is  only effective in  the implementation and execution stages of the 
water distribution micro-projects. One of the maih objectives of the programme is the creation of 
micro-enterprises, controlled by the beneficiaries, to continue to manage the infrastructures built 
through the Programme and ensure the communities' water-supply. The final idea is to confer 
on the groups a greater autonomy through the creation of water-transport micro-enterprises for 
filling the tanks. The main consequence of this would be to make them more independent of the 
transport companies  lobby and  better able to  control  the  cost of  water and  of the  service 
provided to the inhabitants. 
The inhabitants' contribution lies  in  providing non-specialist workpersons, tools,  premises in 
which to store equipment, the remuneration of specialist technicians, support for training and 
reinforcement of the committees responsible for execution, and the organisation of the micro-
enterprise for the maintenance and  administration of the drinking-water system. The micro-
projects  led  to  the creation  of permanent structures  responsible for resolving  problems  of 
technical,  administrative and  financial  management.  These committees,  called  COVAAPs, 
comprise a board of directors who ensure the supervision of a small management team, which 
in  its turn  is  composed of two technicians and a manager,  and  is  recruited  and  paid  by the 
structure. The communities are particularly proud of generating paid work.  This considerable 
and active participation is one of the keys to successful financial and institutional arrangements 
of this kind. 
No permanent consultative  mechanism  has  been  set  up  bringing together Programme and 
beneficiaries. The NGOs executing the programme provide intermediation. It would be  best if 
such fora could be set up in order to favour dialogue and the negotiation of aspects considered 
by the beneficiaries as liable to inhibit popular participation. 
4.  Instruments 
The  institutional  set-up  brings together different agents  identified  and  associated  with  the 
execution of the  Programme thanks to the  place they occupy relative to  the  problem to  be 
solved, to their professional know-how 'and their experience of working in shanty towns. 
An  Autonomous  Management  Unit  (AMU)  constituted  by  a joint direction  (European  and 
Peruvian co-directors), backed up by two specialized cells, assumes the tasks of management, 
coordinating the action of the executing bodies, and supervising and control the execution of the 
micro-projects.  It  also  manages  certain  aspects  of  the  intervention  of  Cites  Unies 
Developpement (CUD). The executing entities have responsibility for the execution of projects 
and specific training actions. They are SEPAPAL, the national counterpart, which covers the whole technical field;  the  NGOs,  which  ensure the  mobilisation of the  inhabitants, training, 
supervision  and  the  monitoring  of  the  micro-projects;  the  municipalities  validate  the 
administrative  procedures;  the  CUD  intervenes with  financial  support for the  realisation  of 
complementary work. 
The two co-directors have full  responsibility for managing the  physical,  human and  financial 
resources of the Programme and are alone authorized to manage the EC contribution in accord 
with the annual Plan  of Operation (POA) established by them and approved by the  EU  Latin 
American Consultative Committee and Technical Unit.  Execution takes place on  the basis of 
their programme. Decisions concerning beneficiary selection are taken by the AMU on the basis 
of the consultative and selective criteria of the various agents. 
A consultation and coordination forum  (Steering Committee) was  initially created by the two 
main donors (EC and French Cooperation) but has never functioned. 
··· ··  .·'::.:.:.:.:  .. :;.;:·~Nex:.:o:~:.c~sa::·stum&j·:·~£1)·b..u.a.s•oH·a:aP.O~ts: .  ·. :  .. ;,:~·.'·•·: . 
. .....  _  .. _.  ..... -.-· ............  _  ...  _.'(,  .. . Fondo Nacional de Compensacion y  Desarrollo 
Social (FONCODES), Peru 
1.  Origin and background of the initiative 
FONCODES, a Peruvian  government initiative,  is  a component of the  Programme of  Social 
Spending Focalisation, which is in its turn a component of the short term Strategy implemented 
by the  government in  order to  alleviate the  new  poverty caused  by the  national  structural 
adjustment policy begun in the early 1990s. FONCODES was created in  1991  to improve the 
living conditions of the poorest by generating employment, responding to the most fundamental 
needs of  Peruvians in the fields of health, nutrition, hygiene and education, while acting as an 
instrument of pacification and promoting the participation of poor inhabitants in the management 
of their own development. The Fondo grants funds to groups that have organised in  order to 
carry out actions of social interest and offers technical assistance, training and support in  the 
form of credits at market rates through specialised intermediary organisations and in  specific 
fields (micro-enterprises, artisanal fishing,  etc.).  FONCODES takes its inspiration in  particular 
from the Bolivian Fonda de  Inversion Social. The initiative is top-down in that the identification 
of  the  regions  and  sectors  of  intervention  is  conducted  on  the  basis  of  priority  criteria 
established by the Fund; financial intervention is performed on the basis of a methodology and 
modalities which determine access to the funds. A formal framework for interventions has been 
established, and access to funding is possible only within limits fixed by the Fund. The initiative 
is bottom-up in the sense that the methodology used (project cycle) rests on the identification of 
needs and  projects by the beneficiaries themselves who are then alone responsible for the 
execution of projects. 
This government initiative seems to  have found  little difficulty in  obtaining donors. The most 
important support comes from the World Bank and the lnteramerican Development Bank, each 
of which contributed $100 million (December 1993). The form and status of FONCODES were 
designed so that the institution would be in a position to channel international aid. 
2.  Support measures 
At the instigation of the World Bank, a project cycle was introduced during 1994. This provides 
for  the  guidance  of  potential  beneficiaries  during  the  various  phases  of  preparation  and 
realisation of projects. For each project there is an Inspector, employed by the Execution Group 
(made up  of beneficiaries) who monitors, supervises and approves the realisations; he  reports 
to an  itinerant Supervisor (appointed  by  FONCODES)  on  the  technical,  administrative and 
accounting  aspects  of  the  execution  of  the  works.  He  also  promotes  participation  and 
coordination between different public and private institutions. Training is  given as  support for 
organisational processes and the auto-prioritisation of projects. The training  is  not,  however, 
systematic;  it  depends  on  the  nature  of  the  projects to  be  executed.  These measures are 
unlikely  to  have  been  requested  by  beneficiaries,  and  result  from  a  concern  for  the 
effectiveness and efficiency of  investments, given the  scale of poverty in  Peru.  It  is  however 
certain that this  support  logic  is  the product of  a deliberate strategy of  development of the 
capacities of the groups involved. The FONCODES  approach is based on participation and the 
carrying out of projects through specific structures set up by beneficiaries. 3.  Intensity of  participation 
Overall,  FONCODES works  on  the  basis  of the  inhabitants' demands (Supreme  Decree of 
November 1993, modifying certain statutes and specifying beneficiary participation methods) by 
promoting participation and coordination between the different public and private institutions 
making up society. 
Demand comes from the grassroots, developed by an Execution Group, supported on occasion 
by Promoters (NGOs, municipalities, consultants, enterprises, etc.); the project is monitored by 
an Inspector and a Supervisor. 
The  main  objective  pursued  through  the  beneficiary  participation  is  to  reinforce  local 
management capacity. The population plays a central role  in this process;  it first consults and 
then  takes  decisions among  neighbours about the  identification  of  priority actions.  It  then 
organises an Execution Group which will be responsible for the execution of the project funded 
by FONCODES  ..  For the managers  of the  Fund,  participation  is  an  important factor in  the 
sustainability of actions. 
Basing  projects  on  demand could  limit  recourse  to  the  Fund.  A first  problem  lies  with  the 
choices made by the beneficiaries when they establish priorities for action; they are not always 
aware of the hierarchy of problems and tend to imitate· their neighbours. Clear difficulties have 
also arisen at the level of the organisation and cofunding of actions by beneficiaries. Moreover, 
the procedures for obtaining access to funding seem very complex for certain categories of 
beneficiaries.  All  this  suggests that there  should  be  increased  support,  particularly in  the 
preparation phases (funding pre-investment, appropriate training). 
4.  Instruments 
The set-up is that of a conventional Social Fund. FONCODES is defined as a flexible institution, 
of small  dimensions,  and  non-bureaucratic.  Some  400  persons  are  currently in  permanent 
employment at  national  level  in  its  22  zonal  bureaux and  at the  Lima  headquarters  (1995 
budget: $204 million).  Its running costs are low (±6%} The institution, while decentralized and 
autonomous, is directly under the President's control, and  is  not secure from attempts to  use it 
for political purposes. The fact that the donors have a say in matters through their interventions 
limits this ever present eventuality. 
The Fund was created for a fixed duration (due to run out in late 1997) with a view to short term 
intervention  but  must  face  structural  problems  needing  long  term  solutions,  whence  an 
ambiguity.  It seems likely to prove an  interim measure; policy and intervention structures now 
at design stage will be intended to work towards a longer term perspective. 
A  specialised cell  within  the  Fund  is  responsible  for the  management and  coordination  of 
programmes and projects. It comprises a team of managers employed by the Fund.  Its  main 
functions are scheduling, demand analysis, the management of  project/programme dossiers, 
and coordination. 
There is a permanent internal system of monitoring-control. Quarterly, six-monthly and annual 
external audits make it  possible to  monitor the working of the institution and  in  each cGse  to 
examine a significant sample of the projects. Sectoral evaluations also take place. The World 
Bank is  deeply involved  in  the  promotion of  suitable  management and  monitoring systems (computerisation). Cases of complaint or legal process as a result of bad  management on the 
part of  Inspectors or Execution Groups have been rare (±1% of all projects funded); this is an 
indicator of the degree of efficiency attained by the Fund. 
The approval  of  funding  demands is  the  direct responsibility of the Fund  which  is  currently 
engaged  in  a process of  regional  decentralization of approvals  in  order to be able to satisfy 
demand more quickly and directly, as the volume of demand now exceeds the capacity of the 
central headquarters (±13,000 requests between  1 and  1  0/94). FONCODES directly ensures 
useful contacts between its various donors, who sometimes cooperate over interventions (e.g. 
the WB and the IDB). Programa  Nacional  de  Solidaridad 
(PRONASOL), Mexico 
1.  Origin and background of the project/programme idea 
This is a vast poverty reduction programme at national level set up by the Mexican government. 
The priority objectives of PRONASOL are: (a) the improvement of the living conditions of target 
groups (indigenous  gro~.:~ps,  peasants,  and  marginalized  urban  areas);  (b)  the  promotion  of 
balanced regional development and the creation of the conditions for productive improvement of 
the living conditions of the population; (c) the promotion and  reinforcement of the participation 
and management of social organisations and local authorities. 
In overall conception, it is a completely top-down programme, but it  is bottom-up in  respect of 
the project ideas which arise from the grassroots and are prioritised at grassroots. The projects 
(proposed  within  the  limits  of  project  qualification  defined  in  each  sub-programme)  are 
appraised  by  the  Municipality,  the  State  and  the  central  services  of  the  Ministry  with 
responsibility at federal level. 
The administration, the manager of the project, is required to observe at its different hierarchical 
levels, the basic PRONASOL principles: (1) Respect for the initiatives and forms of organisation 
of the population;  (2)  Impetus for the participation and  total and effective organisation of the 
population;  (3)  Responsibility  shared  between  governmental  institutions  and  social 
organisations;  (4)  Transparency,  honesty,  efficiency,  and  flexibility in  the use of  resources. 
Practices do not always meet this norm. 
PRONASOL  is  funded  by  Mexican  national  resources  (tax,  privatisation,  etc.),  with  the 
exception of the sub-programme 'Municipal Funds' which enjoys World Bank funding and  is 
therefore subject to monitoring and control on the basis of criteria negotiated between the World 
Bank and the government. 
2.  Support measures 
Support measures are internal to the programme and include: 
•  learning how to organise and manage project committees; 
•  training and technical support in the field (publishing simple manuals, availability of recently 
qualified or retired staff); 
•  exchange of experience between Solidarity committees at State level, exchange session at 
federal level organised by the National Solidarity Institute; 
•  circulation of the Solidarity Gazette and other journals at the state level or relating to specific 
sub-programmes;  . 
•  award of a National Solidarity Prize and organisation of the Annual Solidarity Week,  when 
sub-programmes exchange information at national level; 
•  reinforcing the capacities of municipalities (both financially and through training) which have 
a central role in the implementation of several sub-programmes. 3.  Intensity of  participation 
The Mexican government conceived this ambitious social  programme  relying  on  the full  and 
effective participation of the end-beneficiaries at all stages of the project cycle; this was the only 
way in which to some extent to guarantee the viability and sustainability of the actions realised. 
The continuity between government planning and popular participation was favoured by the use 
ot a method known as participatory planning, whose principle was that of taking into account the 
initiatives  and  participation of social  groups,  autonomy,  responsibility and  the consultation 
possibilities between municipalities and  local communities in  the resolution of their problems. 
PRONASOL thus  in  many cases made it possible for direct consultation with communities to 
take place through collective and community bodies, throughout the process: identification of 
problems,  definition of  solutions, establishing of  priorities, execution of projects,  evaluation, 
supervision and management of projects realised. 
In  many cases, PRONASOL has demonstrated to the Mexican establishment and society that 
this 'other way of doing things' was indeed feasible. Apart from the extraordinary range of its 
implementation, it is this inauguration of a new relationship between society and State which is 
the fundamental gain made by PRONASOL. Where this result has been achieved, it breaks with 
the exercise of power traditional to Mexjco and could well prove irreversible. 
4.  Instruments 
PRONASOL  is  subdivided  into  many  specific  sub-programmes,  which  are  subject  to  the 
definition  of  precise  guidelines,  the formulation  of norms and  to control  (in  relation  to  the 
appraisal of projects and ex-post) by the specialised services of the Ministry with responsibility 
(SEDESOL, the Ministry for Social Development). 
These  services  are  decentralized to  the  level  of  the  states  (SEDESOL  Delegations).  The 
kingpins of  programme implementation are the municipal administrations and,  of course, the 
Solidarity Committees, which make democratic choices as to the priority actions to be carried 
out.  Within  the states,  the  distribution of support is  conducted through Coplades:  pluralistic 
development consultation and  planning  bodies.  The projects approved at  state level  by the 
Coplades are then subjected to technical analysis (the need for the projects is not questioned) 
at federal level by the specialist services of the Ministry with responsibility. Once the projects 
are approved,  the  management of  funding  and  the  execution  are  entirely delegated to the 
Committees. The population contributes to the costs by work, material and/or money. 
As  this description shows, the entire chain  is  part of the State's administrative panoply at its 
different levels. The autonomy of management structures is thus that which  is  granted by the 
Mexican Constitution to these different levels of power (Federations, States, Municipalities). The 
only  independent management structure  is  the  Committee,  to  which  is  granted the widest 
possible autonomy in  the definition of priorities,  decision-making,  management of funds and 
execution. 
Of course,  the  programme  has  not  wholly escaped  clientelistic deformations  and  political 
impositions,  and  the  autonomy  of  the  Committees  is  not  always  respected  in  practice. 
Moreover,  the  programme  does  not  significantly  address  the  causes  of  poverty,  but  is  a 
palliative for the effects of the neoliberal policy adopted at macro level. 